From: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
To: <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
<bp@alien8.de>, <x86@kernel.org>, <kvm@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: <mingo@redhat.com>, <tglx@linutronix.de>,
<dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>, <pgonda@google.com>,
<seanjc@google.com>, <pbonzini@redhat.com>, <nikunj@amd.com>
Subject: [PATCH v8 08/16] x86/mm: Add generic guest initialization hook
Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2024 17:01:20 +0530 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240215113128.275608-9-nikunj@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240215113128.275608-1-nikunj@amd.com>
Add generic enc_init guest hook for performing any type of initialization
that is vendor specific. Generic enc_init hook can be used for early guest
feature initialization before secondary processors are up.
Signed-off-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
Tested-by: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h | 2 ++
arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c | 2 ++
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 2 ++
3 files changed, 6 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h
index c878616a18b8..8095553e14a7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h
@@ -148,12 +148,14 @@ struct x86_init_acpi {
* @enc_status_change_finish Notify HV after the encryption status of a range is changed
* @enc_tlb_flush_required Returns true if a TLB flush is needed before changing page encryption status
* @enc_cache_flush_required Returns true if a cache flush is needed before changing page encryption status
+ * @enc_init Prepare and initialize encryption features
*/
struct x86_guest {
bool (*enc_status_change_prepare)(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc);
bool (*enc_status_change_finish)(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc);
bool (*enc_tlb_flush_required)(bool enc);
bool (*enc_cache_flush_required)(void);
+ void (*enc_init)(void);
};
/**
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c b/arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c
index a37ebd3b4773..a07985a96ca5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c
@@ -136,6 +136,7 @@ static bool enc_status_change_finish_noop(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool
static bool enc_tlb_flush_required_noop(bool enc) { return false; }
static bool enc_cache_flush_required_noop(void) { return false; }
static bool is_private_mmio_noop(u64 addr) {return false; }
+static void enc_init_noop(void) { }
struct x86_platform_ops x86_platform __ro_after_init = {
.calibrate_cpu = native_calibrate_cpu_early,
@@ -158,6 +159,7 @@ struct x86_platform_ops x86_platform __ro_after_init = {
.enc_status_change_finish = enc_status_change_finish_noop,
.enc_tlb_flush_required = enc_tlb_flush_required_noop,
.enc_cache_flush_required = enc_cache_flush_required_noop,
+ .enc_init = enc_init_noop,
},
};
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
index d035bce3a2b0..68aa06852466 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
@@ -89,6 +89,8 @@ void __init mem_encrypt_init(void)
/* Call into SWIOTLB to update the SWIOTLB DMA buffers */
swiotlb_update_mem_attributes();
+ x86_platform.guest.enc_init();
+
print_mem_encrypt_feature_info();
}
--
2.34.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-02-15 11:32 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 45+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-02-15 11:31 [PATCH v8 00/16] Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-02-15 11:31 ` [PATCH v8 01/16] virt: sev-guest: Use AES GCM crypto library Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-02-27 18:25 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-02-15 11:31 ` [PATCH v8 02/16] virt: sev-guest: Replace dev_dbg with pr_debug Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-02-27 18:28 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-02-15 11:31 ` [PATCH v8 03/16] virt: sev-guest: Add SNP guest request structure Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-02-27 22:20 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-02-29 9:12 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-02-28 11:50 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-02-29 9:26 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-02-15 11:31 ` [PATCH v8 04/16] virt: sev-guest: Add vmpck_id to snp_guest_dev struct Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-04-09 10:23 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-16 5:57 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-04-16 9:06 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-17 4:18 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-02-15 11:31 ` [PATCH v8 05/16] x86/sev: Cache the secrets page address Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-04-16 14:45 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-17 5:27 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-04-17 7:59 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-02-15 11:31 ` [PATCH v8 06/16] virt: sev-guest: Move SNP Guest command mutex Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-04-22 13:00 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-23 4:22 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-04-23 10:28 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-23 10:42 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-04-23 11:21 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-02-15 11:31 ` [PATCH v8 07/16] x86/sev: Move and reorganize sev guest request api Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-04-22 13:14 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-23 4:26 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-04-23 13:22 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-02-15 11:31 ` Nikunj A Dadhania [this message]
2024-04-22 13:20 ` [PATCH v8 08/16] x86/mm: Add generic guest initialization hook Borislav Petkov
2024-04-23 4:34 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-02-15 11:31 ` [PATCH v8 09/16] x86/cpufeatures: Add synthetic Secure TSC bit Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-04-22 13:25 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-23 4:40 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-04-23 13:29 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-02-15 11:31 ` [PATCH v8 10/16] x86/sev: Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-04-22 13:50 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-23 4:44 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-02-15 11:31 ` [PATCH v8 11/16] x86/sev: Change TSC MSR behavior for Secure TSC enabled guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-02-15 11:31 ` [PATCH v8 12/16] x86/sev: Prevent RDTSC/RDTSCP interception " Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-02-15 11:31 ` [PATCH v8 13/16] x86/kvmclock: Skip kvmclock when Secure TSC is available Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-02-15 11:31 ` [PATCH v8 14/16] x86/sev: Mark Secure TSC as reliable Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-02-15 11:31 ` [PATCH v8 15/16] x86/cpu/amd: Do not print FW_BUG for Secure TSC Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-02-15 11:31 ` [PATCH v8 16/16] x86/sev: Enable Secure TSC for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
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