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From: serue@us.ibm.com
To: lkml <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@osdl.org>,
	Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>,
	James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>, Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>,
	Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>,
	David Safford <safford@watson.ibm.com>,
	Reiner Sailer <sailer@us.ibm.com>,
	Gerrit Huizenga <gh@us.ibm.com>,
	Emily Ratliff <emilyr@us.ibm.com>
Subject: [patch 14/15] lsm stacking v0.3: fix security_{del,unlink}_value race
Date: Wed, 27 Jul 2005 13:28:32 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20050727182832.GO22483@serge.austin.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20050727181921.GB22483@serge.austin.ibm.com>

The security_unlink_value() hook can race with security_del_value().  This
is because security_del_value() is optimized to assume that it is naturally
serialized by only being called from security_<object>_free().

At the moment we want modules to only call security_unlink_value() while
they are being unloaded, so we try to avoid a spinlock at any other time.
If this is unreasonable, we can simply protect security_del_value() with
the spinlock at all times.  Or, we can try to find another solution.

Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
---
 security.c |   18 ++++++++++++++++--
 stacker.c  |    2 ++
 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

Index: linux-2.6.13-rc3/security/security.c
===================================================================
--- linux-2.6.13-rc3.orig/security/security.c	2005-07-25 14:50:34.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-2.6.13-rc3/security/security.c	2005-07-25 15:30:35.000000000 -0500
@@ -125,22 +125,36 @@ void security_disown_value(struct hlist_
 	spin_unlock(&stacker_value_spinlock);
 }
 
+int lsm_unloading;
+
 /* No locking needed: only called during object_destroy */
 fastcall struct security_list *
 security_del_value(struct hlist_head *head, int security_id)
 {
 	struct security_list *e;
 	struct hlist_node *tmp;
+	char d = 0;
+
+	if (lsm_unloading) {
+		d = 1;
+		spin_lock(&stacker_value_spinlock);
+	}
 
 	for (tmp = head->first; tmp; tmp = tmp->next) {
 		e = hlist_entry(tmp, struct security_list, list);
 		if (e->security_id == security_id) {
 			hlist_del(&e->list);
-			return e;
+			goto out;
 		}
 	}
 
-	return NULL;
+	e = NULL;
+
+out:
+	if (d)
+		spin_unlock(&stacker_value_spinlock);
+
+	return e;
 }
 
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_get_value);
Index: linux-2.6.13-rc3/security/stacker.c
===================================================================
--- linux-2.6.13-rc3.orig/security/stacker.c	2005-07-25 14:55:27.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-2.6.13-rc3/security/stacker.c	2005-07-25 15:31:17.000000000 -0500
@@ -1267,6 +1267,7 @@ find_lsm_with_namelen(const char *name, 
 	return ret;
 }
 
+extern int lsm_unloading;  /* from security/security.c */
 /*
  * XXX TODO I need an all_modules list again to use here
  */
@@ -1286,6 +1287,7 @@ static int stacker_unregister (const cha
 	}
 	list_del_rcu(&m->all_lsms);
 	call_rcu(&m->m_rcu, stacker_del_module);
+	lsm_unloading = 1;
 
 out:
 	spin_unlock(&stacker_lock);

  parent reply	other threads:[~2005-07-27 19:12 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 39+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2005-07-27 18:17 [patch 0/15] lsm stacking v0.3: intro serue
2005-07-27 18:19 ` [patch 1/15] lsm stacking v0.3: introduce securityfs serue
2005-07-27 18:20   ` [patch 2/15] lsm stacking v0.3: add module * to security_ops serue
2005-07-27 18:21   ` [patch 3/15] lsm stacking v0.3: don't default to dummy_##hook serue
2005-07-27 18:23   ` [patch 4/15] lsm stacking v0.3: swith ->security to hlist serue
2005-07-27 18:24   ` [patch 5/15] lsm stacking v0.3: introduce security_*_value API serue
2005-07-27 18:24   ` [patch 6/15] lsm stacking v0.3: stacker documentation serue
2005-07-27 18:24   ` [patch 7/15] lsm stacking v0.3: actual stacker module serue
2005-07-27 18:25   ` [patch 8/15] lsm stacking v0.3: stackable capabilities lsm serue
2005-07-27 18:26   ` [patch 9/15] lsm stacking v0.3: selinux: update ->security structs serue
2005-07-27 18:26   ` [patch 10/15] lsm stacking v0.3: selinux: use security_*_value API serue
2005-07-27 18:27   ` [patch 11/15] lsm stacking v0.3: selinux: remove secondary support serue
2005-07-27 18:27   ` [patch 12/15] lsm stacking v0.3: hook completeness verification script serue
2005-07-27 18:28   ` [patch 13/15] lsm stacking v0.3: seclvl: update for stacking serue
2005-07-27 18:28   ` serue [this message]
2005-07-27 18:28   ` [patch 15/15] lsm stacking v0.3: stacking for digsig serue
2005-07-27 19:34 ` [patch 0/15] lsm stacking v0.3: intro James Morris
2005-07-27 19:37   ` James Morris
2005-08-03 16:45     ` [PATCH] Stacker - single-use static slots serue
2005-08-03 17:57       ` Chris Wright
2005-08-03 19:27         ` serue
2005-08-03 19:45           ` Chris Wright
2005-08-03 20:31             ` serge
2005-08-05 15:55       ` James Morris
2005-08-05 17:27         ` serue
2005-08-05 17:34           ` serue
2005-08-10 14:45         ` serue
2005-08-11  7:42           ` James Morris
2005-08-11 21:22             ` serue
2005-08-11 23:02               ` James Morris
2005-07-27 19:54   ` [patch 0/15] lsm stacking v0.3: intro serue
2005-07-30  5:07 ` Tony Jones
2005-07-30 19:02   ` serge
2005-07-30 20:18     ` Tony Jones
2005-07-31  3:22       ` Steve Beattie
2005-07-31  3:44         ` serge
2005-07-31  4:13           ` Tony Jones
2005-07-31 13:37             ` serge
2005-07-31  3:53       ` serge

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