From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
"Jethro Beekman" <jethro@fortanix.com>,
"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
"Carlos López" <clopez@suse.de>
Subject: [PATCH 04/21] KVM: SEV: Disallow LAUNCH_FINISH if vCPUs are actively being created
Date: Tue, 10 Mar 2026 16:48:12 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260310234829.2608037-5-seanjc@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260310234829.2608037-1-seanjc@google.com>
Reject LAUNCH_FINISH for SEV-ES and SNP VMs if KVM is actively creating
one or more vCPUs, as KVM needs to process and encrypt each vCPU's VMSA.
Letting userspace create vCPUs while LAUNCH_FINISH is in-progress is
"fine", at least in the current code base, as kvm_for_each_vcpu() operates
on online_vcpus, LAUNCH_FINISH (all SEV+ sub-ioctls) holds kvm->mutex, and
fully onlining a vCPU in kvm_vm_ioctl_create_vcpu() is done under
kvm->mutex. I.e. there's no difference between an in-progress vCPU and a
vCPU that is created entirely after LAUNCH_FINISH.
However, given that concurrent LAUNCH_FINISH and vCPU creation can't
possibly work (for any reasonable definition of "work"), since userspace
can't guarantee whether a particular vCPU will be encrypted or not,
disallow the combination as a hardening measure, to reduce the probability
of introducing bugs in the future, and to avoid having to reason about the
safety of future changes related to LAUNCH_FINISH.
Cc: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/b31f7c6e-2807-4662-bcdd-eea2c1e132fa@fortanix.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
---
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 10 ++++++++--
include/linux/kvm_host.h | 7 +++++++
2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
index 7da040baba1c..5de36bbc4c53 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
@@ -1030,6 +1030,9 @@ static int sev_launch_update_vmsa(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
if (!sev_es_guest(kvm))
return -ENOTTY;
+ if (kvm_is_vcpu_creation_in_progress(kvm))
+ return -EBUSY;
+
kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, kvm) {
ret = mutex_lock_killable(&vcpu->mutex);
if (ret)
@@ -2050,8 +2053,8 @@ static int sev_check_source_vcpus(struct kvm *dst, struct kvm *src)
struct kvm_vcpu *src_vcpu;
unsigned long i;
- if (src->created_vcpus != atomic_read(&src->online_vcpus) ||
- dst->created_vcpus != atomic_read(&dst->online_vcpus))
+ if (kvm_is_vcpu_creation_in_progress(src) ||
+ kvm_is_vcpu_creation_in_progress(dst))
return -EBUSY;
if (!sev_es_guest(src))
@@ -2450,6 +2453,9 @@ static int snp_launch_update_vmsa(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
unsigned long i;
int ret;
+ if (kvm_is_vcpu_creation_in_progress(kvm))
+ return -EBUSY;
+
data.gctx_paddr = __psp_pa(sev->snp_context);
data.page_type = SNP_PAGE_TYPE_VMSA;
diff --git a/include/linux/kvm_host.h b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
index 34759a262b28..3c7f8557f7af 100644
--- a/include/linux/kvm_host.h
+++ b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
@@ -1029,6 +1029,13 @@ static inline struct kvm_vcpu *kvm_get_vcpu_by_id(struct kvm *kvm, int id)
return NULL;
}
+static inline bool kvm_is_vcpu_creation_in_progress(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+ lockdep_assert_held(&kvm->lock);
+
+ return kvm->created_vcpus != atomic_read(&kvm->online_vcpus);
+}
+
void kvm_destroy_vcpus(struct kvm *kvm);
int kvm_trylock_all_vcpus(struct kvm *kvm);
--
2.53.0.473.g4a7958ca14-goog
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-03-10 23:48 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 34+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-03-10 23:48 [PATCH 00/21] Fixes and lock cleanup+hardening Sean Christopherson
2026-03-10 23:48 ` [PATCH 01/21] KVM: selftests: Remove duplicate LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA call in SEV-ES migrate test Sean Christopherson
2026-03-10 23:48 ` [PATCH 02/21] KVM: SEV: Reject attempts to sync VMSA of an already-launched/encrypted vCPU Sean Christopherson
2026-03-10 23:48 ` [PATCH 03/21] KVM: SEV: Protect *all* of sev_mem_enc_register_region() with kvm->lock Sean Christopherson
2026-03-10 23:48 ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2026-03-10 23:48 ` [PATCH 05/21] KVM: SEV: Lock all vCPUs when synchronzing VMSAs for SNP launch finish Sean Christopherson
2026-04-08 14:07 ` Aithal, Srikanth
2026-04-08 18:42 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-04-09 5:12 ` Aithal, Srikanth
2026-03-10 23:48 ` [PATCH 06/21] KVM: SEV: Lock all vCPUs for the duration of SEV-ES VMSA synchronization Sean Christopherson
2026-03-10 23:48 ` [PATCH 07/21] KVM: SEV: Provide vCPU-scoped accessors for detecting SEV+ guests Sean Christopherson
2026-03-10 23:48 ` [PATCH 08/21] KVM: SEV: Add quad-underscore version of VM-scoped APIs to detect " Sean Christopherson
2026-03-10 23:48 ` [PATCH 09/21] KVM: SEV: Document the SEV-ES check when querying SMM support as "safe" Sean Christopherson
2026-03-10 23:48 ` [PATCH 10/21] KVM: SEV: Move standard VM-scoped helpers to detect SEV+ guests to sev.c Sean Christopherson
2026-03-17 10:33 ` Alexander Potapenko
2026-03-31 18:42 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-03-10 23:48 ` [PATCH 11/21] KVM: SEV: Move SEV-specific VM initialization " Sean Christopherson
2026-03-10 23:48 ` [PATCH 12/21] KVM: SEV: WARN on unhandled VM type when initializing VM Sean Christopherson
2026-04-09 5:12 ` Yan Zhao
2026-04-09 18:48 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-04-10 7:46 ` Yan Zhao
2026-04-10 15:49 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-03-10 23:48 ` [PATCH 13/21] KVM: SEV: Hide "struct kvm_sev_info" behind CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV=y Sean Christopherson
2026-03-10 23:48 ` [PATCH 14/21] KVM: SEV: Document that checking for SEV+ guests when reclaiming memory is "safe" Sean Christopherson
2026-03-10 23:48 ` [PATCH 15/21] KVM: SEV: Assert that kvm->lock is held when querying SEV+ support Sean Christopherson
2026-03-10 23:48 ` [PATCH 16/21] KVM: SEV: use mutex guard in snp_launch_update() Sean Christopherson
2026-03-10 23:48 ` [PATCH 17/21] KVM: SEV: use mutex guard in sev_mem_enc_ioctl() Sean Christopherson
2026-03-10 23:48 ` [PATCH 18/21] KVM: SEV: use mutex guard in sev_mem_enc_unregister_region() Sean Christopherson
2026-03-10 23:48 ` [PATCH 19/21] KVM: SEV: use mutex guard in snp_handle_guest_req() Sean Christopherson
2026-03-10 23:48 ` [PATCH 20/21] KVM: SVM: Move lock-protected allocation of SEV ASID into a separate helper Sean Christopherson
2026-03-10 23:48 ` [PATCH 21/21] KVM: SEV: Goto an existing error label if charging misc_cg for an ASID fails Sean Christopherson
2026-03-11 14:29 ` [PATCH 00/21] Fixes and lock cleanup+hardening Jethro Beekman
2026-03-12 16:03 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-04-08 0:14 ` Sean Christopherson
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