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From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
To: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: Marcus Meissner <meissner@suse.de>,
	security@kernel.org, mort@sgi.com,
	Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>,
	fweisbec@gmail.com, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, jason.wessel@windriver.com,
	tj@kernel.org, Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Subject: Re: [Security] [PATCH] kernel: make /proc/kallsyms mode 400 to reduce ease of attacking
Date: Sun, 7 Nov 2010 09:56:41 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20101107085641.GB23843@elte.hu> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20101104223526.GC31236@1wt.eu>


* Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> wrote:

> > Not an 'arms race' thing where we just put obstruction in the road of attackers 
> > - but some real, unavoidable risk not detectable by attackers - running on most 
> > stock distro kernels. (so there would be a real economy of scale)
> > 
> > The kerneloops client could also collect exploit attempt stats.
> 
> Well, in my opinion, either the attacker is remote and you can already get many 
> info, or he's local and has time to precisely qualify the environment in order not 
> to leave the slightest trace. [...]

Your view of how attackers operate is rather simplistic. Knowing the precise 
environment (via remote or local measures) is a big tactical advantage to them.

See the very patch we are discussing. People are submitting patches to hide certain 
pieces of information exactly because that information is an advantage to attackers.

And my point is that "if you want to hide information do it effectively - or if it's 
too hard dont do it at all".

Thanks,

	Ingo

  parent reply	other threads:[~2010-11-07  8:56 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 46+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2010-11-04 10:09 Marcus Meissner
2010-11-04 10:11 ` Tejun Heo
2010-11-05  0:11   ` [Security] " Eugene Teo
2010-11-04 11:46 ` Ingo Molnar
2010-11-04 12:29   ` Marcus Meissner
2010-11-04 13:58     ` Ingo Molnar
2010-11-04 14:11       ` Ingo Molnar
2010-11-04 14:33         ` Marcus Meissner
2010-11-04 14:38           ` Tejun Heo
2010-11-04 14:43             ` H. Peter Anvin
2010-11-04 14:48               ` Tejun Heo
2010-11-04 19:08           ` Ingo Molnar
2010-11-04 21:29             ` [Security] " Willy Tarreau
2010-11-04 21:51               ` Ingo Molnar
2010-11-04 22:35                 ` Willy Tarreau
2010-11-04 23:46                   ` Willy Tarreau
2010-11-07  8:50                   ` Ingo Molnar
2010-11-07  9:08                     ` Ingo Molnar
2010-11-07  9:49                     ` Willy Tarreau
2010-11-07 11:27                       ` Ingo Molnar
2010-11-07 11:41                         ` Willy Tarreau
2010-11-07 11:47                           ` Ingo Molnar
2010-11-07 11:56                             ` Willy Tarreau
2010-11-07 12:12                               ` Ingo Molnar
2010-11-07 12:22                                 ` Willy Tarreau
2010-11-07 12:25                                   ` Ingo Molnar
2010-11-07 12:39                                     ` Willy Tarreau
2010-11-07 12:32                                   ` Ingo Molnar
2010-11-07 12:51                                     ` Willy Tarreau
2010-11-07 15:27                                     ` Alan Cox
2010-11-08  6:29                                       ` Ingo Molnar
2010-11-07 11:42                       ` Ingo Molnar
2010-11-07 11:51                         ` Willy Tarreau
2010-11-07 12:37                           ` Ingo Molnar
2010-11-07 12:55                             ` Willy Tarreau
2010-11-07  8:56                   ` Ingo Molnar [this message]
2010-11-07  9:03                   ` Ingo Molnar
     [not found]               ` <20101104215157.GA25128@ <20101107090805.GA27983@elte.hu>
2010-11-13 13:06                 ` Gilles Espinasse
2010-11-07 18:02           ` Andi Kleen
2010-11-07 18:32             ` H. Peter Anvin
2010-11-10  8:53               ` Ingo Molnar
2010-11-11  2:51                 ` H. Peter Anvin
2010-11-11  7:05                   ` Ingo Molnar
2010-11-05  2:38     ` Frank Rowand
2010-11-10 20:58       ` Jesper Juhl
2010-11-05  0:20 ` Jesper Juhl

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