From: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
To: x86@kernel.org, David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>,
Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>,
Tao Zhang <tao1.zhang@intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH v4 10/11] x86/vmscape: Override conflicting attack-vector controls with =force
Date: Wed, 19 Nov 2025 22:20:06 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20251119-vmscape-bhb-v4-10-1adad4e69ddc@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20251119-vmscape-bhb-v4-0-1adad4e69ddc@linux.intel.com>
vmscape=force option currently defaults to AUTO mitigation. This is not
correct because attack-vector controls override a mitigation when in AUTO
mode. This prevents a user from being able to force VMSCAPE mitigation when
it conflicts with attack-vector controls.
Kernel should deploy a forced mitigation irrespective of attack vectors.
Instead of AUTO, use VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_ON that wins over attack-vector
controls.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 6 +++++-
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index d12c07ccf59479ecf590935607394492c988b2ff..81b0db27f4094c90ebf4704c74f5e7e6b809560f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -3197,6 +3197,7 @@ static void __init srso_apply_mitigation(void)
enum vmscape_mitigations {
VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_NONE,
VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_AUTO,
+ VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_ON,
VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_IBPB_EXIT_TO_USER,
VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT,
VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_BHB_CLEAR_EXIT_TO_USER,
@@ -3205,6 +3206,7 @@ enum vmscape_mitigations {
static const char * const vmscape_strings[] = {
[VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_NONE] = "Vulnerable",
/* [VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_AUTO] */
+ /* [VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_ON] */
[VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_IBPB_EXIT_TO_USER] = "Mitigation: IBPB before exit to userspace",
[VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT] = "Mitigation: IBPB on VMEXIT",
[VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_BHB_CLEAR_EXIT_TO_USER] = "Mitigation: Clear BHB before exit to userspace",
@@ -3224,7 +3226,7 @@ static int __init vmscape_parse_cmdline(char *str)
vmscape_mitigation = VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_IBPB_EXIT_TO_USER;
} else if (!strcmp(str, "force")) {
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_VMSCAPE);
- vmscape_mitigation = VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_AUTO;
+ vmscape_mitigation = VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_ON;
} else {
pr_err("Ignoring unknown vmscape=%s option.\n", str);
}
@@ -3259,6 +3261,7 @@ static void __init vmscape_select_mitigation(void)
vmscape_mitigation = VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_NONE;
break;
case VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_AUTO:
+ case VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_ON:
/*
* CPUs with BHI_CTRL(ADL and newer) can avoid the IBPB and use BHB
* clear sequence. These CPUs are only vulnerable to the BHI variant
@@ -3381,6 +3384,7 @@ void cpu_bugs_smt_update(void)
switch (vmscape_mitigation) {
case VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_NONE:
case VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_AUTO:
+ case VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_ON:
break;
case VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT:
case VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_IBPB_EXIT_TO_USER:
--
2.34.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-11-20 6:20 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 63+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-11-20 6:17 [PATCH v4 00/11] VMSCAPE optimization for BHI variant Pawan Gupta
2025-11-20 6:17 ` [PATCH v4 01/11] x86/bhi: x86/vmscape: Move LFENCE out of clear_bhb_loop() Pawan Gupta
2025-11-20 16:15 ` Nikolay Borisov
2025-11-20 16:56 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-11-20 16:58 ` Nikolay Borisov
2025-11-20 6:18 ` [PATCH v4 02/11] x86/bhi: Move the BHB sequence to a macro for reuse Pawan Gupta
2025-11-20 16:28 ` Nikolay Borisov
2025-11-20 16:57 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-11-25 0:21 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-11-20 6:18 ` [PATCH v4 03/11] x86/bhi: Make the depth of BHB-clearing configurable Pawan Gupta
2025-11-20 17:02 ` Nikolay Borisov
2025-11-20 6:18 ` [PATCH v4 04/11] x86/bhi: Make clear_bhb_loop() effective on newer CPUs Pawan Gupta
2025-11-21 12:33 ` Nikolay Borisov
2025-11-21 16:40 ` Dave Hansen
2025-11-21 16:45 ` Nikolay Borisov
2025-11-21 16:50 ` Dave Hansen
2025-11-21 18:16 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-11-21 18:42 ` Dave Hansen
2025-11-21 21:26 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-11-21 21:36 ` Dave Hansen
2025-11-24 19:21 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-11-22 11:05 ` david laight
2025-11-24 19:31 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-11-25 11:34 ` david laight
2025-12-04 1:40 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-12-04 9:15 ` david laight
2025-12-04 21:56 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-12-05 9:21 ` david laight
2025-11-26 19:23 ` Pawan Gupta
2026-03-06 21:00 ` Jim Mattson
2026-03-06 22:32 ` Pawan Gupta
2026-03-06 22:57 ` Jim Mattson
2026-03-06 23:29 ` Pawan Gupta
2026-03-07 0:35 ` Jim Mattson
2026-03-07 1:00 ` Pawan Gupta
2026-03-07 1:10 ` Jim Mattson
2026-03-07 2:41 ` Pawan Gupta
2026-03-07 5:05 ` Jim Mattson
2026-03-09 22:29 ` Pawan Gupta
2026-03-09 23:05 ` Jim Mattson
2026-03-10 0:00 ` Pawan Gupta
2026-03-10 0:08 ` Jim Mattson
2026-03-10 0:52 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-11-20 6:18 ` [PATCH v4 05/11] x86/vmscape: Rename x86_ibpb_exit_to_user to x86_predictor_flush_exit_to_user Pawan Gupta
2025-11-20 6:19 ` [PATCH v4 06/11] x86/vmscape: Move mitigation selection to a switch() Pawan Gupta
2025-11-21 14:27 ` Nikolay Borisov
2025-11-24 23:09 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-11-25 10:19 ` Nikolay Borisov
2025-11-25 17:45 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-11-20 6:19 ` [PATCH v4 07/11] x86/vmscape: Use write_ibpb() instead of indirect_branch_prediction_barrier() Pawan Gupta
2025-11-21 12:59 ` Nikolay Borisov
2025-11-20 6:19 ` [PATCH v4 08/11] x86/vmscape: Use static_call() for predictor flush Pawan Gupta
2025-11-20 6:19 ` [PATCH v4 09/11] x86/vmscape: Deploy BHB clearing mitigation Pawan Gupta
2025-11-21 14:18 ` Nikolay Borisov
2025-11-21 18:29 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-11-21 14:23 ` Nikolay Borisov
2025-11-21 18:41 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-11-21 18:53 ` Nikolay Borisov
2025-11-21 21:29 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-11-20 6:20 ` Pawan Gupta [this message]
2025-11-21 18:04 ` [PATCH v4 10/11] x86/vmscape: Override conflicting attack-vector controls with =force Nikolay Borisov
2025-11-20 6:20 ` [PATCH v4 11/11] x86/vmscape: Add cmdline vmscape=on to override attack vector controls Pawan Gupta
2025-11-25 11:41 ` Nikolay Borisov
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20251119-vmscape-bhb-v4-10-1adad4e69ddc@linux.intel.com \
--to=pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com \
--cc=asit.k.mallick@intel.com \
--cc=bp@alien8.de \
--cc=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com \
--cc=david.kaplan@amd.com \
--cc=hpa@zytor.com \
--cc=jpoimboe@kernel.org \
--cc=kvm@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=nik.borisov@suse.com \
--cc=pbonzini@redhat.com \
--cc=seanjc@google.com \
--cc=tao1.zhang@intel.com \
--cc=x86@kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox
all inboxes | Powered by JetHome®