Re: [PATCH 3/8] kvm: vmx: pass MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL and MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD down to the guest

[David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>]

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 1274 bytes --]

On Wed, 2018-01-10 at 16:56 +0100, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
> On 10/01/2018 16:48, Woodhouse, David wrote:
> >>
> >> And what is the point of this "always set IBRS=1" then? Are there
> >> some other things lurking in the shadows?
> > Yes. *FUTURE* CPUs will have a mode where you can just set IBRS and
> > leave it set for ever and not worry about any of this, and the
> > performance won't even suck.
> > 
> > Quite why it's still an option you have to set in an MSR, and not just
> > a feature bit that they advertise and do it unconditionally, I have no
> > idea. But apparently that's the plan.
> 
> And again---why you still need IBPBs.  That also escapes me.  I wouldn't
> be surprised if that's just a trick to sneak it in a generation earlier...

There was some suggestion in early development that guests/processes
with a different CR3 or different VMCS would be considered "mutually
less privileged". It got dropped, and I'm sure we'll have clarification
before IBRS_ATT actually gets released.

I think the current docs do suggest that you need IBPB on context
switch (and vmptrld) still. But I expect that *might* go away if we're
lucky. And really, we have other things to work on for now before we
support hypothetical future hardware :)

[-- Attachment #2: smime.p7s --]
[-- Type: application/x-pkcs7-signature, Size: 5213 bytes --]