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From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	"Jethro Beekman" <jethro@fortanix.com>,
	"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
	"Carlos López" <clopez@suse.de>
Subject: [PATCH 00/21] Fixes and lock cleanup+hardening
Date: Tue, 10 Mar 2026 16:48:08 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260310234829.2608037-1-seanjc@google.com> (raw)

Fix several fatal SEV bugs, then clean up the SEV+ APIs to either document
that they are safe to query outside of kvm->lock, or to use lockdep-protected
version.  The sev_mem_enc_register_region() goof is at least the second bug
we've had related to checking for an SEV guest outside of kvm->lock, and in
general it's nearly impossible to just "eyeball" the safety of KVM's usage.

I included Carlos' guard() cleanups here to avoid annoying conflicts (well,
to solve them now instead of when applying).

Carlos López (5):
  KVM: SEV: use mutex guard in snp_launch_update()
  KVM: SEV: use mutex guard in sev_mem_enc_ioctl()
  KVM: SEV: use mutex guard in sev_mem_enc_unregister_region()
  KVM: SEV: use mutex guard in snp_handle_guest_req()
  KVM: SVM: Move lock-protected allocation of SEV ASID into a separate
    helper

Sean Christopherson (16):
  KVM: selftests: Remove duplicate LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA call in SEV-ES
    migrate test
  KVM: SEV: Reject attempts to sync VMSA of an
    already-launched/encrypted vCPU
  KVM: SEV: Protect *all* of sev_mem_enc_register_region() with
    kvm->lock
  KVM: SEV: Disallow LAUNCH_FINISH if vCPUs are actively being created
  KVM: SEV: Lock all vCPUs when synchronzing VMSAs for SNP launch finish
  KVM: SEV: Lock all vCPUs for the duration of SEV-ES VMSA
    synchronization
  KVM: SEV: Provide vCPU-scoped accessors for detecting SEV+ guests
  KVM: SEV: Add quad-underscore version of VM-scoped APIs to detect SEV+
    guests
  KVM: SEV: Document the SEV-ES check when querying SMM support as
    "safe"
  KVM: SEV: Move standard VM-scoped helpers to detect SEV+ guests to
    sev.c
  KVM: SEV: Move SEV-specific VM initialization to sev.c
  KVM: SEV: WARN on unhandled VM type when initializing VM
  KVM: SEV: Hide "struct kvm_sev_info" behind CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV=y
  KVM: SEV: Document that checking for SEV+ guests when reclaiming
    memory is "safe"
  KVM: SEV: Assert that kvm->lock is held when querying SEV+ support
  KVM: SEV: Goto an existing error label if charging misc_cg for an ASID
    fails

 arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c                        | 315 +++++++++++-------
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c                        | 106 +++---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h                        |  36 +-
 include/linux/kvm_host.h                      |   7 +
 .../selftests/kvm/x86/sev_migrate_tests.c     |   2 -
 5 files changed, 275 insertions(+), 191 deletions(-)


base-commit: 11439c4635edd669ae435eec308f4ab8a0804808
-- 
2.53.0.473.g4a7958ca14-goog


             reply	other threads:[~2026-03-10 23:48 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 34+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-03-10 23:48 Sean Christopherson [this message]
2026-03-10 23:48 ` [PATCH 01/21] KVM: selftests: Remove duplicate LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA call in SEV-ES migrate test Sean Christopherson
2026-03-10 23:48 ` [PATCH 02/21] KVM: SEV: Reject attempts to sync VMSA of an already-launched/encrypted vCPU Sean Christopherson
2026-03-10 23:48 ` [PATCH 03/21] KVM: SEV: Protect *all* of sev_mem_enc_register_region() with kvm->lock Sean Christopherson
2026-03-10 23:48 ` [PATCH 04/21] KVM: SEV: Disallow LAUNCH_FINISH if vCPUs are actively being created Sean Christopherson
2026-03-10 23:48 ` [PATCH 05/21] KVM: SEV: Lock all vCPUs when synchronzing VMSAs for SNP launch finish Sean Christopherson
2026-04-08 14:07   ` Aithal, Srikanth
2026-04-08 18:42     ` Sean Christopherson
2026-04-09  5:12       ` Aithal, Srikanth
2026-03-10 23:48 ` [PATCH 06/21] KVM: SEV: Lock all vCPUs for the duration of SEV-ES VMSA synchronization Sean Christopherson
2026-03-10 23:48 ` [PATCH 07/21] KVM: SEV: Provide vCPU-scoped accessors for detecting SEV+ guests Sean Christopherson
2026-03-10 23:48 ` [PATCH 08/21] KVM: SEV: Add quad-underscore version of VM-scoped APIs to detect " Sean Christopherson
2026-03-10 23:48 ` [PATCH 09/21] KVM: SEV: Document the SEV-ES check when querying SMM support as "safe" Sean Christopherson
2026-03-10 23:48 ` [PATCH 10/21] KVM: SEV: Move standard VM-scoped helpers to detect SEV+ guests to sev.c Sean Christopherson
2026-03-17 10:33   ` Alexander Potapenko
2026-03-31 18:42     ` Sean Christopherson
2026-03-10 23:48 ` [PATCH 11/21] KVM: SEV: Move SEV-specific VM initialization " Sean Christopherson
2026-03-10 23:48 ` [PATCH 12/21] KVM: SEV: WARN on unhandled VM type when initializing VM Sean Christopherson
2026-04-09  5:12   ` Yan Zhao
2026-04-09 18:48     ` Sean Christopherson
2026-04-10  7:46       ` Yan Zhao
2026-04-10 15:49         ` Sean Christopherson
2026-03-10 23:48 ` [PATCH 13/21] KVM: SEV: Hide "struct kvm_sev_info" behind CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV=y Sean Christopherson
2026-03-10 23:48 ` [PATCH 14/21] KVM: SEV: Document that checking for SEV+ guests when reclaiming memory is "safe" Sean Christopherson
2026-03-10 23:48 ` [PATCH 15/21] KVM: SEV: Assert that kvm->lock is held when querying SEV+ support Sean Christopherson
2026-03-10 23:48 ` [PATCH 16/21] KVM: SEV: use mutex guard in snp_launch_update() Sean Christopherson
2026-03-10 23:48 ` [PATCH 17/21] KVM: SEV: use mutex guard in sev_mem_enc_ioctl() Sean Christopherson
2026-03-10 23:48 ` [PATCH 18/21] KVM: SEV: use mutex guard in sev_mem_enc_unregister_region() Sean Christopherson
2026-03-10 23:48 ` [PATCH 19/21] KVM: SEV: use mutex guard in snp_handle_guest_req() Sean Christopherson
2026-03-10 23:48 ` [PATCH 20/21] KVM: SVM: Move lock-protected allocation of SEV ASID into a separate helper Sean Christopherson
2026-03-10 23:48 ` [PATCH 21/21] KVM: SEV: Goto an existing error label if charging misc_cg for an ASID fails Sean Christopherson
2026-03-11 14:29 ` [PATCH 00/21] Fixes and lock cleanup+hardening Jethro Beekman
2026-03-12 16:03   ` Sean Christopherson
2026-04-08  0:14 ` Sean Christopherson

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