From: "Aithal, Srikanth" <sraithal@amd.com>
To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: "Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
"Jethro Beekman" <jethro@fortanix.com>,
"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
"Carlos López" <clopez@suse.de>,
"Thomas Lendacky" <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 05/21] KVM: SEV: Lock all vCPUs when synchronzing VMSAs for SNP launch finish
Date: Thu, 9 Apr 2026 10:42:18 +0530 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <723b6ba2-b4cb-47f4-9cc9-530c0ece1cdd@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <adahqilc9IrIpIvr@google.com>
On 4/9/2026 12:12 AM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> On Wed, Apr 08, 2026, Srikanth Aithal wrote:
>> On 3/11/2026 5:18 AM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
>>> Lock all vCPUs when synchronizing and encrypting VMSAs for SNP guests, as
>>> allowing userspace to manipulate and/or run a vCPU while its state is being
>>> synchronized would at best corrupt vCPU state, and at worst crash the host
>>> kernel.
>>>
>>> Opportunistically assert that vcpu->mutex is held when synchronizing its
>>> VMSA (the SEV-ES path already locks vCPUs).
>>>
>>> Fixes: ad27ce155566 ("KVM: SEV: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH command")
>>> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
>>> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
>>> ---
>>> arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 16 +++++++++++++---
>>> 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
>>> index 5de36bbc4c53..c10c71608208 100644
>>> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
>>> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
>>> @@ -882,6 +882,8 @@ static int sev_es_sync_vmsa(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
>>> u8 *d;
>>> int i;
>>> + lockdep_assert_held(&vcpu->mutex);
>>> +
>>> if (vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
>>> return -EINVAL;
>>> @@ -2456,6 +2458,10 @@ static int snp_launch_update_vmsa(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
>>> if (kvm_is_vcpu_creation_in_progress(kvm))
>>> return -EBUSY;
>>> + ret = kvm_lock_all_vcpus(kvm);
>>> + if (ret)
>>> + return ret;
>>> +
>>> data.gctx_paddr = __psp_pa(sev->snp_context);
>>> data.page_type = SNP_PAGE_TYPE_VMSA;
>>> @@ -2465,12 +2471,12 @@ static int snp_launch_update_vmsa(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
>>> ret = sev_es_sync_vmsa(svm);
>>> if (ret)
>>> - return ret;
>>> + goto err;
>>> /* Transition the VMSA page to a firmware state. */
>>> ret = rmp_make_private(pfn, INITIAL_VMSA_GPA, PG_LEVEL_4K, sev->asid, true);
>>> if (ret)
>>> - return ret;
>>> + goto err;
>>> /* Issue the SNP command to encrypt the VMSA */
>>> data.address = __sme_pa(svm->sev_es.vmsa);
>>> @@ -2479,7 +2485,7 @@ static int snp_launch_update_vmsa(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
>>> if (ret) {
>>> snp_page_reclaim(kvm, pfn);
>>> - return ret;
>>> + goto err;
>>> }
>>> svm->vcpu.arch.guest_state_protected = true;
>>> @@ -2494,6 +2500,10 @@ static int snp_launch_update_vmsa(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
>>> }
>>> return 0;
>>> +
>>> +err:
>>> + kvm_unlock_all_vcpus(kvm);
>>> + return ret;
>
> /facepalm
>
> With an assist from lockdep (see below), I forgot to actually unlock in the
> *success* path. The failure manifested as a "guest" hang instead of a deadlock
> by pure dumb luck: kvm_vcpu_ioctl() uses mutex_lock_killable() so killing QEMU
> still works.
>
> I'll squash this (assuming it fixes the problem you're seeing), and omit this
> entire series from the initial 7.1 pull requests. If everything looks good, I'll
> plan on sending a second pull request for this series after it's had more time to
> soak in -next.
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> index 2010b157e288..770f7dfc0e5c 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> @@ -2512,12 +2512,12 @@ static int snp_launch_update_vmsa(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
>
> ret = sev_es_sync_vmsa(svm);
> if (ret)
> - goto err;
> + goto out;
>
> /* Transition the VMSA page to a firmware state. */
> ret = rmp_make_private(pfn, INITIAL_VMSA_GPA, PG_LEVEL_4K, sev->asid, true);
> if (ret)
> - goto err;
> + goto out;
>
> /* Issue the SNP command to encrypt the VMSA */
> data.address = __sme_pa(svm->sev_es.vmsa);
> @@ -2526,7 +2526,7 @@ static int snp_launch_update_vmsa(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
> if (ret) {
> snp_page_reclaim(kvm, pfn);
>
> - goto err;
> + goto out;
> }
>
> svm->vcpu.arch.guest_state_protected = true;
> @@ -2540,9 +2540,7 @@ static int snp_launch_update_vmsa(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
> svm_enable_lbrv(vcpu);
> }
>
> - return 0;
> -
> -err:
> +out:
> kvm_unlock_all_vcpus(kvm);
> return ret;
> }
>
This fixes the snp guest boot issue.
>>> }
>>> static int snp_launch_finish(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
>>
>>
>> I am seeing an SNP guest boot failure starting with linux-next tag
>> next-20260406 [1].
>>
>> The SNP guest hangs during boot.
>
> ...
>
>> There are no error messages on either the host or guest serial console when
>> this happens.
>
> WARNING: Nested lock was not taken
> 7.0.0-smp--36ad607330fb-snp #112 Tainted: G U W O
> ----------------------------------
> qemu/39235 is trying to lock:
> ffff8d0e590c00b0 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: kvm_lock_all_vcpus+0xab/0x180 [kvm]
>
> but this task is not holding:
> &kvm->lock
>
> stack backtrace:
> CPU: 123 UID: 0 PID: 39235 Comm: qemu Tainted: G U W O 7.0.0-smp--36ad607330fb-snp #112 PREEMPTLAZY
> Tainted: [U]=USER, [W]=WARN, [O]=OOT_MODULE
> Hardware name: Google, Inc. Arcadia_IT_80/Arcadia_IT_80, BIOS 34.86.0-102 01/25/2026
> Call Trace:
> <TASK>
> dump_stack_lvl+0x54/0x70
> __lock_acquire+0x7b9/0x2900
> reacquire_held_locks+0x107/0x160
> lock_release+0x177/0x360
> __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x3c/0x2b0
> sev_mem_enc_ioctl+0x3c9/0x400 [kvm_amd]
> kvm_vm_ioctl+0x57c/0x5d0 [kvm]
> __se_sys_ioctl+0x6d/0xb0
> do_syscall_64+0xe8/0x920
> entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
> </TASK>
>
> other info that might help us debug this:
> no locks held by qemu/39235.
>
> stack backtrace:
> CPU: 123 UID: 0 PID: 39235 Comm: qemu Tainted: G U W O 7.0.0-smp--36ad607330fb-snp #112 PREEMPTLAZY
> Tainted: [U]=USER, [W]=WARN, [O]=OOT_MODULE
> Hardware name: Google, Inc. Arcadia_IT_80/Arcadia_IT_80, BIOS 34.86.0-102 01/25/2026
> Call Trace:
> <TASK>
> dump_stack_lvl+0x54/0x70
> __lock_acquire+0x7de/0x2900
> reacquire_held_locks+0x107/0x160
> lock_release+0x177/0x360
> __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x3c/0x2b0
> sev_mem_enc_ioctl+0x3c9/0x400 [kvm_amd]
> kvm_vm_ioctl+0x57c/0x5d0 [kvm]
> __se_sys_ioctl+0x6d/0xb0
> do_syscall_64+0xe8/0x920
> entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
> </TASK>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-04-09 5:12 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 34+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-03-10 23:48 [PATCH 00/21] Fixes and lock cleanup+hardening Sean Christopherson
2026-03-10 23:48 ` [PATCH 01/21] KVM: selftests: Remove duplicate LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA call in SEV-ES migrate test Sean Christopherson
2026-03-10 23:48 ` [PATCH 02/21] KVM: SEV: Reject attempts to sync VMSA of an already-launched/encrypted vCPU Sean Christopherson
2026-03-10 23:48 ` [PATCH 03/21] KVM: SEV: Protect *all* of sev_mem_enc_register_region() with kvm->lock Sean Christopherson
2026-03-10 23:48 ` [PATCH 04/21] KVM: SEV: Disallow LAUNCH_FINISH if vCPUs are actively being created Sean Christopherson
2026-03-10 23:48 ` [PATCH 05/21] KVM: SEV: Lock all vCPUs when synchronzing VMSAs for SNP launch finish Sean Christopherson
2026-04-08 14:07 ` Aithal, Srikanth
2026-04-08 18:42 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-04-09 5:12 ` Aithal, Srikanth [this message]
2026-03-10 23:48 ` [PATCH 06/21] KVM: SEV: Lock all vCPUs for the duration of SEV-ES VMSA synchronization Sean Christopherson
2026-03-10 23:48 ` [PATCH 07/21] KVM: SEV: Provide vCPU-scoped accessors for detecting SEV+ guests Sean Christopherson
2026-03-10 23:48 ` [PATCH 08/21] KVM: SEV: Add quad-underscore version of VM-scoped APIs to detect " Sean Christopherson
2026-03-10 23:48 ` [PATCH 09/21] KVM: SEV: Document the SEV-ES check when querying SMM support as "safe" Sean Christopherson
2026-03-10 23:48 ` [PATCH 10/21] KVM: SEV: Move standard VM-scoped helpers to detect SEV+ guests to sev.c Sean Christopherson
2026-03-17 10:33 ` Alexander Potapenko
2026-03-31 18:42 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-03-10 23:48 ` [PATCH 11/21] KVM: SEV: Move SEV-specific VM initialization " Sean Christopherson
2026-03-10 23:48 ` [PATCH 12/21] KVM: SEV: WARN on unhandled VM type when initializing VM Sean Christopherson
2026-04-09 5:12 ` Yan Zhao
2026-04-09 18:48 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-04-10 7:46 ` Yan Zhao
2026-04-10 15:49 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-03-10 23:48 ` [PATCH 13/21] KVM: SEV: Hide "struct kvm_sev_info" behind CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV=y Sean Christopherson
2026-03-10 23:48 ` [PATCH 14/21] KVM: SEV: Document that checking for SEV+ guests when reclaiming memory is "safe" Sean Christopherson
2026-03-10 23:48 ` [PATCH 15/21] KVM: SEV: Assert that kvm->lock is held when querying SEV+ support Sean Christopherson
2026-03-10 23:48 ` [PATCH 16/21] KVM: SEV: use mutex guard in snp_launch_update() Sean Christopherson
2026-03-10 23:48 ` [PATCH 17/21] KVM: SEV: use mutex guard in sev_mem_enc_ioctl() Sean Christopherson
2026-03-10 23:48 ` [PATCH 18/21] KVM: SEV: use mutex guard in sev_mem_enc_unregister_region() Sean Christopherson
2026-03-10 23:48 ` [PATCH 19/21] KVM: SEV: use mutex guard in snp_handle_guest_req() Sean Christopherson
2026-03-10 23:48 ` [PATCH 20/21] KVM: SVM: Move lock-protected allocation of SEV ASID into a separate helper Sean Christopherson
2026-03-10 23:48 ` [PATCH 21/21] KVM: SEV: Goto an existing error label if charging misc_cg for an ASID fails Sean Christopherson
2026-03-11 14:29 ` [PATCH 00/21] Fixes and lock cleanup+hardening Jethro Beekman
2026-03-12 16:03 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-04-08 0:14 ` Sean Christopherson
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