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From: serue@us.ibm.com
To: lkml <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@osdl.org>,
	Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>,
	James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>, Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>,
	Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>,
	David Safford <safford@watson.ibm.com>,
	Reiner Sailer <sailer@us.ibm.com>,
	Gerrit Huizenga <gh@us.ibm.com>,
	Emily Ratliff <emilyr@us.ibm.com>
Subject: [patch 15/15] lsm stacking v0.3: stacking for digsig
Date: Wed, 27 Jul 2005 13:28:48 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20050727182848.GP22483@serge.austin.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20050727181921.GB22483@serge.austin.ibm.com>

Support stacking in digsig.  This patch is on top of the cvs version from
www.sf.net/projects/disec.

	[Jul 16] Update to support dynamic unloading by freeing
		object->security data at unload.

Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
--
 digsig.c |  142 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
 1 files changed, 128 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)

--- digsig/digsig.c	2005-07-06 08:41:38.000000000 -0500
+++ digsig-patched/digsig.c	2005-07-25 16:08:36.000000000 -0500
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
 #include <linux/fs.h>
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 #include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/security-stack.h>
 #include <linux/dcache.h>
 #include <linux/kobject.h>
 #include <linux/mman.h>
@@ -47,6 +48,8 @@
 #include "gnupg/mpi/mpi.h"
 #include "gnupg/cipher/rsa-verify.h"
 
+#define DIGSIG_LSM_ID 0x5AA8
+
 #ifdef DIGSIG_DEBUG
 #define DIGSIG_MODE 0		/*permissive  mode */
 #define DIGSIG_BENCH 1
@@ -55,11 +58,11 @@
 #define DIGSIG_BENCH 0
 #endif
 
-#define get_inode_security(ino) ((unsigned long)(ino->i_security))
-#define set_inode_security(ino,val) (ino->i_security = (void *)val)
-
-#define get_file_security(file) ((unsigned long)(file->f_security))
-#define set_file_security(file,val) (file->f_security = (void *)val)
+struct digsig_ksec {
+	struct security_list lsm_list;
+	struct list_head chain;
+	unsigned count;
+};
 
 unsigned long int total_jiffies = 0;
 
@@ -82,6 +85,73 @@ int dsi_cache_buckets = 128;
 module_param(dsi_cache_buckets, int, 0);
 MODULE_PARM_DESC(dsi_cache_buckets, "Number of cache buckets for signatures validations.\n");
 
+LIST_HEAD(digsig_del_chain);
+DEFINE_SPINLOCK(digsig_chain_lock);
+
+static int get_file_security(struct file *file)
+{
+	struct digsig_ksec *ksec;
+
+	ksec = security_get_value_type(&file->f_security, DIGSIG_LSM_ID,
+				struct digsig_ksec);
+	if (!ksec)
+		return 0;
+	return ksec->count;
+}
+
+static int set_file_security(struct file *file, int v)
+{
+	struct digsig_ksec *ksec;
+
+	ksec = security_get_value_type(&file->f_security, DIGSIG_LSM_ID,
+				struct digsig_ksec);
+	if (!ksec) {
+		ksec = kmalloc(sizeof(struct digsig_ksec), GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!ksec)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ksec->chain);
+		spin_lock(&digsig_chain_lock);
+		list_add_rcu(&ksec->chain, &digsig_del_chain);
+		spin_unlock(&digsig_chain_lock);
+		security_add_value_type(&file->f_security, DIGSIG_LSM_ID,
+				 ksec);
+	}
+	ksec->count = v;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+
+static int get_inode_security(struct inode *inode)
+{
+	struct digsig_ksec *ksec;
+
+	ksec = security_get_value_type(&inode->i_security, DIGSIG_LSM_ID,
+				struct digsig_ksec);
+	if (!ksec)
+		return 0;
+	return ksec->count;
+}
+
+static int set_inode_security(struct inode *inode, int v)
+{
+	struct digsig_ksec *ksec;
+
+	ksec = security_get_value_type(&inode->i_security, DIGSIG_LSM_ID,
+				struct digsig_ksec);
+	if (!ksec) {
+		ksec = kmalloc(sizeof(struct digsig_ksec), GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!ksec)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ksec->chain);
+		spin_lock(&digsig_chain_lock);
+		list_add(&ksec->chain, &digsig_del_chain);
+		spin_unlock(&digsig_chain_lock);
+		security_add_value_type(&inode->i_security, DIGSIG_LSM_ID,
+				 ksec);
+	}
+	ksec->count = v;
+	return 0;
+}
 
 /******************************************************************************
 Description : 
@@ -342,18 +412,22 @@ static int digsig_deny_write_access(stru
 {
 	struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
 	unsigned long isec;
+	int err;
 
 	spin_lock(&inode->i_lock);
 	isec = get_inode_security(inode);
 	if (atomic_read(&inode->i_writecount) > 0) {
-		spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
-		return -ETXTBSY;
+		err = -ETXTBSY;
+		goto out;
 	}
 	set_inode_security(inode, (isec+1));
-	set_file_security(file, 1);
-	spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
+	err = set_file_security(file, 1);
+	if (err)
+		set_inode_security(inode, (isec));
 
-	return 0;
+out:
+	spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
+	return err;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -379,9 +453,17 @@ static void digsig_allow_write_access(st
  */
 static void digsig_file_free_security(struct file *file)
 {
-	if (file->f_security) {
-		digsig_allow_write_access(file);
-	}
+	struct digsig_ksec *ksec;
+
+	ksec = security_get_value_type(&file->f_security, DIGSIG_LSM_ID,
+				struct digsig_ksec);
+	if (!ksec)
+		return;
+
+	spin_lock(&digsig_chain_lock);
+	list_del(&ksec->chain);
+	spin_unlock(&digsig_chain_lock);
+	kfree(ksec);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -530,7 +612,7 @@ static inline int is_unprotected_file(st
 			__FUNCTION__, file->f_dentry->d_name.name, exec_time); \
 	}
 	
-static int digsig_file_mmap(struct file * file, unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
+static int digsig_file_mmap(struct file * file, unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
 {
 	struct elf64_hdr *elf64_ex;
 	struct elf32_hdr *elf32_ex;
@@ -668,8 +750,20 @@ static int digsig_file_mmap(struct file 
 
 static void digsig_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
 {
+	struct digsig_ksec *ksec;
+
 	if (is_cached_signature(inode))
 		remove_signature(inode);
+
+	ksec = security_del_value_type(&inode->i_security, DIGSIG_LSM_ID,
+				struct digsig_ksec);
+	if (!ksec)
+		return;
+
+	spin_lock(&digsig_chain_lock);
+	list_del(&ksec->chain);
+	spin_unlock(&digsig_chain_lock);
+	kfree(ksec);
 }
 
 static struct security_operations digsig_security_ops = {
@@ -715,6 +809,25 @@ out:
 	return ret;
 }
 
+static void digsig_free_secchain(void)
+{
+	struct digsig_ksec *ksec, *n;
+
+	list_for_each_entry_safe(ksec, n, &digsig_del_chain, chain) {
+		printk(KERN_NOTICE "free_ichain unlinking %u, %d, %lu\n",
+			ksec->count, ksec->lsm_list.security_id,
+			(unsigned long)ksec->lsm_list.list.pprev);
+		security_unlink_value(&ksec->lsm_list.list);
+	}
+
+	synchronize_rcu();
+	list_for_each_entry_safe(ksec, n, &digsig_del_chain, chain) {
+		printk(KERN_NOTICE "free_ichain freeing 1\n");
+		list_del(&ksec->chain);
+		kfree(ksec);
+	}
+}
+
 static void __exit digsig_exit_module(void)
 {
 	DSM_PRINT (DEBUG_INIT, "Deinitializing module\n");
@@ -734,6 +847,7 @@ static void __exit digsig_exit_module(vo
 	digsig_cleanup_sysfs();
 	digsig_cleanup_revocation();
 	digsig_cache_cleanup();
+	digsig_free_secchain();
 	mpi_free(digsig_public_key[0]);
 	mpi_free(digsig_public_key[1]);
 }

  parent reply	other threads:[~2005-07-27 19:12 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 39+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2005-07-27 18:17 [patch 0/15] lsm stacking v0.3: intro serue
2005-07-27 18:19 ` [patch 1/15] lsm stacking v0.3: introduce securityfs serue
2005-07-27 18:20   ` [patch 2/15] lsm stacking v0.3: add module * to security_ops serue
2005-07-27 18:21   ` [patch 3/15] lsm stacking v0.3: don't default to dummy_##hook serue
2005-07-27 18:23   ` [patch 4/15] lsm stacking v0.3: swith ->security to hlist serue
2005-07-27 18:24   ` [patch 5/15] lsm stacking v0.3: introduce security_*_value API serue
2005-07-27 18:24   ` [patch 6/15] lsm stacking v0.3: stacker documentation serue
2005-07-27 18:24   ` [patch 7/15] lsm stacking v0.3: actual stacker module serue
2005-07-27 18:25   ` [patch 8/15] lsm stacking v0.3: stackable capabilities lsm serue
2005-07-27 18:26   ` [patch 9/15] lsm stacking v0.3: selinux: update ->security structs serue
2005-07-27 18:26   ` [patch 10/15] lsm stacking v0.3: selinux: use security_*_value API serue
2005-07-27 18:27   ` [patch 11/15] lsm stacking v0.3: selinux: remove secondary support serue
2005-07-27 18:27   ` [patch 12/15] lsm stacking v0.3: hook completeness verification script serue
2005-07-27 18:28   ` [patch 13/15] lsm stacking v0.3: seclvl: update for stacking serue
2005-07-27 18:28   ` [patch 14/15] lsm stacking v0.3: fix security_{del,unlink}_value race serue
2005-07-27 18:28   ` serue [this message]
2005-07-27 19:34 ` [patch 0/15] lsm stacking v0.3: intro James Morris
2005-07-27 19:37   ` James Morris
2005-08-03 16:45     ` [PATCH] Stacker - single-use static slots serue
2005-08-03 17:57       ` Chris Wright
2005-08-03 19:27         ` serue
2005-08-03 19:45           ` Chris Wright
2005-08-03 20:31             ` serge
2005-08-05 15:55       ` James Morris
2005-08-05 17:27         ` serue
2005-08-05 17:34           ` serue
2005-08-10 14:45         ` serue
2005-08-11  7:42           ` James Morris
2005-08-11 21:22             ` serue
2005-08-11 23:02               ` James Morris
2005-07-27 19:54   ` [patch 0/15] lsm stacking v0.3: intro serue
2005-07-30  5:07 ` Tony Jones
2005-07-30 19:02   ` serge
2005-07-30 20:18     ` Tony Jones
2005-07-31  3:22       ` Steve Beattie
2005-07-31  3:44         ` serge
2005-07-31  4:13           ` Tony Jones
2005-07-31 13:37             ` serge
2005-07-31  3:53       ` serge

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