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From: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
To: x86@kernel.org, David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>,
	Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>,
	Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
	Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>,
	Tao Zhang <tao1.zhang@intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH v4 10/11] x86/vmscape: Override conflicting attack-vector controls with =force
Date: Wed, 19 Nov 2025 22:20:06 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20251119-vmscape-bhb-v4-10-1adad4e69ddc@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20251119-vmscape-bhb-v4-0-1adad4e69ddc@linux.intel.com>

vmscape=force option currently defaults to AUTO mitigation. This is not
correct because attack-vector controls override a mitigation when in AUTO
mode. This prevents a user from being able to force VMSCAPE mitigation when
it conflicts with attack-vector controls.

Kernel should deploy a forced mitigation irrespective of attack vectors.
Instead of AUTO, use VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_ON that wins over attack-vector
controls.

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 6 +++++-
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index d12c07ccf59479ecf590935607394492c988b2ff..81b0db27f4094c90ebf4704c74f5e7e6b809560f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -3197,6 +3197,7 @@ static void __init srso_apply_mitigation(void)
 enum vmscape_mitigations {
 	VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_NONE,
 	VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_AUTO,
+	VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_ON,
 	VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_IBPB_EXIT_TO_USER,
 	VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT,
 	VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_BHB_CLEAR_EXIT_TO_USER,
@@ -3205,6 +3206,7 @@ enum vmscape_mitigations {
 static const char * const vmscape_strings[] = {
 	[VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_NONE]			= "Vulnerable",
 	/* [VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_AUTO] */
+	/* [VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_ON] */
 	[VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_IBPB_EXIT_TO_USER]		= "Mitigation: IBPB before exit to userspace",
 	[VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT]		= "Mitigation: IBPB on VMEXIT",
 	[VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_BHB_CLEAR_EXIT_TO_USER]	= "Mitigation: Clear BHB before exit to userspace",
@@ -3224,7 +3226,7 @@ static int __init vmscape_parse_cmdline(char *str)
 		vmscape_mitigation = VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_IBPB_EXIT_TO_USER;
 	} else if (!strcmp(str, "force")) {
 		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_VMSCAPE);
-		vmscape_mitigation = VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_AUTO;
+		vmscape_mitigation = VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_ON;
 	} else {
 		pr_err("Ignoring unknown vmscape=%s option.\n", str);
 	}
@@ -3259,6 +3261,7 @@ static void __init vmscape_select_mitigation(void)
 			vmscape_mitigation = VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_NONE;
 		break;
 	case VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_AUTO:
+	case VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_ON:
 		/*
 		 * CPUs with BHI_CTRL(ADL and newer) can avoid the IBPB and use BHB
 		 * clear sequence. These CPUs are only vulnerable to the BHI variant
@@ -3381,6 +3384,7 @@ void cpu_bugs_smt_update(void)
 	switch (vmscape_mitigation) {
 	case VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_NONE:
 	case VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_AUTO:
+	case VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_ON:
 		break;
 	case VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT:
 	case VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_IBPB_EXIT_TO_USER:

-- 
2.34.1



  parent reply	other threads:[~2025-11-20  6:20 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 63+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-11-20  6:17 [PATCH v4 00/11] VMSCAPE optimization for BHI variant Pawan Gupta
2025-11-20  6:17 ` [PATCH v4 01/11] x86/bhi: x86/vmscape: Move LFENCE out of clear_bhb_loop() Pawan Gupta
2025-11-20 16:15   ` Nikolay Borisov
2025-11-20 16:56     ` Pawan Gupta
2025-11-20 16:58       ` Nikolay Borisov
2025-11-20  6:18 ` [PATCH v4 02/11] x86/bhi: Move the BHB sequence to a macro for reuse Pawan Gupta
2025-11-20 16:28   ` Nikolay Borisov
2025-11-20 16:57     ` Pawan Gupta
2025-11-25  0:21   ` Pawan Gupta
2025-11-20  6:18 ` [PATCH v4 03/11] x86/bhi: Make the depth of BHB-clearing configurable Pawan Gupta
2025-11-20 17:02   ` Nikolay Borisov
2025-11-20  6:18 ` [PATCH v4 04/11] x86/bhi: Make clear_bhb_loop() effective on newer CPUs Pawan Gupta
2025-11-21 12:33   ` Nikolay Borisov
2025-11-21 16:40   ` Dave Hansen
2025-11-21 16:45     ` Nikolay Borisov
2025-11-21 16:50       ` Dave Hansen
2025-11-21 18:16         ` Pawan Gupta
2025-11-21 18:42           ` Dave Hansen
2025-11-21 21:26             ` Pawan Gupta
2025-11-21 21:36               ` Dave Hansen
2025-11-24 19:21                 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-11-22 11:05               ` david laight
2025-11-24 19:31                 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-11-25 11:34                   ` david laight
2025-12-04  1:40                     ` Pawan Gupta
2025-12-04  9:15                       ` david laight
2025-12-04 21:56                         ` Pawan Gupta
2025-12-05  9:21                           ` david laight
2025-11-26 19:23     ` Pawan Gupta
2026-03-06 21:00   ` Jim Mattson
2026-03-06 22:32     ` Pawan Gupta
2026-03-06 22:57       ` Jim Mattson
2026-03-06 23:29         ` Pawan Gupta
2026-03-07  0:35           ` Jim Mattson
2026-03-07  1:00             ` Pawan Gupta
2026-03-07  1:10               ` Jim Mattson
2026-03-07  2:41                 ` Pawan Gupta
2026-03-07  5:05                   ` Jim Mattson
2026-03-09 22:29                     ` Pawan Gupta
2026-03-09 23:05                       ` Jim Mattson
2026-03-10  0:00                         ` Pawan Gupta
2026-03-10  0:08                           ` Jim Mattson
2026-03-10  0:52                             ` Pawan Gupta
2025-11-20  6:18 ` [PATCH v4 05/11] x86/vmscape: Rename x86_ibpb_exit_to_user to x86_predictor_flush_exit_to_user Pawan Gupta
2025-11-20  6:19 ` [PATCH v4 06/11] x86/vmscape: Move mitigation selection to a switch() Pawan Gupta
2025-11-21 14:27   ` Nikolay Borisov
2025-11-24 23:09     ` Pawan Gupta
2025-11-25 10:19       ` Nikolay Borisov
2025-11-25 17:45         ` Pawan Gupta
2025-11-20  6:19 ` [PATCH v4 07/11] x86/vmscape: Use write_ibpb() instead of indirect_branch_prediction_barrier() Pawan Gupta
2025-11-21 12:59   ` Nikolay Borisov
2025-11-20  6:19 ` [PATCH v4 08/11] x86/vmscape: Use static_call() for predictor flush Pawan Gupta
2025-11-20  6:19 ` [PATCH v4 09/11] x86/vmscape: Deploy BHB clearing mitigation Pawan Gupta
2025-11-21 14:18   ` Nikolay Borisov
2025-11-21 18:29     ` Pawan Gupta
2025-11-21 14:23   ` Nikolay Borisov
2025-11-21 18:41     ` Pawan Gupta
2025-11-21 18:53       ` Nikolay Borisov
2025-11-21 21:29         ` Pawan Gupta
2025-11-20  6:20 ` Pawan Gupta [this message]
2025-11-21 18:04   ` [PATCH v4 10/11] x86/vmscape: Override conflicting attack-vector controls with =force Nikolay Borisov
2025-11-20  6:20 ` [PATCH v4 11/11] x86/vmscape: Add cmdline vmscape=on to override attack vector controls Pawan Gupta
2025-11-25 11:41   ` Nikolay Borisov

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