[Part2 PATCH v4 16/29] KVM: SVM: Add support for SEV LAUNCH_START command

[Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>]

The command is used for creating a memory encryption context.

Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h |   2 +
 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c              | 194 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 196 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index 6bd49e80a16d..7453ef7cb487 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -750,6 +750,8 @@ enum kvm_irqchip_mode {
 struct kvm_sev_info {
 	bool active;		/* SEV enabled guest */
 	unsigned int asid;	/* ASID used for this guest */
+	unsigned int handle;	/* SEV firmware handle */
+	int fd;			/* SEV device fd */
 };
 
 struct kvm_arch {
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
index 0149bfa75bb2..5e3e7d46270b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
@@ -1540,10 +1540,54 @@ static void sev_asid_free(struct kvm *kvm)
 	}
 }
 
+static void sev_decommission_handle(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &kvm->arch.sev_info;
+	struct sev_data_decommission *data;
+
+	if (!sev->handle)
+		return;
+
+	data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!data)
+		return;
+
+	data->handle = sev->handle;
+	sev_guest_decommission(data, NULL);
+	kfree(data);
+}
+
+static void sev_deactivate_handle(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &kvm->arch.sev_info;
+	struct sev_data_deactivate *data;
+
+	if (!sev->handle)
+		return;
+
+	data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!data)
+		return;
+
+	data->handle = sev->handle;
+	sev_guest_deactivate(data, NULL);
+
+	wbinvd_on_all_cpus();
+	sev_guest_df_flush(NULL);
+
+	kfree(data);
+}
+
 static void sev_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)
 {
+	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &kvm->arch.sev_info;
+
+	sev_deactivate_handle(kvm);
+	sev_decommission_handle(kvm);
 	sev_asid_free(kvm);
 	sev_firmware_exit();
+
+	memset(sev, 0x00, sizeof(*sev));
 }
 
 static void avic_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)
@@ -5625,6 +5669,152 @@ static int sev_guest_init(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
 	return ret;
 }
 
+static int sev_activate_asid(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int handle, int *error)
+{
+	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &kvm->arch.sev_info;
+	struct sev_data_activate *data;
+	int asid = sev_get_asid(kvm);
+	int ret;
+
+	wbinvd_on_all_cpus();
+
+	ret = sev_guest_df_flush(error);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!data)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	data->handle = handle;
+	data->asid   = asid;
+	ret = sev_guest_activate(data, error);
+	if (ret)
+		goto e_err;
+
+	sev->asid = asid;
+e_err:
+	kfree(data);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int sev_issue_cmd(int fd, int id, void *data, int *error)
+{
+	struct fd f;
+	int ret;
+
+	f = fdget(fd);
+	if (!f.file)
+		return -EBADF;
+
+	ret = sev_issue_cmd_external_user(f.file, id, data, error);
+
+	fdput(f);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static void *copy_user_blob(u64 __user uaddr, u32 len)
+{
+	void *data;
+
+	if (!uaddr || !len)
+		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
+	/* verify that blob length does not exceed our limit */
+	if (len > SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE)
+		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
+	data = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (IS_ERR(data))
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+	if (copy_from_user(data, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)uaddr, len))
+		goto e_free;
+
+	return data;
+e_free:
+	kfree(data);
+	return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
+}
+
+static int sev_launch_start(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
+{
+	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &kvm->arch.sev_info;
+	struct sev_data_launch_start *start;
+	struct kvm_sev_launch_start params;
+	void *dh_blob, *session_blob;
+	int *error = &argp->error;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (!sev_guest(kvm))
+		return -ENOTTY;
+
+	if (copy_from_user(&params, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data,
+			   sizeof(struct kvm_sev_launch_start)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	start = kzalloc(sizeof(*start), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!start)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	dh_blob = NULL;
+	if (params.dh_uaddr) {
+		dh_blob = copy_user_blob(params.dh_uaddr, params.dh_len);
+		if (IS_ERR(dh_blob)) {
+			ret = PTR_ERR(dh_blob);
+			goto e_free;
+		}
+
+		start->dh_cert_address = __sme_set(__pa(dh_blob));
+		start->dh_cert_len = params.dh_len;
+	}
+
+	session_blob = NULL;
+	if (params.session_uaddr) {
+		dh_blob = copy_user_blob(params.session_uaddr, params.session_len);
+		if (IS_ERR(session_blob)) {
+			ret = PTR_ERR(session_blob);
+			goto e_free_dh;
+		}
+
+		start->session_address = __sme_set(__pa(session_blob));
+		start->session_len = params.session_len;
+	}
+
+	start->handle = params.handle;
+	start->policy = params.policy;
+
+	/* create memory encryption context */
+	ret = sev_issue_cmd(argp->sev_fd, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_START, start, error);
+	if (ret)
+		goto e_free_session;
+
+	sev->handle = start->handle;
+
+	/* Bind ASID to this guest */
+	ret = sev_activate_asid(kvm, start->handle, error);
+	if (ret)
+		goto e_free_session;
+
+	/* return handle to userspace */
+	params.handle = start->handle;
+	if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, &params,
+			 sizeof(struct kvm_sev_launch_start))) {
+		sev_vm_destroy(kvm);
+		ret = -EFAULT;
+		goto e_free_session;
+	}
+
+	sev->fd = argp->sev_fd;
+e_free_session:
+	kfree(session_blob);
+e_free_dh:
+	kfree(dh_blob);
+e_free:
+	kfree(start);
+	return ret;
+}
+
 static int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
 {
 	struct kvm_sev_cmd sev_cmd;
@@ -5640,6 +5830,10 @@ static int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
 		r = sev_guest_init(kvm, &sev_cmd);
 		break;
 	}
+	case KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_START: {
+		r = sev_launch_start(kvm, &sev_cmd);
+		break;
+	}
 	default:
 		break;
 	}
-- 
2.9.5