From: serue@us.ibm.com
To: lkml <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@osdl.org>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>,
James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>, Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>,
Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>,
David Safford <safford@watson.ibm.com>,
Reiner Sailer <sailer@us.ibm.com>,
Gerrit Huizenga <gh@us.ibm.com>,
Emily Ratliff <emilyr@us.ibm.com>
Subject: [patch 2/15] lsm stacking v0.3: add module * to security_ops
Date: Wed, 27 Jul 2005 13:20:39 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20050727182039.GC22483@serge.austin.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20050727181921.GB22483@serge.austin.ibm.com>
Add the owning module to the security_operations struct. This will allow
stacker to module_get the LSM to prevent its premature unloading.
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
--
include/linux/security.h | 7 +++++++
security/capability.c | 1 +
security/root_plug.c | 2 ++
security/seclvl.c | 1 +
security/selinux/hooks.c | 2 ++
5 files changed, 13 insertions(+)
Index: linux-2.6.13-rc3/include/linux/security.h
===================================================================
--- linux-2.6.13-rc3.orig/include/linux/security.h 2005-07-18 15:49:52.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-2.6.13-rc3/include/linux/security.h 2005-07-18 15:51:36.000000000 -0500
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
#include <linux/sched.h>
struct ctl_table;
+struct module;
/*
* These functions are in security/capability.c and are used
@@ -94,6 +95,10 @@ struct swap_info_struct;
*
* Security hooks for program execution operations.
*
+ *
+ * @owner:
+ * Module owning this security_operations. NULL if not a module.
+ *
* @bprm_alloc_security:
* Allocate and attach a security structure to the @bprm->security field.
* The security field is initialized to NULL when the bprm structure is
@@ -1027,6 +1032,8 @@ struct swap_info_struct;
* This is the main security structure.
*/
struct security_operations {
+ struct module *owner;
+
int (*ptrace) (struct task_struct * parent, struct task_struct * child);
int (*capget) (struct task_struct * target,
kernel_cap_t * effective,
Index: linux-2.6.13-rc3/security/capability.c
===================================================================
--- linux-2.6.13-rc3.orig/security/capability.c 2005-07-18 15:49:52.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-2.6.13-rc3/security/capability.c 2005-07-18 15:51:36.000000000 -0500
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
#include <linux/moduleparam.h>
static struct security_operations capability_ops = {
+ .owner = THIS_MODULE,
.ptrace = cap_ptrace,
.capget = cap_capget,
.capset_check = cap_capset_check,
Index: linux-2.6.13-rc3/security/root_plug.c
===================================================================
--- linux-2.6.13-rc3.orig/security/root_plug.c 2005-07-18 15:49:52.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-2.6.13-rc3/security/root_plug.c 2005-07-18 15:51:36.000000000 -0500
@@ -83,6 +83,8 @@ static int rootplug_bprm_check_security
}
static struct security_operations rootplug_security_ops = {
+ .owner = THIS_MODULE,
+
/* Use the capability functions for some of the hooks */
.ptrace = cap_ptrace,
.capget = cap_capget,
Index: linux-2.6.13-rc3/security/seclvl.c
===================================================================
--- linux-2.6.13-rc3.orig/security/seclvl.c 2005-07-18 15:49:52.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-2.6.13-rc3/security/seclvl.c 2005-07-18 15:51:36.000000000 -0500
@@ -591,6 +591,7 @@ static int seclvl_umount(struct vfsmount
}
static struct security_operations seclvl_ops = {
+ .owner = THIS_MODULE,
.ptrace = seclvl_ptrace,
.capable = seclvl_capable,
.inode_permission = seclvl_inode_permission,
Index: linux-2.6.13-rc3/security/selinux/hooks.c
===================================================================
--- linux-2.6.13-rc3.orig/security/selinux/hooks.c 2005-07-18 15:49:52.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-2.6.13-rc3/security/selinux/hooks.c 2005-07-18 15:51:36.000000000 -0500
@@ -4265,6 +4265,8 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(struct ta
}
static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
+ .owner = THIS_MODULE,
+
.ptrace = selinux_ptrace,
.capget = selinux_capget,
.capset_check = selinux_capset_check,
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2005-07-27 18:20 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 39+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2005-07-27 18:17 [patch 0/15] lsm stacking v0.3: intro serue
2005-07-27 18:19 ` [patch 1/15] lsm stacking v0.3: introduce securityfs serue
2005-07-27 18:20 ` serue [this message]
2005-07-27 18:21 ` [patch 3/15] lsm stacking v0.3: don't default to dummy_##hook serue
2005-07-27 18:23 ` [patch 4/15] lsm stacking v0.3: swith ->security to hlist serue
2005-07-27 18:24 ` [patch 5/15] lsm stacking v0.3: introduce security_*_value API serue
2005-07-27 18:24 ` [patch 6/15] lsm stacking v0.3: stacker documentation serue
2005-07-27 18:24 ` [patch 7/15] lsm stacking v0.3: actual stacker module serue
2005-07-27 18:25 ` [patch 8/15] lsm stacking v0.3: stackable capabilities lsm serue
2005-07-27 18:26 ` [patch 9/15] lsm stacking v0.3: selinux: update ->security structs serue
2005-07-27 18:26 ` [patch 10/15] lsm stacking v0.3: selinux: use security_*_value API serue
2005-07-27 18:27 ` [patch 11/15] lsm stacking v0.3: selinux: remove secondary support serue
2005-07-27 18:27 ` [patch 12/15] lsm stacking v0.3: hook completeness verification script serue
2005-07-27 18:28 ` [patch 13/15] lsm stacking v0.3: seclvl: update for stacking serue
2005-07-27 18:28 ` [patch 14/15] lsm stacking v0.3: fix security_{del,unlink}_value race serue
2005-07-27 18:28 ` [patch 15/15] lsm stacking v0.3: stacking for digsig serue
2005-07-27 19:34 ` [patch 0/15] lsm stacking v0.3: intro James Morris
2005-07-27 19:37 ` James Morris
2005-08-03 16:45 ` [PATCH] Stacker - single-use static slots serue
2005-08-03 17:57 ` Chris Wright
2005-08-03 19:27 ` serue
2005-08-03 19:45 ` Chris Wright
2005-08-03 20:31 ` serge
2005-08-05 15:55 ` James Morris
2005-08-05 17:27 ` serue
2005-08-05 17:34 ` serue
2005-08-10 14:45 ` serue
2005-08-11 7:42 ` James Morris
2005-08-11 21:22 ` serue
2005-08-11 23:02 ` James Morris
2005-07-27 19:54 ` [patch 0/15] lsm stacking v0.3: intro serue
2005-07-30 5:07 ` Tony Jones
2005-07-30 19:02 ` serge
2005-07-30 20:18 ` Tony Jones
2005-07-31 3:22 ` Steve Beattie
2005-07-31 3:44 ` serge
2005-07-31 4:13 ` Tony Jones
2005-07-31 13:37 ` serge
2005-07-31 3:53 ` serge
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