From: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
To: <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
<bp@alien8.de>, <x86@kernel.org>, <kvm@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: <mingo@redhat.com>, <tglx@linutronix.de>,
<dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>, <pgonda@google.com>,
<seanjc@google.com>, <pbonzini@redhat.com>, <nikunj@amd.com>
Subject: [PATCH v8 06/16] virt: sev-guest: Move SNP Guest command mutex
Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2024 17:01:18 +0530 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240215113128.275608-7-nikunj@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240215113128.275608-1-nikunj@amd.com>
SNP command mutex is used to serialize the shared buffer access, command
handling and message sequence number races. Move the SNP guest command
mutex out of the sev guest driver and provide accessors to sev-guest
driver. Remove multiple lockdep check in sev-guest driver, next patch adds
a single lockdep check in snp_send_guest_request().
Signed-off-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h | 4 ++++
arch/x86/kernel/sev.c | 15 +++++++++++++++
drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c | 23 +++++++----------------
3 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
index e4f52a606487..8578b33d8fc4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
@@ -295,6 +295,8 @@ void snp_accept_memory(phys_addr_t start, phys_addr_t end);
u64 snp_get_unsupported_features(u64 status);
u64 sev_get_status(void);
void kdump_sev_callback(void);
+void snp_guest_cmd_lock(void);
+void snp_guest_cmd_unlock(void);
#else
static inline void sev_es_ist_enter(struct pt_regs *regs) { }
static inline void sev_es_ist_exit(void) { }
@@ -325,6 +327,8 @@ static inline void snp_accept_memory(phys_addr_t start, phys_addr_t end) { }
static inline u64 snp_get_unsupported_features(u64 status) { return 0; }
static inline u64 sev_get_status(void) { return 0; }
static inline void kdump_sev_callback(void) { }
+static inline void snp_guest_cmd_lock(void) { }
+static inline void snp_guest_cmd_unlock(void) { }
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
index eda43c35a9f2..bc4a705d989c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
@@ -940,6 +940,21 @@ static void snp_cleanup_vmsa(struct sev_es_save_area *vmsa)
free_page((unsigned long)vmsa);
}
+/* SNP Guest command mutex to serialize the shared buffer access and command handling. */
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(snp_guest_cmd_mutex);
+
+void snp_guest_cmd_lock(void)
+{
+ mutex_lock(&snp_guest_cmd_mutex);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(snp_guest_cmd_lock);
+
+void snp_guest_cmd_unlock(void)
+{
+ mutex_unlock(&snp_guest_cmd_mutex);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(snp_guest_cmd_unlock);
+
static int wakeup_cpu_via_vmgexit(u32 apic_id, unsigned long start_ip)
{
struct sev_es_save_area *cur_vmsa, *vmsa;
diff --git a/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c b/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c
index 646eb215f3c7..ba9ffaee647c 100644
--- a/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c
+++ b/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c
@@ -62,9 +62,6 @@ static u32 vmpck_id;
module_param(vmpck_id, uint, 0444);
MODULE_PARM_DESC(vmpck_id, "The VMPCK ID to use when communicating with the PSP.");
-/* Mutex to serialize the shared buffer access and command handling. */
-static DEFINE_MUTEX(snp_cmd_mutex);
-
static inline u8 *snp_get_vmpck(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev)
{
return snp_dev->layout->vmpck0 + snp_dev->vmpck_id * VMPCK_KEY_LEN;
@@ -114,8 +111,6 @@ static inline u64 __snp_get_msg_seqno(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev)
u32 *os_area_msg_seqno = snp_get_os_area_msg_seqno(snp_dev);
u64 count;
- lockdep_assert_held(&snp_cmd_mutex);
-
/* Read the current message sequence counter from secrets pages */
count = *os_area_msg_seqno;
@@ -408,8 +403,6 @@ static int get_report(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, struct snp_guest_request_io
struct snp_report_resp *report_resp;
int rc, resp_len;
- lockdep_assert_held(&snp_cmd_mutex);
-
if (!arg->req_data || !arg->resp_data)
return -EINVAL;
@@ -456,8 +449,6 @@ static int get_derived_key(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, struct snp_guest_reque
/* Response data is 64 bytes and max authsize for GCM is 16 bytes. */
u8 buf[64 + 16];
- lockdep_assert_held(&snp_cmd_mutex);
-
if (!arg->req_data || !arg->resp_data)
return -EINVAL;
@@ -508,8 +499,6 @@ static int get_ext_report(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, struct snp_guest_reques
sockptr_t certs_address;
int ret, resp_len;
- lockdep_assert_held(&snp_cmd_mutex);
-
if (sockptr_is_null(io->req_data) || sockptr_is_null(io->resp_data))
return -EINVAL;
@@ -605,12 +594,12 @@ static long snp_guest_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int ioctl, unsigned long
if (!input.msg_version)
return -EINVAL;
- mutex_lock(&snp_cmd_mutex);
+ snp_guest_cmd_lock();
/* Check if the VMPCK is not empty */
if (snp_is_vmpck_empty(snp_dev)) {
dev_err_ratelimited(snp_dev->dev, "VMPCK is disabled\n");
- mutex_unlock(&snp_cmd_mutex);
+ snp_guest_cmd_unlock();
return -ENOTTY;
}
@@ -635,7 +624,7 @@ static long snp_guest_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int ioctl, unsigned long
break;
}
- mutex_unlock(&snp_cmd_mutex);
+ snp_guest_cmd_unlock();
if (input.exitinfo2 && copy_to_user(argp, &input, sizeof(input)))
return -EFAULT;
@@ -725,14 +714,14 @@ static int sev_report_new(struct tsm_report *report, void *data)
if (!buf)
return -ENOMEM;
- guard(mutex)(&snp_cmd_mutex);
-
/* Check if the VMPCK is not empty */
if (snp_is_vmpck_empty(snp_dev)) {
dev_err_ratelimited(snp_dev->dev, "VMPCK is disabled\n");
return -ENOTTY;
}
+ snp_guest_cmd_lock();
+
cert_table = buf + report_size;
struct snp_ext_report_req ext_req = {
.data = { .vmpl = desc->privlevel },
@@ -753,6 +742,8 @@ static int sev_report_new(struct tsm_report *report, void *data)
};
ret = get_ext_report(snp_dev, &input, &io);
+ snp_guest_cmd_unlock();
+
if (ret)
return ret;
--
2.34.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-02-15 11:32 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 45+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-02-15 11:31 [PATCH v8 00/16] Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-02-15 11:31 ` [PATCH v8 01/16] virt: sev-guest: Use AES GCM crypto library Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-02-27 18:25 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-02-15 11:31 ` [PATCH v8 02/16] virt: sev-guest: Replace dev_dbg with pr_debug Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-02-27 18:28 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-02-15 11:31 ` [PATCH v8 03/16] virt: sev-guest: Add SNP guest request structure Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-02-27 22:20 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-02-29 9:12 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-02-28 11:50 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-02-29 9:26 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-02-15 11:31 ` [PATCH v8 04/16] virt: sev-guest: Add vmpck_id to snp_guest_dev struct Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-04-09 10:23 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-16 5:57 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-04-16 9:06 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-17 4:18 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-02-15 11:31 ` [PATCH v8 05/16] x86/sev: Cache the secrets page address Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-04-16 14:45 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-17 5:27 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-04-17 7:59 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-02-15 11:31 ` Nikunj A Dadhania [this message]
2024-04-22 13:00 ` [PATCH v8 06/16] virt: sev-guest: Move SNP Guest command mutex Borislav Petkov
2024-04-23 4:22 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-04-23 10:28 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-23 10:42 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-04-23 11:21 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-02-15 11:31 ` [PATCH v8 07/16] x86/sev: Move and reorganize sev guest request api Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-04-22 13:14 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-23 4:26 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-04-23 13:22 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-02-15 11:31 ` [PATCH v8 08/16] x86/mm: Add generic guest initialization hook Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-04-22 13:20 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-23 4:34 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-02-15 11:31 ` [PATCH v8 09/16] x86/cpufeatures: Add synthetic Secure TSC bit Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-04-22 13:25 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-23 4:40 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-04-23 13:29 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-02-15 11:31 ` [PATCH v8 10/16] x86/sev: Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-04-22 13:50 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-23 4:44 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-02-15 11:31 ` [PATCH v8 11/16] x86/sev: Change TSC MSR behavior for Secure TSC enabled guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-02-15 11:31 ` [PATCH v8 12/16] x86/sev: Prevent RDTSC/RDTSCP interception " Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-02-15 11:31 ` [PATCH v8 13/16] x86/kvmclock: Skip kvmclock when Secure TSC is available Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-02-15 11:31 ` [PATCH v8 14/16] x86/sev: Mark Secure TSC as reliable Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-02-15 11:31 ` [PATCH v8 15/16] x86/cpu/amd: Do not print FW_BUG for Secure TSC Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-02-15 11:31 ` [PATCH v8 16/16] x86/sev: Enable Secure TSC for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
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