mirror of https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
To: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: arjan@linux.intel.com, tglx@linutronix.de, karahmed@amazon.de,
	x86@kernel.org,  linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com, bp@alien8.de,  pbonzini@redhat.com,
	ak@linux.intel.com, torvalds@linux-foundation.org,
	 gregkh@linux-foundation.org, dave.hansen@intel.com,
	gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk,  ashok.raj@intel.com,
	mingo@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 5/7] x86/pti: Do not enable PTI on processors which are not vulnerable to Meltdown
Date: Thu, 25 Jan 2018 09:56:49 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1516874209.30244.38.camel@infradead.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180125094258.GZ2228@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net>

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 1153 bytes --]

On Thu, 2018-01-25 at 10:42 +0100, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> On Thu, Jan 25, 2018 at 09:23:07AM +0000, David Woodhouse wrote:
> > +static bool __init early_cpu_vulnerable_meltdown(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
> > +{
> > +     u64 ia32_cap = 0;
> > +
> > +     if (x86_match_cpu(cpu_no_meltdown))
> > +                return false;
> > +
> > +     if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES))
> > +             rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, ia32_cap);
> 
> I think it was suggested a while back to write this like:
> 
>         if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES) &&
>             !rdmsrl_safe(MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, ia32_cap))
> 
> to deal with funny virt scenarios where they accidentally advertise the
> CPUID bit but don't in fact provide the MSR.

It was indeed suggested, but I was a bit confused by that. Because the
CPUID bit exists *purely* to advertise the existence of that MSR;
nothing more.

If it doesn't exist we'll end up with zero in ia32_cap anyway, which
will mean we *won't* see the RDCL_NO bit, and won't disable the
Meltdown flag.

[-- Attachment #2: smime.p7s --]
[-- Type: application/x-pkcs7-signature, Size: 5213 bytes --]

  reply	other threads:[~2018-01-25  9:56 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-01-25  9:23 [PATCH v4 0/7] Basic Speculation Control feature support David Woodhouse
2018-01-25  9:23 ` [PATCH v4 1/7] x86/cpufeatures: Add CPUID_7_EDX CPUID leaf David Woodhouse
2018-01-25  9:23 ` [PATCH v4 2/7] x86/cpufeatures: Add Intel feature bits for Speculation Control David Woodhouse
2018-01-25  9:23 ` [PATCH v4 3/7] x86/cpufeatures: Add AMD " David Woodhouse
2018-01-25  9:23 ` [PATCH v4 4/7] x86/msr: Add definitions for new speculation control MSRs David Woodhouse
2018-01-25  9:23 ` [PATCH v4 5/7] x86/pti: Do not enable PTI on processors which are not vulnerable to Meltdown David Woodhouse
2018-01-25  9:42   ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-25  9:56     ` David Woodhouse [this message]
2018-01-25 10:01       ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-25 15:12   ` Alan Cox
2018-01-25  9:23 ` [PATCH v4 6/7] x86/cpufeature: Blacklist SPEC_CTRL on early Spectre v2 microcodes David Woodhouse
2018-01-25 10:43   ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-25 10:54     ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-25 11:20       ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-25 11:34         ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-25 13:41           ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-25 14:58             ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-25 16:16             ` Alan Cox
2018-01-25 16:24               ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-25 16:35                 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-26  9:40             ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-25  9:23 ` [PATCH v4 7/7] x86/speculation: Add basic IBPB (Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier) support David Woodhouse
2018-01-25 11:41   ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-25 11:47     ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-25 11:50       ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-25 11:58         ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-25 12:03           ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-25 12:11             ` David Woodhouse

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=1516874209.30244.38.camel@infradead.org \
    --to=dwmw2@infradead.org \
    --cc=ak@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=arjan@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=ashok.raj@intel.com \
    --cc=bp@alien8.de \
    --cc=dave.hansen@intel.com \
    --cc=gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk \
    --cc=gregkh@linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=karahmed@amazon.de \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=mingo@kernel.org \
    --cc=pbonzini@redhat.com \
    --cc=peterz@infradead.org \
    --cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
    --cc=tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=torvalds@linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=x86@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox

all inboxes | Powered by JetHome®