From: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
To: arjan@linux.intel.com, tglx@linutronix.de, karahmed@amazon.de,
x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com, bp@alien8.de, peterz@infradead.org,
pbonzini@redhat.com, ak@linux.intel.com,
torvalds@linux-foundation.org, gregkh@linux-foundation.org,
dave.hansen@intel.com, gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk,
ashok.raj@intel.com, mingo@kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v4 7/7] x86/speculation: Add basic IBPB (Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier) support
Date: Thu, 25 Jan 2018 09:23:09 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1516872189-16577-8-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1516872189-16577-1-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Expose indirect_branch_prediction_barrier() for use in subsequent patches.
[karahmed: remove the special-casing of skylake for using IBPB (wtf?),
switch to using ALTERNATIVES instead of static_cpu_has]
[dwmw2: set up ax/cx/dx in the asm too so it gets NOP'd out]
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@amazon.de>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 +
arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 13 +++++++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 7 +++++++
3 files changed, 21 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index ae3212f..6b988278 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -207,6 +207,7 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD ( 7*32+13) /* AMD Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */
#define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PPIN ( 7*32+14) /* Intel Processor Inventory Number */
+#define X86_FEATURE_IBPB ( 7*32+16) /* Using Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */
#define X86_FEATURE_MBA ( 7*32+18) /* Memory Bandwidth Allocation */
#define X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW ( 7*32+19) /* Fill RSB on context switches */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
index 4ad4108..34e384c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -218,5 +218,18 @@ static inline void vmexit_fill_RSB(void)
#endif
}
+static inline void indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(void)
+{
+ asm volatile(ALTERNATIVE("",
+ "movl %[msr], %%ecx\n\t"
+ "movl %[val], %%eax\n\t"
+ "movl $0, %%edx\n\t"
+ "wrmsr",
+ X86_FEATURE_IBPB)
+ : : [msr] "i" (MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD),
+ [val] "i" (PRED_CMD_IBPB)
+ : "eax", "ecx", "edx", "memory");
+}
+
#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
#endif /* __NOSPEC_BRANCH_H__ */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 390b3dc..96548ff 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -249,6 +249,13 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW);
pr_info("Filling RSB on context switch\n");
}
+
+ /* Initialize Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier if supported */
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL) ||
+ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_PRED_CMD)) {
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB);
+ pr_info("Enabling Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier\n");
+ }
}
#undef pr_fmt
--
2.7.4
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-01-25 9:23 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-01-25 9:23 [PATCH v4 0/7] Basic Speculation Control feature support David Woodhouse
2018-01-25 9:23 ` [PATCH v4 1/7] x86/cpufeatures: Add CPUID_7_EDX CPUID leaf David Woodhouse
2018-01-25 9:23 ` [PATCH v4 2/7] x86/cpufeatures: Add Intel feature bits for Speculation Control David Woodhouse
2018-01-25 9:23 ` [PATCH v4 3/7] x86/cpufeatures: Add AMD " David Woodhouse
2018-01-25 9:23 ` [PATCH v4 4/7] x86/msr: Add definitions for new speculation control MSRs David Woodhouse
2018-01-25 9:23 ` [PATCH v4 5/7] x86/pti: Do not enable PTI on processors which are not vulnerable to Meltdown David Woodhouse
2018-01-25 9:42 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-25 9:56 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-25 10:01 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-25 15:12 ` Alan Cox
2018-01-25 9:23 ` [PATCH v4 6/7] x86/cpufeature: Blacklist SPEC_CTRL on early Spectre v2 microcodes David Woodhouse
2018-01-25 10:43 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-25 10:54 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-25 11:20 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-25 11:34 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-25 13:41 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-25 14:58 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-25 16:16 ` Alan Cox
2018-01-25 16:24 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-25 16:35 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-26 9:40 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-25 9:23 ` David Woodhouse [this message]
2018-01-25 11:41 ` [PATCH v4 7/7] x86/speculation: Add basic IBPB (Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier) support Borislav Petkov
2018-01-25 11:47 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-25 11:50 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-25 11:58 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-25 12:03 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-25 12:11 ` David Woodhouse
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