From: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>,
Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>, <x86@kernel.org>,
"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@google.com>,
Derek Manwaring <derekmn@amazon.com>
Subject: [PATCH v4 06/36] x86/bugs: Restructure srbds mitigation
Date: Mon, 10 Mar 2025 11:39:53 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250310164023.779191-7-david.kaplan@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250310164023.779191-1-david.kaplan@amd.com>
Restructure srbds to use select/apply functions to create consistent
vulnerability handling.
Define new AUTO mitigation for SRBDS.
Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 841ab123a180..fd04de518fd0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -72,6 +72,7 @@ static void __init rfds_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init rfds_update_mitigation(void);
static void __init rfds_apply_mitigation(void);
static void __init srbds_select_mitigation(void);
+static void __init srbds_apply_mitigation(void);
static void __init l1d_flush_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init gds_select_mitigation(void);
@@ -222,6 +223,7 @@ void __init cpu_select_mitigations(void)
taa_apply_mitigation();
mmio_apply_mitigation();
rfds_apply_mitigation();
+ srbds_apply_mitigation();
}
/*
@@ -680,6 +682,7 @@ early_param("reg_file_data_sampling", rfds_parse_cmdline);
enum srbds_mitigations {
SRBDS_MITIGATION_OFF,
+ SRBDS_MITIGATION_AUTO,
SRBDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED,
SRBDS_MITIGATION_FULL,
SRBDS_MITIGATION_TSX_OFF,
@@ -687,7 +690,7 @@ enum srbds_mitigations {
};
static enum srbds_mitigations srbds_mitigation __ro_after_init =
- IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRBDS) ? SRBDS_MITIGATION_FULL : SRBDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
+ IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRBDS) ? SRBDS_MITIGATION_AUTO : SRBDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
static const char * const srbds_strings[] = {
[SRBDS_MITIGATION_OFF] = "Vulnerable",
@@ -738,8 +741,13 @@ void update_srbds_msr(void)
static void __init srbds_select_mitigation(void)
{
- if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SRBDS))
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SRBDS) || cpu_mitigations_off()) {
+ srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
return;
+ }
+
+ if (srbds_mitigation == SRBDS_MITIGATION_AUTO)
+ srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
/*
* Check to see if this is one of the MDS_NO systems supporting TSX that
@@ -753,13 +761,17 @@ static void __init srbds_select_mitigation(void)
srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR;
else if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SRBDS_CTRL))
srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED;
- else if (cpu_mitigations_off() || srbds_off)
+ else if (srbds_off)
srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
- update_srbds_msr();
pr_info("%s\n", srbds_strings[srbds_mitigation]);
}
+static void __init srbds_apply_mitigation(void)
+{
+ update_srbds_msr();
+}
+
static int __init srbds_parse_cmdline(char *str)
{
if (!str)
--
2.34.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-03-10 16:40 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 76+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-03-10 16:39 [PATCH v4 00/36] Attack vector controls David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:39 ` [PATCH v4 01/36] x86/bugs: Restructure mds mitigation David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:39 ` [PATCH v4 02/36] x86/bugs: Restructure taa mitigation David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:39 ` [PATCH v4 03/36] x86/bugs: Restructure mmio mitigation David Kaplan
2025-03-13 9:36 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-03-13 14:19 ` Kaplan, David
2025-03-13 19:26 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-03-18 14:16 ` MMIO and VERW Borislav Petkov
2025-03-18 16:25 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-03-18 16:34 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-03-18 16:56 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-03-18 17:37 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-03-18 18:15 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-03-18 18:55 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-03-24 9:29 ` [PATCH v4 03/36] x86/bugs: Restructure mmio mitigation Borislav Petkov
2025-03-24 17:41 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-03-25 11:31 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-03-10 16:39 ` [PATCH v4 04/36] x86/bugs: Restructure rfds mitigation David Kaplan
2025-04-10 16:24 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-04-14 19:10 ` Kaplan, David
2025-03-10 16:39 ` [PATCH v4 05/36] x86/bugs: Remove md_clear_*_mitigation() David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:39 ` David Kaplan [this message]
2025-03-10 16:39 ` [PATCH v4 07/36] x86/bugs: Restructure gds mitigation David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:39 ` [PATCH v4 08/36] x86/bugs: Restructure spectre_v1 mitigation David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:39 ` [PATCH v4 09/36] x86/bugs: Only allow retbleed=stuff on Intel David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:39 ` [PATCH v4 10/36] x86/bugs: Restructure retbleed mitigation David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:39 ` [PATCH v4 11/36] x86/bugs: Restructure spectre_v2_user mitigation David Kaplan
2025-03-12 9:49 ` kernel test robot
2025-04-10 16:26 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-04-14 19:20 ` Kaplan, David
2025-04-10 16:41 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-04-14 19:20 ` Kaplan, David
2025-04-14 23:48 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-04-15 14:56 ` Kaplan, David
2025-03-10 16:39 ` [PATCH v4 12/36] x86/bugs: Restructure bhi mitigation David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 13/36] x86/bugs: Restructure spectre_v2 mitigation David Kaplan
2025-04-10 17:08 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-04-14 19:25 ` Kaplan, David
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 14/36] x86/bugs: Restructure ssb mitigation David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 15/36] x86/bugs: Restructure l1tf mitigation David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 16/36] x86/bugs: Restructure srso mitigation David Kaplan
2025-04-10 17:38 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-04-14 21:12 ` Kaplan, David
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 17/36] Documentation/x86: Document the new attack vector controls David Kaplan
2025-04-10 18:14 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-04-14 21:15 ` Kaplan, David
2025-04-14 23:51 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-04-15 14:59 ` Kaplan, David
2025-04-15 15:32 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-04-15 16:10 ` Kaplan, David
2025-04-15 16:47 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-04-15 17:06 ` Kaplan, David
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 18/36] cpu: Define attack vectors David Kaplan
2025-04-10 18:12 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-04-14 21:20 ` Kaplan, David
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 19/36] x86/Kconfig: Arch attack vector support David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 20/36] x86/bugs: Determine relevant vulnerabilities based on attack vector controls David Kaplan
2025-03-12 11:32 ` kernel test robot
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 21/36] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for mds David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 22/36] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for taa David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 23/36] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for mmio David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 24/36] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for rfds David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 25/36] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for srbds David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 26/36] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for gds David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 27/36] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v1 David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 28/36] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for retbleed David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 29/36] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v2_user David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 30/36] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for bhi David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 31/36] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v2 David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 32/36] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for l1tf David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 33/36] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for srso David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 34/36] x86/pti: Add attack vector controls for pti David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 35/36] x86/bugs: Print enabled attack vectors David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 36/36] cpu: Show attack vectors in sysfs David Kaplan
2025-03-10 18:45 ` [PATCH v4 00/36] Attack vector controls Ingo Molnar
2025-03-10 20:46 ` Kaplan, David
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