From: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
To: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Cc: jmattson@google.com, konrad.wilk@oracle.com, x86@kernel.org,
nadav.amit@gmail.com, bp@alien8.de, arjan@linux.intel.com,
aliguori@amazon.com, thomas.lendacky@amd.com, rkrcmar@redhat.com,
pbonzini@redhat.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
kvm@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/8] kvm: vmx: pass MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL and MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD down to the guest
Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2018 17:07:27 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1515604047.22302.218.camel@infradead.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <06779fe6-7ab6-4906-a66c-2466d03877e0@default>
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On Wed, 2018-01-10 at 08:51 -0800, Liran Alon wrote:
>
> Hmm... This is exactly how Google Project-Zero PoC leaks kvm-
> intel.ko, kvm.ko & vmlinux...
> See section "Locating the host kernel" here:
> https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.co.il/2018/01/reading-privileged-m
> emory-with-side.html
>
> This was an important primitive in order for them to actually launch
> the attack of reading host's memory pages. As they needed the
> hypervisor addresses such that they will be able to later poison the
> BTB/BHB to gadgets residing in known host addresses.
Ah, joy. I'm not sure that leak is being plugged. Even setting IBRS=1
when entering the guest isn't guaranteed to plug it, as it's only
defined to prevent predictions from affecting a *more* privileged
prediction mode than they were 'learned' in.
Maybe IBPB would suffice? I'm not sure.
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-01-10 17:07 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-01-10 16:51 Liran Alon
2018-01-10 17:07 ` David Woodhouse [this message]
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2018-01-10 16:19 Liran Alon
2018-01-10 16:27 ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-10 17:14 ` Jim Mattson
2018-01-10 17:16 ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-10 17:23 ` Nadav Amit
2018-01-10 17:32 ` Jim Mattson
2018-01-10 16:47 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-10 0:33 Liran Alon
2018-01-09 16:48 Liran Alon
2018-01-09 16:57 ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-10 5:03 ` Nadav Amit
2018-01-10 13:20 ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-10 14:06 ` Arjan van de Ven
2018-01-10 14:28 ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-10 15:41 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-01-10 15:45 ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-10 15:48 ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-10 15:56 ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-10 16:05 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-12 23:17 ` Jim Mattson
2018-01-12 23:19 ` Nadav Amit
2018-01-09 16:06 Liran Alon
2018-01-09 12:03 [PATCH v2 0/8] KVM: x86: expose CVE-2017-5715 ("Spectre variant 2") mitigations to guest Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-09 12:03 ` [PATCH 3/8] kvm: vmx: pass MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL and MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD down to the guest Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-13 10:16 ` Longpeng (Mike)
2018-01-15 9:23 ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-15 9:34 ` Thomas Gleixner
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