From: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
To: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>,
Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
x86@kernel.org, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: llvm@lists.linux.dev, oe-kbuild-all@lists.linux.dev,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@google.com>,
Derek Manwaring <derekmn@amazon.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 11/36] x86/bugs: Restructure spectre_v2_user mitigation
Date: Wed, 12 Mar 2025 17:49:02 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <202503121721.1nslvluh-lkp@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250310164023.779191-12-david.kaplan@amd.com>
Hi David,
kernel test robot noticed the following build warnings:
[auto build test WARNING on tip/master]
[cannot apply to tip/x86/core linus/master tip/auto-latest tip/smp/core v6.14-rc6 next-20250311]
[If your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, kindly drop us a note.
And when submitting patch, we suggest to use '--base' as documented in
https://git-scm.com/docs/git-format-patch#_base_tree_information]
url: https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux/commits/David-Kaplan/x86-bugs-Restructure-mds-mitigation/20250311-005151
base: tip/master
patch link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250310164023.779191-12-david.kaplan%40amd.com
patch subject: [PATCH v4 11/36] x86/bugs: Restructure spectre_v2_user mitigation
config: x86_64-allnoconfig (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20250312/202503121721.1nslvluh-lkp@intel.com/config)
compiler: clang version 19.1.7 (https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project cd708029e0b2869e80abe31ddb175f7c35361f90)
reproduce (this is a W=1 build): (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20250312/202503121721.1nslvluh-lkp@intel.com/reproduce)
If you fix the issue in a separate patch/commit (i.e. not just a new version of
the same patch/commit), kindly add following tags
| Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
| Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202503121721.1nslvluh-lkp@intel.com/
All warnings (new ones prefixed by >>):
>> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c:1490:7: warning: variable 'smt_possible' set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable]
1490 | bool smt_possible = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMP);
| ^
1 warning generated.
vim +/smt_possible +1490 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
1487
1488 static void __init spectre_v2_user_update_mitigation(void)
1489 {
> 1490 bool smt_possible = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMP);
1491
1492 if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB) && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP))
1493 return;
1494
1495 if (cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_FORCE_DISABLED ||
1496 cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_NOT_SUPPORTED)
1497 smt_possible = false;
1498
1499 /* The spectre_v2 cmd line can override spectre_v2_user options */
1500 if (spectre_v2_cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE) {
1501 spectre_v2_user_ibpb = SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE;
1502 spectre_v2_user_stibp = SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE;
1503 } else if (spectre_v2_cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE) {
1504 spectre_v2_user_ibpb = SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT;
1505 spectre_v2_user_stibp = SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT;
1506 }
1507
1508 /*
1509 * If no STIBP, Intel enhanced IBRS is enabled, or SMT impossible, STIBP
1510 * is not required.
1511 *
1512 * Intel's Enhanced IBRS also protects against cross-thread branch target
1513 * injection in user-mode as the IBRS bit remains always set which
1514 * implicitly enables cross-thread protections. However, in legacy IBRS
1515 * mode, the IBRS bit is set only on kernel entry and cleared on return
1516 * to userspace. AMD Automatic IBRS also does not protect userspace.
1517 * These modes therefore disable the implicit cross-thread protection,
1518 * so allow for STIBP to be selected in those cases.
1519 */
1520 if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP) ||
1521 !cpu_smt_possible() ||
1522 (spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled) &&
1523 !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AUTOIBRS))) {
1524 spectre_v2_user_stibp = SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE;
1525 return;
1526 }
1527
1528 if (spectre_v2_user_stibp != SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE &&
1529 (retbleed_mitigation == RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET ||
1530 retbleed_mitigation == RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB)) {
1531 if (spectre_v2_user_stibp != SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT &&
1532 spectre_v2_user_stibp != SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED)
1533 pr_info("Selecting STIBP always-on mode to complement retbleed mitigation\n");
1534 spectre_v2_user_stibp = SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED;
1535 }
1536 pr_info("%s\n", spectre_v2_user_strings[spectre_v2_user_stibp]);
1537 }
1538
--
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service
https://github.com/intel/lkp-tests/wiki
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-03-12 9:49 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 76+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-03-10 16:39 [PATCH v4 00/36] Attack vector controls David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:39 ` [PATCH v4 01/36] x86/bugs: Restructure mds mitigation David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:39 ` [PATCH v4 02/36] x86/bugs: Restructure taa mitigation David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:39 ` [PATCH v4 03/36] x86/bugs: Restructure mmio mitigation David Kaplan
2025-03-13 9:36 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-03-13 14:19 ` Kaplan, David
2025-03-13 19:26 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-03-18 14:16 ` MMIO and VERW Borislav Petkov
2025-03-18 16:25 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-03-18 16:34 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-03-18 16:56 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-03-18 17:37 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-03-18 18:15 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-03-18 18:55 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-03-24 9:29 ` [PATCH v4 03/36] x86/bugs: Restructure mmio mitigation Borislav Petkov
2025-03-24 17:41 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-03-25 11:31 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-03-10 16:39 ` [PATCH v4 04/36] x86/bugs: Restructure rfds mitigation David Kaplan
2025-04-10 16:24 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-04-14 19:10 ` Kaplan, David
2025-03-10 16:39 ` [PATCH v4 05/36] x86/bugs: Remove md_clear_*_mitigation() David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:39 ` [PATCH v4 06/36] x86/bugs: Restructure srbds mitigation David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:39 ` [PATCH v4 07/36] x86/bugs: Restructure gds mitigation David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:39 ` [PATCH v4 08/36] x86/bugs: Restructure spectre_v1 mitigation David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:39 ` [PATCH v4 09/36] x86/bugs: Only allow retbleed=stuff on Intel David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:39 ` [PATCH v4 10/36] x86/bugs: Restructure retbleed mitigation David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:39 ` [PATCH v4 11/36] x86/bugs: Restructure spectre_v2_user mitigation David Kaplan
2025-03-12 9:49 ` kernel test robot [this message]
2025-04-10 16:26 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-04-14 19:20 ` Kaplan, David
2025-04-10 16:41 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-04-14 19:20 ` Kaplan, David
2025-04-14 23:48 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-04-15 14:56 ` Kaplan, David
2025-03-10 16:39 ` [PATCH v4 12/36] x86/bugs: Restructure bhi mitigation David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 13/36] x86/bugs: Restructure spectre_v2 mitigation David Kaplan
2025-04-10 17:08 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-04-14 19:25 ` Kaplan, David
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 14/36] x86/bugs: Restructure ssb mitigation David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 15/36] x86/bugs: Restructure l1tf mitigation David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 16/36] x86/bugs: Restructure srso mitigation David Kaplan
2025-04-10 17:38 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-04-14 21:12 ` Kaplan, David
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 17/36] Documentation/x86: Document the new attack vector controls David Kaplan
2025-04-10 18:14 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-04-14 21:15 ` Kaplan, David
2025-04-14 23:51 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-04-15 14:59 ` Kaplan, David
2025-04-15 15:32 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-04-15 16:10 ` Kaplan, David
2025-04-15 16:47 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-04-15 17:06 ` Kaplan, David
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 18/36] cpu: Define attack vectors David Kaplan
2025-04-10 18:12 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-04-14 21:20 ` Kaplan, David
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 19/36] x86/Kconfig: Arch attack vector support David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 20/36] x86/bugs: Determine relevant vulnerabilities based on attack vector controls David Kaplan
2025-03-12 11:32 ` kernel test robot
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 21/36] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for mds David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 22/36] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for taa David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 23/36] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for mmio David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 24/36] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for rfds David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 25/36] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for srbds David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 26/36] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for gds David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 27/36] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v1 David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 28/36] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for retbleed David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 29/36] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v2_user David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 30/36] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for bhi David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 31/36] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v2 David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 32/36] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for l1tf David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 33/36] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for srso David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 34/36] x86/pti: Add attack vector controls for pti David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 35/36] x86/bugs: Print enabled attack vectors David Kaplan
2025-03-10 16:40 ` [PATCH v4 36/36] cpu: Show attack vectors in sysfs David Kaplan
2025-03-10 18:45 ` [PATCH v4 00/36] Attack vector controls Ingo Molnar
2025-03-10 20:46 ` Kaplan, David
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