* [RFC PATCH 1/2] security: Add hook for unresolved pathname opens
2026-11-20 9:48 [RFC PATCH 0/2] security: Add pre-lookup pathname open check Anastasios Papagiannis
@ 2026-11-20 9:48 ` Anastasios Papagiannis
2026-11-20 10:44 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-11-20 9:48 ` [RFC PATCH 2/2] selftests/bpf: Test pathname open enforcement Anastasios Papagiannis
1 sibling, 1 reply; 4+ messages in thread
From: Anastasios Papagiannis @ 2026-11-20 9:48 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-security-module
Cc: bpf, linux-kernel, linux-fsdevel, paul, jmorris, serge, brauner,
viro, jack, ast, daniel, andrii, kpsingh, matt, eddyz87,
tasos.papagiannnis
Check the copied pathname against the selected base before traversal or
file changes, including O_PATH and O_TMPFILE.
Pass lookup flags so policy can request a referenced retry. Recheck the
base after each restart and cover kernel opens with an explicit root.
Signed-off-by: Anastasios Papagiannis <tasos.papagiannnis@gmail.com>
---
fs/namei.c | 15 +++++++++++++--
include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 2 ++
include/linux/security.h | 10 ++++++++++
security/security.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
4 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
index 925aeb63bfa1..fde11d36d434 100644
--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c
@@ -749,6 +749,7 @@ struct nameidata {
} *stack, internal[EMBEDDED_LEVELS];
struct filename *name;
const char *pathname;
+ const struct open_flags *open;
struct nameidata *saved;
unsigned root_seq;
int dfd;
@@ -768,6 +769,7 @@ static void __set_nameidata(struct nameidata *p, int dfd, struct filename *name)
p->dfd = dfd;
p->name = name;
p->pathname = likely(name) ? name->name : "";
+ p->open = NULL;
p->path.mnt = NULL;
p->path.dentry = NULL;
p->total_link_count = old ? old->total_link_count : 0;
@@ -2716,7 +2718,7 @@ static const char *path_init(struct nameidata *nd, unsigned flags)
} else {
path_get(&nd->path);
}
- return s;
+ goto out;
}
nd->root.mnt = NULL;
@@ -2726,7 +2728,7 @@ static const char *path_init(struct nameidata *nd, unsigned flags)
error = nd_jump_root(nd);
if (unlikely(error))
return ERR_PTR(error);
- return s;
+ goto out;
}
/* Relative pathname -- get the starting-point it is relative to. */
@@ -2784,6 +2786,14 @@ static const char *path_init(struct nameidata *nd, unsigned flags)
nd->state |= ND_ROOT_GRABBED;
}
}
+out:
+ if (nd->open) {
+ error = security_file_open_name(nd->name, &nd->path,
+ nd->open->open_flag, nd->open->mode,
+ nd->flags);
+ if (error)
+ return ERR_PTR(error);
+ }
return s;
}
@@ -4999,6 +5009,7 @@ static struct file *path_openat(struct nameidata *nd,
struct file *file;
int error;
+ nd->open = op;
file = alloc_empty_file(op->open_flag, current_cred());
if (IS_ERR(file))
return file;
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
index 87d9d06710cb..3537f2b73d8c 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
@@ -213,6 +213,8 @@ LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, file_set_fowner, struct file *file)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_send_sigiotask, struct task_struct *tsk,
struct fown_struct *fown, int sig)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_receive, struct file *file)
+LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_open_name, const struct filename *name,
+ const struct path *base, int flags, umode_t mode, unsigned int lookup_flags)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_open, struct file *file)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_post_open, struct file *file, int mask)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_truncate, struct file *file)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 40831fab5470..e6c66cf1cd1c 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -498,6 +498,9 @@ void security_file_set_fowner(struct file *file);
int security_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
struct fown_struct *fown, int sig);
int security_file_receive(struct file *file);
+int security_file_open_name(const struct filename *name,
+ const struct path *base, int flags, umode_t mode,
+ unsigned int lookup_flags);
int security_file_open(struct file *file);
int security_file_post_open(struct file *file, int mask);
int security_file_truncate(struct file *file);
@@ -1238,6 +1241,13 @@ static inline int security_file_receive(struct file *file)
return 0;
}
+static inline int security_file_open_name(const struct filename *name,
+ const struct path *base, int flags, umode_t mode,
+ unsigned int lookup_flags)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
static inline int security_file_open(struct file *file)
{
return 0;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index f6583d507395..d265f9347791 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2742,6 +2742,33 @@ int security_file_receive(struct file *file)
return call_int_hook(file_receive, file);
}
+/**
+ * security_file_open_name() - Authorize a pathname open before lookup
+ * @name: kernel copy of the unresolved pathname, which may be empty
+ * @base: starting path selected by the lookup
+ * @flags: effective open flags
+ * @mode: creation mode, including the file type, before applying the umask
+ * @lookup_flags: current pathname lookup flags, including LOOKUP_RCU
+ *
+ * Check the original pathname before lookup, creation, or opening the file.
+ * @base is the starting path for this attempt, or the file itself for an empty
+ * pathname. This hook also covers O_PATH and io_uring opens.
+ *
+ * This hook must not sleep. @name and @base are borrowed for the call. With
+ * LOOKUP_RCU, @base is RCU-protected; otherwise it holds path references.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 to allow the open or -EACCES or -EPERM to deny it.
+ * During RCU walk, -ECHILD requests a referenced retry. A cached-only
+ * lookup returns -EAGAIN instead.
+ */
+int security_file_open_name(const struct filename *name,
+ const struct path *base, int flags, umode_t mode,
+ unsigned int lookup_flags)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(file_open_name, name, base, flags, mode,
+ lookup_flags);
+}
+
/**
* security_file_open() - Save open() time state for late use by the LSM
* @file:
--
2.56.0
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread* [RFC PATCH 2/2] selftests/bpf: Test pathname open enforcement
2026-11-20 9:48 [RFC PATCH 0/2] security: Add pre-lookup pathname open check Anastasios Papagiannis
2026-11-20 9:48 ` [RFC PATCH 1/2] security: Add hook for unresolved pathname opens Anastasios Papagiannis
@ 2026-11-20 9:48 ` Anastasios Papagiannis
1 sibling, 0 replies; 4+ messages in thread
From: Anastasios Papagiannis @ 2026-11-20 9:48 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-security-module
Cc: bpf, linux-kernel, linux-fsdevel, paul, jmorris, serge, brauner,
viro, jack, ast, daniel, andrii, kpsingh, matt, eddyz87,
tasos.papagiannnis
Verify that the hook sees the raw symlink pathname and the dirfd base.
Check denials before creation and truncation and on O_PATH and O_TMPFILE
opens. Check that -ECHILD makes the VFS retry the open with references.
Signed-off-by: Anastasios Papagiannis <tasos.papagiannnis@gmail.com>
---
.../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/file_open_name.c | 103 ++++++++++++++++++
.../selftests/bpf/progs/file_open_name.c | 56 ++++++++++
2 files changed, 159 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/file_open_name.c
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/file_open_name.c
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/file_open_name.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/file_open_name.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..553e8c9e75f7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/file_open_name.c
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+#include <test_progs.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include "file_open_name.skel.h"
+
+static void check_open(struct file_open_name *skel, int dfd, const char *name,
+ int flags, mode_t mode, int error)
+{
+ int fd, saved_errno;
+
+ skel->bss->calls = 0;
+ skel->bss->rcu_calls = 0;
+ skel->bss->deny = error != 0;
+ skel->bss->check_enabled = true;
+ fd = openat(dfd, name, flags, mode);
+ saved_errno = errno;
+ skel->bss->check_enabled = false;
+
+ if (error) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(fd, -1, "deny open");
+ ASSERT_EQ(saved_errno, error, "open errno");
+ } else {
+ ASSERT_OK_FD(fd, "allow open");
+ }
+ if (fd >= 0)
+ close(fd);
+ ASSERT_GT(skel->bss->calls, 0, "hook count");
+ ASSERT_STREQ(skel->bss->pathname, name, "raw pathname");
+ ASSERT_EQ(skel->bss->observed_flags & flags, flags, "open flags");
+ ASSERT_EQ(skel->bss->observed_mode & 0777, mode, "creation mode");
+}
+
+void test_file_open_name(void)
+{
+ char dir[] = "/tmp/file_open_name.XXXXXX";
+ struct file_open_name *skel = NULL;
+ int dfd = -1, fd = -1;
+ struct stat st;
+
+ if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(mkdtemp(dir), "mkdtemp"))
+ return;
+ dfd = open(dir, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY);
+ if (!ASSERT_OK_FD(dfd, "open directory"))
+ goto out;
+ fd = openat(dfd, "target", O_CREAT | O_RDWR, 0600);
+ if (!ASSERT_OK_FD(fd, "create target"))
+ goto out;
+ if (!ASSERT_EQ(write(fd, "data", 4), 4, "write target"))
+ goto out;
+ if (!ASSERT_OK(symlinkat("target", dfd, "alias"), "symlink"))
+ goto out;
+
+ skel = file_open_name__open_and_load();
+ if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(skel, "open and load"))
+ goto out;
+ if (!ASSERT_OK(stat("/proc/self/ns/pid", &st), "stat PID namespace"))
+ goto out;
+ skel->bss->pidns_dev = st.st_dev;
+ skel->bss->pidns_ino = st.st_ino;
+ skel->bss->monitored_tgid = getpid();
+ if (!ASSERT_OK(file_open_name__attach(skel), "attach"))
+ goto out;
+
+ if (test__start_subtest("raw_symlink")) {
+ check_open(skel, dfd, "./alias", O_RDONLY, 0, 0);
+ if (ASSERT_OK(fstat(dfd, &st), "stat base"))
+ ASSERT_EQ(skel->bss->base_ino, st.st_ino, "dirfd base inode");
+ }
+
+ if (test__start_subtest("deny_create")) {
+ check_open(skel, dfd, "new", O_CREAT | O_RDWR, 0600, EPERM);
+ ASSERT_EQ(fstatat(dfd, "new", &st, 0), -1, "file not created");
+ ASSERT_EQ(errno, ENOENT, "missing file");
+ }
+ if (test__start_subtest("deny_truncate")) {
+ check_open(skel, dfd, "target", O_WRONLY | O_TRUNC, 0, EPERM);
+ if (ASSERT_OK(fstat(fd, &st), "stat target"))
+ ASSERT_EQ(st.st_size, 4, "file not truncated");
+ }
+ if (test__start_subtest("deny_o_path"))
+ check_open(skel, dfd, "alias", O_PATH, 0, EPERM);
+ if (test__start_subtest("deny_tmpfile"))
+ check_open(skel, dfd, ".", O_TMPFILE | O_RDWR, 0600, EPERM);
+ if (test__start_subtest("rcu_retry")) {
+ skel->bss->require_ref = true;
+ check_open(skel, dfd, "target", O_RDONLY, 0, EPERM);
+ skel->bss->require_ref = false;
+ ASSERT_EQ(skel->bss->calls, 2, "hook count");
+ ASSERT_EQ(skel->bss->rcu_calls, 1, "RCU hook count");
+ }
+out:
+ file_open_name__destroy(skel);
+ if (fd >= 0)
+ close(fd);
+ if (dfd >= 0) {
+ unlinkat(dfd, "alias", 0);
+ unlinkat(dfd, "new", 0);
+ unlinkat(dfd, "target", 0);
+ close(dfd);
+ }
+ rmdir(dir);
+}
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/file_open_name.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/file_open_name.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..ea09af8fc238
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/file_open_name.c
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+#include "vmlinux.h"
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h>
+#include <bpf/bpf_tracing.h>
+
+#define LOOKUP_RCU (1U << 8)
+
+__u64 pidns_dev;
+__u64 pidns_ino;
+__u32 monitored_tgid;
+bool check_enabled;
+bool deny;
+bool require_ref;
+int calls;
+int rcu_calls;
+__u64 base_ino;
+int observed_flags;
+__u16 observed_mode;
+char pathname[256];
+
+SEC("lsm/file_open_name")
+int BPF_PROG(check_name, const struct filename *name, const struct path *base,
+ int flags, umode_t mode, unsigned int lookup_flags, int ret)
+{
+ struct bpf_pidns_info nsdata;
+
+ if (ret || !check_enabled)
+ return ret;
+ if (bpf_get_ns_current_pid_tgid(pidns_dev, pidns_ino, &nsdata, sizeof(nsdata)))
+ return ret;
+ if (nsdata.tgid != monitored_tgid)
+ return ret;
+
+ calls++;
+ if (lookup_flags & LOOKUP_RCU) {
+ rcu_calls++;
+ if (require_ref)
+ return -ECHILD;
+ }
+
+ bpf_probe_read_kernel_str(pathname, sizeof(pathname), name->name);
+ base_ino = base->dentry->d_inode->i_ino;
+ observed_flags = flags;
+ observed_mode = mode;
+ if (deny) {
+ int error = -EPERM;
+
+ /* Prevent GCC from replacing the branch with a negation. */
+ barrier_var(error);
+ return error;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+char LICENSE[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
--
2.56.0
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread