From: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
To: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, peterz@infradead.org,
mingo@elte.hu, ak@linux.intel.com, kan.liang@intel.com,
bp@alien8.de, maria.n.dimakopoulou@gmail.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 06/12] perf/x86: implement cross-HT corruption bug workaround
Date: Wed, 22 Oct 2014 14:31:51 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20141022123151.GA15126@krava.brq.redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1412872486-2930-7-git-send-email-eranian@google.com>
On Thu, Oct 09, 2014 at 06:34:40PM +0200, Stephane Eranian wrote:
> From: Maria Dimakopoulou <maria.n.dimakopoulou@gmail.com>
SNIP
> +static struct event_constraint *
> +intel_get_excl_constraints(struct cpu_hw_events *cpuc, struct perf_event *event,
> + int idx, struct event_constraint *c)
> +{
> + struct event_constraint *cx;
> + struct intel_excl_cntrs *excl_cntrs = cpuc->excl_cntrs;
> + struct intel_excl_states *xl, *xlo;
> + int is_excl, i;
SNIP
> + /*
> + * Modify static constraint with current dynamic
> + * state of thread
> + *
> + * EXCLUSIVE: sibling counter measuring exclusive event
> + * SHARED : sibling counter measuring non-exclusive event
> + * UNUSED : sibling counter unused
> + */
> + for_each_set_bit(i, cx->idxmsk, X86_PMC_IDX_MAX) {
> + /*
> + * exclusive event in sibling counter
> + * our corresponding counter cannot be used
> + * regardless of our event
> + */
> + if (xl->state[i] == INTEL_EXCL_EXCLUSIVE)
> + __clear_bit(i, cx->idxmsk);
if we want to check sibling counter, shouldn't we check xlo->state[i] instead? like
if (xlo->state[i] == INTEL_EXCL_EXCLUSIVE)
__clear_bit(i, cx->idxmsk);
and also in condition below?
> + /*
> + * if measuring an exclusive event, sibling
> + * measuring non-exclusive, then counter cannot
> + * be used
> + */
> + if (is_excl && xl->state[i] == INTEL_EXCL_SHARED)
> + __clear_bit(i, cx->idxmsk);
> + }
> +
> + /*
> + * recompute actual bit weight for scheduling algorithm
> + */
> + cx->weight = hweight64(cx->idxmsk64);
> +
> + /*
> + * if we return an empty mask, then switch
> + * back to static empty constraint to avoid
> + * the cost of freeing later on
> + */
> + if (cx->weight == 0)
> + cx = &emptyconstraint;
> +
SNIP
jirka
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2014-10-22 12:32 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 34+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2014-10-09 16:34 [PATCH v2 0/12] perf/x86: implement HT leak workaround for SNB/IVB/HSW Stephane Eranian
2014-10-09 16:34 ` [PATCH v2 01/12] perf,x86: rename er_flags to flags Stephane Eranian
2014-10-09 16:34 ` [PATCH v2 02/12] perf/x86: vectorize cpuc->kfree_on_online Stephane Eranian
2014-10-09 16:34 ` [PATCH v2 03/12] perf/x86: add 3 new scheduling callbacks Stephane Eranian
2014-10-09 16:34 ` [PATCH v2 04/12] perf/x86: add index param to get_event_constraint() callback Stephane Eranian
2014-10-09 16:34 ` [PATCH v2 05/12] perf/x86: add cross-HT counter exclusion infrastructure Stephane Eranian
2014-10-21 11:17 ` Peter Zijlstra
2014-10-21 11:18 ` Peter Zijlstra
2014-10-22 15:07 ` Jiri Olsa
2014-10-22 17:25 ` Stephane Eranian
2014-10-23 7:14 ` Jiri Olsa
2014-10-09 16:34 ` [PATCH v2 06/12] perf/x86: implement cross-HT corruption bug workaround Stephane Eranian
2014-10-22 12:31 ` Jiri Olsa [this message]
2014-10-23 7:19 ` Jiri Olsa
2014-10-23 8:01 ` Stephane Eranian
2014-10-23 8:13 ` Jiri Olsa
2014-10-09 16:34 ` [PATCH v2 07/12] perf/x86: enforce HT bug workaround for SNB/IVB/HSW Stephane Eranian
2014-10-09 16:34 ` [PATCH v2 08/12] perf/x86: enforce HT bug workaround with PEBS " Stephane Eranian
2014-10-09 16:34 ` [PATCH v2 09/12] perf/x86: fix intel_get_event_constraints() for dynamic constraints Stephane Eranian
2014-10-09 16:34 ` [PATCH v2 10/12] watchdog: add watchdog enable/disable all functions Stephane Eranian
2014-10-09 16:34 ` [PATCH v2 11/12] perf/x86: make HT bug workaround conditioned on HT enabled Stephane Eranian
2014-10-22 13:27 ` Jiri Olsa
2014-10-22 14:36 ` Stephane Eranian
2014-10-22 14:58 ` Jiri Olsa
2014-10-22 16:42 ` Stephane Eranian
2014-10-09 16:34 ` [PATCH v2 12/12] perf/x86: add syfs entry to disable HT bug workaround Stephane Eranian
2014-10-21 11:25 ` [PATCH v2 0/12] perf/x86: implement HT leak workaround for SNB/IVB/HSW Peter Zijlstra
2014-10-21 12:28 ` Stephane Eranian
2014-10-21 13:03 ` Peter Zijlstra
2014-10-21 13:08 ` Stephane Eranian
2014-10-22 9:12 ` Peter Zijlstra
2014-10-22 21:04 ` Stephane Eranian
2014-10-23 8:53 ` Peter Zijlstra
2014-10-23 8:57 ` Stephane Eranian
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