mirror of https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	"Jethro Beekman" <jethro@fortanix.com>,
	"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
	"Carlos López" <clopez@suse.de>
Subject: [PATCH 15/21] KVM: SEV: Assert that kvm->lock is held when querying SEV+ support
Date: Tue, 10 Mar 2026 16:48:23 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260310234829.2608037-16-seanjc@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260310234829.2608037-1-seanjc@google.com>

Assert that kvm->lock is held when checking if a VM is an SEV+ VM, as KVM
sets *and* resets the relevant flags when initialization SEV state, i.e.
it's extremely easy to end up with TOCTOU bugs if kvm->lock isn't held.

Add waivers for a VM being torn down (refcount is '0') and for there being
a loaded vCPU, with comments for both explaining why they're safe.

Note, the "vCPU loaded" waiver is necessary to avoid splats on the SNP
checks in sev_gmem_prepare() and sev_gmem_max_mapping_level(), which are
currently called when handling nested page faults.  Alternatively, those
checks could key off KVM_X86_SNP_VM, as kvm_arch.vm_type is stable early
in VM creation.  Prioritize consistency, at least for now, and to leave a
"reminder" that the max mapping level code in particular likely needs
special attention if/when KVM supports dirty logging for SNP guests.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
index 7bb9318f0703..cbb5886304fa 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
@@ -107,17 +107,42 @@ static unsigned int nr_asids;
 static unsigned long *sev_asid_bitmap;
 static unsigned long *sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap;
 
+static __always_inline void kvm_lockdep_assert_sev_lock_held(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING
+	/*
+	 * Querying SEV+ support is safe if there are no other references, i.e.
+	 * if concurrent initialization of SEV+ is impossible.
+	 */
+	if (!refcount_read(&kvm->users_count))
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * Querying SEV+ support from vCPU context is always safe, as vCPUs can
+	 * only be created after SEV+ is initialized (and KVM disallows all SEV
+	 * sub-ioctls while vCPU creation is in-progress).
+	 */
+	if (kvm_get_running_vcpu())
+		return;
+
+	lockdep_assert_held(&kvm->lock);
+#endif
+}
+
 static bool sev_guest(struct kvm *kvm)
 {
+	kvm_lockdep_assert_sev_lock_held(kvm);
 	return ____sev_guest(kvm);
 }
 static bool sev_es_guest(struct kvm *kvm)
 {
+	kvm_lockdep_assert_sev_lock_held(kvm);
 	return ____sev_es_guest(kvm);
 }
 
 static bool sev_snp_guest(struct kvm *kvm)
 {
+	kvm_lockdep_assert_sev_lock_held(kvm);
 	return ____sev_snp_guest(kvm);
 }
 
-- 
2.53.0.473.g4a7958ca14-goog


  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-03-10 23:49 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 34+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-03-10 23:48 [PATCH 00/21] Fixes and lock cleanup+hardening Sean Christopherson
2026-03-10 23:48 ` [PATCH 01/21] KVM: selftests: Remove duplicate LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA call in SEV-ES migrate test Sean Christopherson
2026-03-10 23:48 ` [PATCH 02/21] KVM: SEV: Reject attempts to sync VMSA of an already-launched/encrypted vCPU Sean Christopherson
2026-03-10 23:48 ` [PATCH 03/21] KVM: SEV: Protect *all* of sev_mem_enc_register_region() with kvm->lock Sean Christopherson
2026-03-10 23:48 ` [PATCH 04/21] KVM: SEV: Disallow LAUNCH_FINISH if vCPUs are actively being created Sean Christopherson
2026-03-10 23:48 ` [PATCH 05/21] KVM: SEV: Lock all vCPUs when synchronzing VMSAs for SNP launch finish Sean Christopherson
2026-04-08 14:07   ` Aithal, Srikanth
2026-04-08 18:42     ` Sean Christopherson
2026-04-09  5:12       ` Aithal, Srikanth
2026-03-10 23:48 ` [PATCH 06/21] KVM: SEV: Lock all vCPUs for the duration of SEV-ES VMSA synchronization Sean Christopherson
2026-03-10 23:48 ` [PATCH 07/21] KVM: SEV: Provide vCPU-scoped accessors for detecting SEV+ guests Sean Christopherson
2026-03-10 23:48 ` [PATCH 08/21] KVM: SEV: Add quad-underscore version of VM-scoped APIs to detect " Sean Christopherson
2026-03-10 23:48 ` [PATCH 09/21] KVM: SEV: Document the SEV-ES check when querying SMM support as "safe" Sean Christopherson
2026-03-10 23:48 ` [PATCH 10/21] KVM: SEV: Move standard VM-scoped helpers to detect SEV+ guests to sev.c Sean Christopherson
2026-03-17 10:33   ` Alexander Potapenko
2026-03-31 18:42     ` Sean Christopherson
2026-03-10 23:48 ` [PATCH 11/21] KVM: SEV: Move SEV-specific VM initialization " Sean Christopherson
2026-03-10 23:48 ` [PATCH 12/21] KVM: SEV: WARN on unhandled VM type when initializing VM Sean Christopherson
2026-04-09  5:12   ` Yan Zhao
2026-04-09 18:48     ` Sean Christopherson
2026-04-10  7:46       ` Yan Zhao
2026-04-10 15:49         ` Sean Christopherson
2026-03-10 23:48 ` [PATCH 13/21] KVM: SEV: Hide "struct kvm_sev_info" behind CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV=y Sean Christopherson
2026-03-10 23:48 ` [PATCH 14/21] KVM: SEV: Document that checking for SEV+ guests when reclaiming memory is "safe" Sean Christopherson
2026-03-10 23:48 ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2026-03-10 23:48 ` [PATCH 16/21] KVM: SEV: use mutex guard in snp_launch_update() Sean Christopherson
2026-03-10 23:48 ` [PATCH 17/21] KVM: SEV: use mutex guard in sev_mem_enc_ioctl() Sean Christopherson
2026-03-10 23:48 ` [PATCH 18/21] KVM: SEV: use mutex guard in sev_mem_enc_unregister_region() Sean Christopherson
2026-03-10 23:48 ` [PATCH 19/21] KVM: SEV: use mutex guard in snp_handle_guest_req() Sean Christopherson
2026-03-10 23:48 ` [PATCH 20/21] KVM: SVM: Move lock-protected allocation of SEV ASID into a separate helper Sean Christopherson
2026-03-10 23:48 ` [PATCH 21/21] KVM: SEV: Goto an existing error label if charging misc_cg for an ASID fails Sean Christopherson
2026-03-11 14:29 ` [PATCH 00/21] Fixes and lock cleanup+hardening Jethro Beekman
2026-03-12 16:03   ` Sean Christopherson
2026-04-08  0:14 ` Sean Christopherson

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20260310234829.2608037-16-seanjc@google.com \
    --to=seanjc@google.com \
    --cc=clopez@suse.de \
    --cc=glider@google.com \
    --cc=jethro@fortanix.com \
    --cc=kvm@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=pbonzini@redhat.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox

all inboxes | Powered by JetHome®