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From: "Nikunj A. Dadhania" <nikunj@amd.com>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, thomas.lendacky@amd.com,
	x86@kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com,
	tglx@linutronix.de, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com,
	pgonda@google.com, seanjc@google.com, pbonzini@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 03/16] virt: sev-guest: Add SNP guest request structure
Date: Thu, 29 Feb 2024 14:56:24 +0530	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <5cc893ef-5e0b-4188-af76-7a9034e1a780@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240228115045.GGZd8eFe9WZYmZmIeU@fat_crate.local>

On 2/28/2024 5:20 PM, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Thu, Feb 15, 2024 at 05:01:15PM +0530, Nikunj A Dadhania wrote:
>> +enum aead_algo {
> 
> Looks unused.

This is being moved from drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.h and is 
used in drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c::enc_payload()

 	hdr->algo = SNP_AEAD_AES_256_GCM;

> Add new struct definitions, etc, together with their first user - not
> preemptively.
> 
> Please audit all your patches.

Sure.

> 
>> +	SNP_AEAD_INVALID,
>> +	SNP_AEAD_AES_256_GCM,
>> +};
>> +
>> +struct snp_guest_msg_hdr {
>> +	u8 authtag[MAX_AUTHTAG_LEN];
>> +	u64 msg_seqno;
>> +	u8 rsvd1[8];
>> +	u8 algo;
>> +	u8 hdr_version;
>> +	u16 hdr_sz;
>> +	u8 msg_type;
>> +	u8 msg_version;
>> +	u16 msg_sz;
>> +	u32 rsvd2;
>> +	u8 msg_vmpck;
>> +	u8 rsvd3[35];
>> +} __packed;
>> +
>> +struct snp_guest_msg {
>> +	struct snp_guest_msg_hdr hdr;
>> +	u8 payload[4000];
> 
> What Tom said.

Responded on that thread.

> 
>> +} __packed;
>> +
>> +struct snp_guest_req {
>> +	void *req_buf;
>> +	size_t req_sz;
>> +
>> +	void *resp_buf;
>> +	size_t resp_sz;
>> +
>> +	void *data;
>> +	size_t data_npages;
>> +
>> +	u64 exit_code;
>> +	unsigned int vmpck_id;
>> +	u8 msg_version;
>> +	u8 msg_type;
>> +};
>> +
>>  #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
>>  extern void __sev_es_ist_enter(struct pt_regs *regs);
>>  extern void __sev_es_ist_exit(void);
>> @@ -223,7 +288,8 @@ void snp_set_memory_private(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long npages);
>>  void snp_set_wakeup_secondary_cpu(void);
>>  bool snp_init(struct boot_params *bp);
>>  void __init __noreturn snp_abort(void);
>> -int snp_issue_guest_request(u64 exit_code, struct snp_req_data *input, struct snp_guest_request_ioctl *rio);
>> +int snp_issue_guest_request(struct snp_guest_req *req, struct snp_req_data *input,
>> +			    struct snp_guest_request_ioctl *rio);
> 
> Much nicer!

Thank you.

> 
> ...
> 
>> @@ -868,7 +890,6 @@ static int __init sev_guest_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
>>  	/* initial the input address for guest request */
> 
> That comment reads wrong - might fix it while here.

Will update.

>>  	snp_dev->input.req_gpa = __pa(snp_dev->request);
>>  	snp_dev->input.resp_gpa = __pa(snp_dev->response);
>> -	snp_dev->input.data_gpa = __pa(snp_dev->certs_data);
> 
>>  
>>  	ret = tsm_register(&sev_tsm_ops, snp_dev, &tsm_report_extra_type);
>>  	if (ret)
> 
> Rest looks ok. I'd chose shorter local vars if I were you but yours are
> ok too.
> 

Regards
Nikunj


  reply	other threads:[~2024-02-29  9:26 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 45+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-02-15 11:31 [PATCH v8 00/16] Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-02-15 11:31 ` [PATCH v8 01/16] virt: sev-guest: Use AES GCM crypto library Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-02-27 18:25   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-02-15 11:31 ` [PATCH v8 02/16] virt: sev-guest: Replace dev_dbg with pr_debug Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-02-27 18:28   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-02-15 11:31 ` [PATCH v8 03/16] virt: sev-guest: Add SNP guest request structure Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-02-27 22:20   ` Tom Lendacky
2024-02-29  9:12     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-02-28 11:50   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-02-29  9:26     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania [this message]
2024-02-15 11:31 ` [PATCH v8 04/16] virt: sev-guest: Add vmpck_id to snp_guest_dev struct Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-04-09 10:23   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-16  5:57     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-04-16  9:06       ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-17  4:18         ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-02-15 11:31 ` [PATCH v8 05/16] x86/sev: Cache the secrets page address Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-04-16 14:45   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-17  5:27     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-04-17  7:59       ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-02-15 11:31 ` [PATCH v8 06/16] virt: sev-guest: Move SNP Guest command mutex Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-04-22 13:00   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-23  4:22     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-04-23 10:28       ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-23 10:42         ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-04-23 11:21           ` Borislav Petkov
2024-02-15 11:31 ` [PATCH v8 07/16] x86/sev: Move and reorganize sev guest request api Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-04-22 13:14   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-23  4:26     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-04-23 13:22       ` Borislav Petkov
2024-02-15 11:31 ` [PATCH v8 08/16] x86/mm: Add generic guest initialization hook Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-04-22 13:20   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-23  4:34     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-02-15 11:31 ` [PATCH v8 09/16] x86/cpufeatures: Add synthetic Secure TSC bit Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-04-22 13:25   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-23  4:40     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-04-23 13:29       ` Borislav Petkov
2024-02-15 11:31 ` [PATCH v8 10/16] x86/sev: Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-04-22 13:50   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-04-23  4:44     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-02-15 11:31 ` [PATCH v8 11/16] x86/sev: Change TSC MSR behavior for Secure TSC enabled guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-02-15 11:31 ` [PATCH v8 12/16] x86/sev: Prevent RDTSC/RDTSCP interception " Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-02-15 11:31 ` [PATCH v8 13/16] x86/kvmclock: Skip kvmclock when Secure TSC is available Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-02-15 11:31 ` [PATCH v8 14/16] x86/sev: Mark Secure TSC as reliable Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-02-15 11:31 ` [PATCH v8 15/16] x86/cpu/amd: Do not print FW_BUG for Secure TSC Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-02-15 11:31 ` [PATCH v8 16/16] x86/sev: Enable Secure TSC for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania

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