From: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
To: <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: <jmattson@google.com>, <x86@kernel.org>, <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>,
<bp@alien8.de>, <aliguori@amazon.com>, <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
<rkrcmar@redhat.com>, <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
<kvm@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/8] kvm: vmx: pass MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL and MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD down to the guest
Date: Tue, 9 Jan 2018 08:48:18 -0800 (PST) [thread overview]
Message-ID: <222d0a6b-820f-4d7c-a616-ac89f77c3c09@default> (raw)
----- liran.alon@oracle.com wrote:
> ----- pbonzini@redhat.com wrote:
>
> > Direct access to MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL and MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD is
> > important
> > for performance. Allow load/store of MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, restore
> > guest
> > IBRS on VM entry and set it to 0 on VM exit (because Linux does not
> > use
> > it yet).
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
> > ---
> > arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> > 1 file changed, 42 insertions(+)
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
> > index 669f5f74857d..ef603692aa98 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
> > @@ -120,6 +120,8 @@
> > module_param_named(preemption_timer, enable_preemption_timer,
> bool,
> > S_IRUGO);
> > #endif
> >
> > +static bool __read_mostly have_spec_ctrl;
> > +
> > #define KVM_GUEST_CR0_MASK (X86_CR0_NW | X86_CR0_CD)
> > #define KVM_VM_CR0_ALWAYS_ON_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST (X86_CR0_WP |
> > X86_CR0_NE)
> > #define KVM_VM_CR0_ALWAYS_ON \
> > @@ -609,6 +611,8 @@ struct vcpu_vmx {
> > u64 msr_host_kernel_gs_base;
> > u64 msr_guest_kernel_gs_base;
> > #endif
> > + u64 spec_ctrl;
> > +
> > u32 vm_entry_controls_shadow;
> > u32 vm_exit_controls_shadow;
> > u32 secondary_exec_control;
> > @@ -3361,6 +3365,9 @@ static int vmx_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> > struct msr_data *msr_info)
> > case MSR_IA32_TSC:
> > msr_info->data = guest_read_tsc(vcpu);
> > break;
> > + case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL:
> > + msr_info->data = to_vmx(vcpu)->spec_ctrl;
> > + break;
> > case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS:
> > msr_info->data = vmcs_read32(GUEST_SYSENTER_CS);
> > break;
> > @@ -3500,6 +3507,9 @@ static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> > struct msr_data *msr_info)
> > case MSR_IA32_TSC:
> > kvm_write_tsc(vcpu, msr_info);
> > break;
> > + case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL:
> > + to_vmx(vcpu)->spec_ctrl = data;
> > + break;
> > case MSR_IA32_CR_PAT:
> > if (vmcs_config.vmentry_ctrl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PAT) {
> > if (!kvm_mtrr_valid(vcpu, MSR_IA32_CR_PAT, data))
> > @@ -7062,6 +7072,17 @@ static __init int hardware_setup(void)
> > goto out;
> > }
> >
> > + /*
> > + * FIXME: this is only needed until SPEC_CTRL is supported
> > + * by upstream Linux in cpufeatures, then it can be replaced
> > + * with static_cpu_has.
> > + */
> > + have_spec_ctrl = cpu_has_spec_ctrl();
> > + if (have_spec_ctrl)
> > + pr_info("kvm: SPEC_CTRL available\n");
> > + else
> > + pr_info("kvm: SPEC_CTRL not available\n");
> > +
> > if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_NX))
> > kvm_enable_efer_bits(EFER_NX);
> >
> > @@ -7131,6 +7152,8 @@ static __init int hardware_setup(void)
> > vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS, false);
> > vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP, false);
> > vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, false);
> > + vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, false);
> > + vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, false);
> >
> > memcpy(vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy_x2apic_apicv,
> > vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy, PAGE_SIZE);
> > @@ -9601,6 +9624,13 @@ static void __noclone vmx_vcpu_run(struct
> > kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> >
> > vmx_arm_hv_timer(vcpu);
> >
> > + /*
> > + * MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL is restored after the last indirect branch
> > + * before vmentry.
> > + */
> > + if (have_spec_ctrl && vmx->spec_ctrl != 0)
> > + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, vmx->spec_ctrl);
> > +
> > vmx->__launched = vmx->loaded_vmcs->launched;
> > asm(
> > /* Store host registers */
> > @@ -9707,6 +9737,18 @@ static void __noclone vmx_vcpu_run(struct
> > kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> > #endif
> > );
> >
> > + if (have_spec_ctrl) {
> > + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, vmx->spec_ctrl);
> > + if (vmx->spec_ctrl != 0)
As I said also on the AMD patch, I think this is a bug.
Intel specify that we should set IBRS bit even if it was already set on every #VMExit.
-Liran
> > + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 0);
> > + }
> > + /*
> > + * Speculative execution past the above wrmsrl might encounter
> > + * an indirect branch and use guest-controlled contents of the
> > + * indirect branch predictor; block it.
> > + */
> > + asm("lfence");
> > +
> > /* MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR is zeroed on vmexit. Restore it if needed
> > */
> > if (vmx->host_debugctlmsr)
> > update_debugctlmsr(vmx->host_debugctlmsr);
> > --
> > 1.8.3.1
>
> Reviewed-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
next reply other threads:[~2018-01-09 16:48 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-01-09 16:48 Liran Alon [this message]
2018-01-09 16:57 ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-10 5:03 ` Nadav Amit
2018-01-10 13:20 ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-10 14:06 ` Arjan van de Ven
2018-01-10 14:28 ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-10 15:41 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-01-10 15:45 ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-10 15:48 ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-10 15:56 ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-10 16:05 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-12 23:17 ` Jim Mattson
2018-01-12 23:19 ` Nadav Amit
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2018-01-10 16:51 Liran Alon
2018-01-10 17:07 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-10 16:19 Liran Alon
2018-01-10 16:27 ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-10 17:14 ` Jim Mattson
2018-01-10 17:16 ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-10 17:23 ` Nadav Amit
2018-01-10 17:32 ` Jim Mattson
2018-01-10 16:47 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-10 0:33 Liran Alon
2018-01-09 16:06 Liran Alon
2018-01-09 12:03 [PATCH v2 0/8] KVM: x86: expose CVE-2017-5715 ("Spectre variant 2") mitigations to guest Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-09 12:03 ` [PATCH 3/8] kvm: vmx: pass MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL and MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD down to the guest Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-13 10:16 ` Longpeng (Mike)
2018-01-15 9:23 ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-15 9:34 ` Thomas Gleixner
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