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From: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@sisk.pl>
To: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Cc: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, security@kernel.org,
	Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
	linux-pm@lists.linux-foundation.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] power: disable hibernation if module loading is disabled
Date: Fri, 4 Mar 2011 21:48:39 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <201103042148.39944.rjw@sisk.pl> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20110304184324.GQ372@outflux.net>

On Friday, March 04, 2011, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Fri, Mar 04, 2011 at 07:11:24PM +0300, Vasiliy Kulikov wrote:
> > If /proc/sys/kernel/modules_disabled is set to 1, then nobody (even full
> > root) may not read/write arbitrary kernel memory.  In spite of it,
> > hibernation allows anyone with an access to either /dev/snapshot or
> > /sys/power/ make the full snapshot of the system.  This snapshot may be
> > freely changed and uploaded back.
> 
> Ah, yes please. I'd like to try to have ways to close all the
> "intentional" arbitrary memory writing interfaces.

They are not exactly arbitrary and I'd like to see a plausible attack
scenario using the hibernation interface as is (assuming you're not a
full root at least).

> Hooking it to modules_disable seems as good as any other toggle.

You're kidding, aren't you?

> Still waiting to hear
> anything on this: http://article.gmane.org/gmane.linux.acpi.devel/49471

I personally don't think it's a good idea, but I'm not the maintainer of that
code.

Thanks,
Rafael

  reply	other threads:[~2011-03-04 20:48 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2011-03-04 16:11 Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-03-04 18:43 ` Kees Cook
2011-03-04 20:48   ` Rafael J. Wysocki [this message]
2011-03-04 20:32 ` Pavel Machek
2011-03-04 21:52   ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-03-04 20:42 ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2011-03-04 21:10   ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-03-04 21:21     ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2011-03-04 21:46       ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-03-04 22:30         ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2011-03-04 22:42           ` Pavel Machek
2011-03-05 10:34           ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-03-05 11:24             ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2011-03-08  6:58               ` Pavel Machek
2011-03-04 21:27 ` [Security] " Greg KH
2011-03-04 21:51   ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-03-06 19:36 ` david

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