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From: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>
To: "Tian, Kevin" <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)" <aneesh.kumar@kernel.org>,
	"linux-coco@lists.linux.dev" <linux-coco@lists.linux.dev>,
	"iommu@lists.linux.dev" <iommu@lists.linux.dev>,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"kvm@vger.kernel.org" <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
	Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@amd.com>,
	Bjorn Helgaas <helgaas@kernel.org>,
	Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>,
	Jonathan Cameron <jic23@kernel.org>,
	Nicolin Chen <nicolinc@nvidia.com>,
	Samuel Ortiz <sameo@rivosinc.com>,
	Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com>,
	Suzuki K Poulose <Suzuki.Poulose@arm.com>,
	Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
	Xu Yilun <yilun.xu@linux.intel.com>,
	Shameer Kolothum <shameerali.kolothum.thodi@huawei.com>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v6 00/11] iommufd: Infrastructure for vIOMMU creation for confidential guests and guest TSM requests
Date: Mon, 28 Sep 2026 10:08:43 -0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260928130843.GH163130@ziepe.ca> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <SA2PR11MB484477E4875E71E4C78854A18C8D2@SA2PR11MB4844.namprd11.prod.outlook.com>

On Mon, Sep 28, 2026 at 03:35:29AM +0000, Tian, Kevin wrote:

> Looks there are some resource shared between the untrust and
> trust invalidation paths, as iommu->qi->q_lock is also acquired
> in the trust path. I still need to understand the motivation behind,
> but this can be resolved properly by exporting a helper to the
> TSM driver even if it's truly required.

That seems a bit suspicious from a security POV.. The secure side
shouldn't be sharing anything like this with the insecure side, that's
just inviting invalidation integrity attacks???

Jason

  reply	other threads:[~2026-09-28 13:08 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 50+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-09-17 14:01 Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-09-17 14:01 ` [RFC PATCH v6 01/11] vfio: cache KVM VM file references instead of raw struct kvm pointers Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-09-24 19:41   ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-09-17 14:01 ` [RFC PATCH v6 02/11] vfio: cdev: Reject duplicate bind before updating KVM file Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-09-24  7:53   ` Tian, Kevin
2026-09-25  5:49     ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-09-17 14:01 ` [RFC PATCH v6 03/11] iommufd/device: Associate KVM file pointer with iommufd_device Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-09-17 14:01 ` [RFC PATCH v6 04/11] iommufd/viommu: Keep a reference to the KVM file Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-09-17 14:01 ` [RFC PATCH v6 05/11] iommu: Add a helper to validate a vIOMMU parent Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-09-24 19:41   ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-09-25  5:48     ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-09-25 12:23       ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-09-28 10:36         ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-09-28 12:11           ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-09-28 15:39             ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-09-28 16:17               ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-09-28 18:08                 ` Jacob Pan
2026-09-28 18:20                   ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-09-17 14:01 ` [RFC PATCH v6 06/11] iommu: Add a helper to query vIOMMU hardware parameters Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-09-24 19:41   ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-09-25  5:59     ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-09-25 12:29       ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-09-17 14:01 ` [RFC PATCH v6 07/11] coco: tsm: Expose active-user lifetime references Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-09-17 14:01 ` [RFC PATCH v6 08/11] iommufd: Add vIOMMU provider support Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-09-24 19:41   ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-09-25  6:08     ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-09-25 12:39       ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-09-28  3:41         ` Tian, Kevin
2026-09-28 10:51         ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-09-17 14:01 ` [RFC PATCH v6 09/11] iommufd: Add the vdevice TSM request ioctl Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-09-18 13:09   ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2026-09-18 13:13     ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-09-24 19:41   ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-09-17 14:01 ` [RFC PATCH v6 10/11] PCI/TSM: Remove the legacy guest request interface Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-09-17 14:01 ` [RFC PATCH v6 11/11] PCI/TSM: Add reference-counted contexts for vdevice providers Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-09-24  8:17   ` Tian, Kevin
2026-09-24 19:41   ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-09-25  8:15     ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-09-28 18:47   ` Sonang Patel
2026-09-17 14:17 ` [RFC PATCH v6 00/11] iommufd: Infrastructure for vIOMMU creation for confidential guests and guest TSM requests Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-09-24  7:48 ` Tian, Kevin
2026-09-24 19:20   ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-09-28  3:35     ` Tian, Kevin
2026-09-28 13:08       ` Jason Gunthorpe [this message]
2026-09-25  8:29   ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-09-28  3:41     ` Tian, Kevin
2026-09-28  3:55       ` Tian, Kevin
2026-09-24 19:09 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-09-25  6:46   ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-09-25 12:45     ` Jason Gunthorpe

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