From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
To: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
arjan@linux.intel.com, karahmed@amazon.de, x86@kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com,
bp@alien8.de, pbonzini@redhat.com, ak@linux.intel.com,
torvalds@linux-foundation.org, gregkh@linux-foundation.org,
dave.hansen@intel.com, gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk,
ashok.raj@intel.com, mingo@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 5/7] x86/pti: Do not enable PTI on processors which are not vulnerable to Meltdown
Date: Thu, 25 Jan 2018 11:01:00 +0100 (CET) [thread overview]
Message-ID: <alpine.DEB.2.20.1801251059410.2020@nanos> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1516874209.30244.38.camel@infradead.org>
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 1402 bytes --]
On Thu, 25 Jan 2018, David Woodhouse wrote:
> On Thu, 2018-01-25 at 10:42 +0100, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> > On Thu, Jan 25, 2018 at 09:23:07AM +0000, David Woodhouse wrote:
> > > +static bool __init early_cpu_vulnerable_meltdown(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
> > > +{
> > > + u64 ia32_cap = 0;
> > > +
> > > + if (x86_match_cpu(cpu_no_meltdown))
> > > + return false;
> > > +
> > > + if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES))
> > > + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, ia32_cap);
> >
> > I think it was suggested a while back to write this like:
> >
> > if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES) &&
> > !rdmsrl_safe(MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, ia32_cap))
> >
> > to deal with funny virt scenarios where they accidentally advertise the
> > CPUID bit but don't in fact provide the MSR.
>
> It was indeed suggested, but I was a bit confused by that. Because the
> CPUID bit exists *purely* to advertise the existence of that MSR;
> nothing more.
>
> If it doesn't exist we'll end up with zero in ia32_cap anyway, which
> will mean we *won't* see the RDCL_NO bit, and won't disable the
> Meltdown flag.
And using rdmsrl() has the benefit of running into the
ex_handler_rdmsr_unsafe() exception handler, which emits a warning. The
value returned in ia32_cap is 0.
Thanks,
tglx
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-01-25 10:01 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-01-25 9:23 [PATCH v4 0/7] Basic Speculation Control feature support David Woodhouse
2018-01-25 9:23 ` [PATCH v4 1/7] x86/cpufeatures: Add CPUID_7_EDX CPUID leaf David Woodhouse
2018-01-25 9:23 ` [PATCH v4 2/7] x86/cpufeatures: Add Intel feature bits for Speculation Control David Woodhouse
2018-01-25 9:23 ` [PATCH v4 3/7] x86/cpufeatures: Add AMD " David Woodhouse
2018-01-25 9:23 ` [PATCH v4 4/7] x86/msr: Add definitions for new speculation control MSRs David Woodhouse
2018-01-25 9:23 ` [PATCH v4 5/7] x86/pti: Do not enable PTI on processors which are not vulnerable to Meltdown David Woodhouse
2018-01-25 9:42 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-25 9:56 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-25 10:01 ` Thomas Gleixner [this message]
2018-01-25 15:12 ` Alan Cox
2018-01-25 9:23 ` [PATCH v4 6/7] x86/cpufeature: Blacklist SPEC_CTRL on early Spectre v2 microcodes David Woodhouse
2018-01-25 10:43 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-25 10:54 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-25 11:20 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-25 11:34 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-25 13:41 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-25 14:58 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-25 16:16 ` Alan Cox
2018-01-25 16:24 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-25 16:35 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-26 9:40 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-25 9:23 ` [PATCH v4 7/7] x86/speculation: Add basic IBPB (Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier) support David Woodhouse
2018-01-25 11:41 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-25 11:47 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-25 11:50 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-25 11:58 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-25 12:03 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-25 12:11 ` David Woodhouse
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