From: serue@us.ibm.com
To: lkml <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@osdl.org>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>,
James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>, Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>,
Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>,
David Safford <safford@watson.ibm.com>,
Reiner Sailer <sailer@us.ibm.com>,
Gerrit Huizenga <gh@us.ibm.com>,
Emily Ratliff <emilyr@us.ibm.com>
Subject: [patch 14/15] lsm stacking v0.3: fix security_{del,unlink}_value race
Date: Wed, 27 Jul 2005 13:28:32 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20050727182832.GO22483@serge.austin.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20050727181921.GB22483@serge.austin.ibm.com>
The security_unlink_value() hook can race with security_del_value(). This
is because security_del_value() is optimized to assume that it is naturally
serialized by only being called from security_<object>_free().
At the moment we want modules to only call security_unlink_value() while
they are being unloaded, so we try to avoid a spinlock at any other time.
If this is unreasonable, we can simply protect security_del_value() with
the spinlock at all times. Or, we can try to find another solution.
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
---
security.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++--
stacker.c | 2 ++
2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
Index: linux-2.6.13-rc3/security/security.c
===================================================================
--- linux-2.6.13-rc3.orig/security/security.c 2005-07-25 14:50:34.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-2.6.13-rc3/security/security.c 2005-07-25 15:30:35.000000000 -0500
@@ -125,22 +125,36 @@ void security_disown_value(struct hlist_
spin_unlock(&stacker_value_spinlock);
}
+int lsm_unloading;
+
/* No locking needed: only called during object_destroy */
fastcall struct security_list *
security_del_value(struct hlist_head *head, int security_id)
{
struct security_list *e;
struct hlist_node *tmp;
+ char d = 0;
+
+ if (lsm_unloading) {
+ d = 1;
+ spin_lock(&stacker_value_spinlock);
+ }
for (tmp = head->first; tmp; tmp = tmp->next) {
e = hlist_entry(tmp, struct security_list, list);
if (e->security_id == security_id) {
hlist_del(&e->list);
- return e;
+ goto out;
}
}
- return NULL;
+ e = NULL;
+
+out:
+ if (d)
+ spin_unlock(&stacker_value_spinlock);
+
+ return e;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_get_value);
Index: linux-2.6.13-rc3/security/stacker.c
===================================================================
--- linux-2.6.13-rc3.orig/security/stacker.c 2005-07-25 14:55:27.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-2.6.13-rc3/security/stacker.c 2005-07-25 15:31:17.000000000 -0500
@@ -1267,6 +1267,7 @@ find_lsm_with_namelen(const char *name,
return ret;
}
+extern int lsm_unloading; /* from security/security.c */
/*
* XXX TODO I need an all_modules list again to use here
*/
@@ -1286,6 +1287,7 @@ static int stacker_unregister (const cha
}
list_del_rcu(&m->all_lsms);
call_rcu(&m->m_rcu, stacker_del_module);
+ lsm_unloading = 1;
out:
spin_unlock(&stacker_lock);
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2005-07-27 19:12 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 39+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2005-07-27 18:17 [patch 0/15] lsm stacking v0.3: intro serue
2005-07-27 18:19 ` [patch 1/15] lsm stacking v0.3: introduce securityfs serue
2005-07-27 18:20 ` [patch 2/15] lsm stacking v0.3: add module * to security_ops serue
2005-07-27 18:21 ` [patch 3/15] lsm stacking v0.3: don't default to dummy_##hook serue
2005-07-27 18:23 ` [patch 4/15] lsm stacking v0.3: swith ->security to hlist serue
2005-07-27 18:24 ` [patch 5/15] lsm stacking v0.3: introduce security_*_value API serue
2005-07-27 18:24 ` [patch 6/15] lsm stacking v0.3: stacker documentation serue
2005-07-27 18:24 ` [patch 7/15] lsm stacking v0.3: actual stacker module serue
2005-07-27 18:25 ` [patch 8/15] lsm stacking v0.3: stackable capabilities lsm serue
2005-07-27 18:26 ` [patch 9/15] lsm stacking v0.3: selinux: update ->security structs serue
2005-07-27 18:26 ` [patch 10/15] lsm stacking v0.3: selinux: use security_*_value API serue
2005-07-27 18:27 ` [patch 11/15] lsm stacking v0.3: selinux: remove secondary support serue
2005-07-27 18:27 ` [patch 12/15] lsm stacking v0.3: hook completeness verification script serue
2005-07-27 18:28 ` [patch 13/15] lsm stacking v0.3: seclvl: update for stacking serue
2005-07-27 18:28 ` serue [this message]
2005-07-27 18:28 ` [patch 15/15] lsm stacking v0.3: stacking for digsig serue
2005-07-27 19:34 ` [patch 0/15] lsm stacking v0.3: intro James Morris
2005-07-27 19:37 ` James Morris
2005-08-03 16:45 ` [PATCH] Stacker - single-use static slots serue
2005-08-03 17:57 ` Chris Wright
2005-08-03 19:27 ` serue
2005-08-03 19:45 ` Chris Wright
2005-08-03 20:31 ` serge
2005-08-05 15:55 ` James Morris
2005-08-05 17:27 ` serue
2005-08-05 17:34 ` serue
2005-08-10 14:45 ` serue
2005-08-11 7:42 ` James Morris
2005-08-11 21:22 ` serue
2005-08-11 23:02 ` James Morris
2005-07-27 19:54 ` [patch 0/15] lsm stacking v0.3: intro serue
2005-07-30 5:07 ` Tony Jones
2005-07-30 19:02 ` serge
2005-07-30 20:18 ` Tony Jones
2005-07-31 3:22 ` Steve Beattie
2005-07-31 3:44 ` serge
2005-07-31 4:13 ` Tony Jones
2005-07-31 13:37 ` serge
2005-07-31 3:53 ` serge
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20050727182832.GO22483@serge.austin.ibm.com \
--to=serue@us.ibm.com \
--cc=akpm@osdl.org \
--cc=chrisw@osdl.org \
--cc=emilyr@us.ibm.com \
--cc=gh@us.ibm.com \
--cc=jmorris@redhat.com \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=mhalcrow@us.ibm.com \
--cc=safford@watson.ibm.com \
--cc=sailer@us.ibm.com \
--cc=sds@epoch.ncsc.mil \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox
all inboxes | Powered by JetHome®