From: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
To: <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
<bp@alien8.de>, <x86@kernel.org>, <kvm@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: <mingo@redhat.com>, <tglx@linutronix.de>,
<dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>, <pgonda@google.com>,
<seanjc@google.com>, <pbonzini@redhat.com>, <nikunj@amd.com>
Subject: [PATCH v8 09/16] x86/cpufeatures: Add synthetic Secure TSC bit
Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2024 17:01:21 +0530 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240215113128.275608-10-nikunj@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240215113128.275608-1-nikunj@amd.com>
Add support for the synthetic CPUID flag which indicates that the SNP
guest is running with secure tsc enabled (MSR_AMD64_SEV Bit 11 -
SecureTsc_Enabled) . This flag is there so that this capability in the
guests can be detected easily without reading MSRs every time accessors.
Suggested-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
Tested-by: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index 0fa702673e73..24ac7fe97806 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -236,6 +236,7 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_PVUNLOCK ( 8*32+20) /* "" PV unlock function */
#define X86_FEATURE_VCPUPREEMPT ( 8*32+21) /* "" PV vcpu_is_preempted function */
#define X86_FEATURE_TDX_GUEST ( 8*32+22) /* Intel Trust Domain Extensions Guest */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SNP_SECURE_TSC ( 8*32+23) /* "" AMD SNP Secure TSC */
/* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:0 (EBX), word 9 */
#define X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE ( 9*32+ 0) /* RDFSBASE, WRFSBASE, RDGSBASE, WRGSBASE instructions*/
--
2.34.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-02-15 11:32 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 45+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-02-15 11:31 [PATCH v8 00/16] Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-02-15 11:31 ` [PATCH v8 01/16] virt: sev-guest: Use AES GCM crypto library Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-02-27 18:25 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-02-15 11:31 ` [PATCH v8 02/16] virt: sev-guest: Replace dev_dbg with pr_debug Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-02-27 18:28 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-02-15 11:31 ` [PATCH v8 03/16] virt: sev-guest: Add SNP guest request structure Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-02-27 22:20 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-02-29 9:12 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-02-28 11:50 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-02-29 9:26 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-02-15 11:31 ` [PATCH v8 04/16] virt: sev-guest: Add vmpck_id to snp_guest_dev struct Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-04-09 10:23 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-16 5:57 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-04-16 9:06 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-17 4:18 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-02-15 11:31 ` [PATCH v8 05/16] x86/sev: Cache the secrets page address Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-04-16 14:45 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-17 5:27 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-04-17 7:59 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-02-15 11:31 ` [PATCH v8 06/16] virt: sev-guest: Move SNP Guest command mutex Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-04-22 13:00 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-23 4:22 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-04-23 10:28 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-23 10:42 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-04-23 11:21 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-02-15 11:31 ` [PATCH v8 07/16] x86/sev: Move and reorganize sev guest request api Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-04-22 13:14 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-23 4:26 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-04-23 13:22 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-02-15 11:31 ` [PATCH v8 08/16] x86/mm: Add generic guest initialization hook Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-04-22 13:20 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-23 4:34 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-02-15 11:31 ` Nikunj A Dadhania [this message]
2024-04-22 13:25 ` [PATCH v8 09/16] x86/cpufeatures: Add synthetic Secure TSC bit Borislav Petkov
2024-04-23 4:40 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-04-23 13:29 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-02-15 11:31 ` [PATCH v8 10/16] x86/sev: Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-04-22 13:50 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-23 4:44 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-02-15 11:31 ` [PATCH v8 11/16] x86/sev: Change TSC MSR behavior for Secure TSC enabled guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-02-15 11:31 ` [PATCH v8 12/16] x86/sev: Prevent RDTSC/RDTSCP interception " Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-02-15 11:31 ` [PATCH v8 13/16] x86/kvmclock: Skip kvmclock when Secure TSC is available Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-02-15 11:31 ` [PATCH v8 14/16] x86/sev: Mark Secure TSC as reliable Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-02-15 11:31 ` [PATCH v8 15/16] x86/cpu/amd: Do not print FW_BUG for Secure TSC Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-02-15 11:31 ` [PATCH v8 16/16] x86/sev: Enable Secure TSC for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20240215113128.275608-10-nikunj@amd.com \
--to=nikunj@amd.com \
--cc=bp@alien8.de \
--cc=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com \
--cc=kvm@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=mingo@redhat.com \
--cc=pbonzini@redhat.com \
--cc=pgonda@google.com \
--cc=seanjc@google.com \
--cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
--cc=thomas.lendacky@amd.com \
--cc=x86@kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox
all inboxes | Powered by JetHome®