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From: Mathias Krause <minipli@grsecurity.net>
To: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	x86@kernel.org, seanjc@google.com, pbonzini@redhat.com,
	dave.hansen@intel.com
Cc: rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, mlevitsk@redhat.com,
	john.allen@amd.com, weijiang.yang@intel.com, xin@zytor.com,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v11 19/23] KVM: x86: Enable CET virtualization for VMX and advertise to userspace
Date: Mon, 21 Jul 2025 17:51:30 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <4114d399-8649-41de-97bf-3b63f29ec7e8@grsecurity.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250704085027.182163-20-chao.gao@intel.com>

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 1020 bytes --]

On 04.07.25 10:49, Chao Gao wrote:
> From: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>
> 
> Expose CET features to guest if KVM/host can support them, clear CPUID
> feature bits if KVM/host cannot support.
> [...]

Can we please make CR4.CET a guest-owned bit as well (sending a patch in
a second)? It's a logical continuation to making CR0.WP a guest-owned
bit just that it's even easier this time, as no MMU role bits are
involved and it still makes a big difference, at least for grsecurity
guest kernels.

Using the old test from [1] gives the following numbers (perf stat -r 5
ssdd 10 50000):

* grsec guest on linux-6.16-rc5 + cet patches:
  2.4647 +- 0.0706 seconds time elapsed  ( +-  2.86% )

* grsec guest on linux-6.16-rc5 + cet patches + CR4.CET guest-owned:
  1.5648 +- 0.0240 seconds time elapsed  ( +-  1.53% )

Not only is it ~35% faster, it's also more stable, less fluctuation due
to less VMEXITs, I believe.

Thanks,
Mathias

[1]
https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20230322013731.102955-1-minipli@grsecurity.net/

[-- Attachment #2: 0001-KVM-VMX-Make-CR4.CET-a-guest-owned-bit.patch --]
[-- Type: text/x-patch, Size: 1260 bytes --]

From 14ef5d8b952744c46c32f16fea3b29184cde3e65 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mathias Krause <minipli@grsecurity.net>
Date: Mon, 21 Jul 2025 13:45:55 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] KVM: VMX: Make CR4.CET a guest owned bit

There's no need to intercept changes of CR4.CET, make it a guest-owned
bit where possible.

This change is VMX-specific, as SVM has no such fine-grained control
register intercept control.

Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@grsecurity.net>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/kvm_cache_regs.h | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/kvm_cache_regs.h b/arch/x86/kvm/kvm_cache_regs.h
index 36a8786db291..8ddb01191d6f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/kvm_cache_regs.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/kvm_cache_regs.h
@@ -7,7 +7,8 @@
 #define KVM_POSSIBLE_CR0_GUEST_BITS	(X86_CR0_TS | X86_CR0_WP)
 #define KVM_POSSIBLE_CR4_GUEST_BITS				  \
 	(X86_CR4_PVI | X86_CR4_DE | X86_CR4_PCE | X86_CR4_OSFXSR  \
-	 | X86_CR4_OSXMMEXCPT | X86_CR4_PGE | X86_CR4_TSD | X86_CR4_FSGSBASE)
+	 | X86_CR4_OSXMMEXCPT | X86_CR4_PGE | X86_CR4_TSD | X86_CR4_FSGSBASE \
+	 | X86_CR4_CET)
 
 #define X86_CR0_PDPTR_BITS    (X86_CR0_CD | X86_CR0_NW | X86_CR0_PG)
 #define X86_CR4_TLBFLUSH_BITS (X86_CR4_PGE | X86_CR4_PCIDE | X86_CR4_PAE | X86_CR4_SMEP)
-- 
2.47.2


  reply	other threads:[~2025-07-21 15:51 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 49+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-07-04  8:49 [PATCH v11 00/23] Enable CET Virtualization Chao Gao
2025-07-04  8:49 ` [PATCH v11 01/23] KVM: x86: Rename kvm_{g,s}et_msr()* to show that they emulate guest accesses Chao Gao
2025-07-24 11:37   ` Huang, Kai
2025-07-24 13:31     ` Sean Christopherson
2025-07-28 22:31   ` Xin Li
2025-07-29  0:45     ` Chao Gao
2025-07-29 18:19       ` Sean Christopherson
2025-07-04  8:49 ` [PATCH v11 02/23] KVM: x86: Add kvm_msr_{read,write}() helpers Chao Gao
2025-07-04  8:49 ` [PATCH v11 03/23] KVM: x86: Manually clear MPX state only on INIT Chao Gao
2025-07-04  8:49 ` [PATCH v11 04/23] KVM: x86: Zero XSTATE components on INIT by iterating over supported features Chao Gao
2025-07-04  8:49 ` [PATCH v11 05/23] KVM: x86: Introduce KVM_{G,S}ET_ONE_REG uAPIs support Chao Gao
2025-07-04  8:49 ` [PATCH v11 06/23] KVM: x86: Report XSS as to-be-saved if there are supported features Chao Gao
2025-07-04  8:49 ` [PATCH v11 07/23] KVM: x86: Refresh CPUID on write to guest MSR_IA32_XSS Chao Gao
2025-07-04  8:49 ` [PATCH v11 08/23] KVM: x86: Initialize kvm_caps.supported_xss Chao Gao
2025-07-04  8:49 ` [PATCH v11 09/23] KVM: x86: Load guest FPU state when access XSAVE-managed MSRs Chao Gao
2025-07-04  8:49 ` [PATCH v11 10/23] KVM: x86: Add fault checks for guest CR4.CET setting Chao Gao
2025-07-04  8:49 ` [PATCH v11 11/23] KVM: x86: Report KVM supported CET MSRs as to-be-saved Chao Gao
2025-07-04  8:49 ` [PATCH v11 12/23] KVM: VMX: Introduce CET VMCS fields and control bits Chao Gao
2025-07-28 22:53   ` Xin Li
2025-07-29  1:30     ` Chao Gao
2025-07-29  2:17       ` Xin Li
2025-07-04  8:49 ` [PATCH v11 13/23] KVM: x86: Enable guest SSP read/write interface with new uAPIs Chao Gao
2025-07-04  8:49 ` [PATCH v11 14/23] KVM: VMX: Emulate read and write to CET MSRs Chao Gao
2025-07-04  8:49 ` [PATCH v11 15/23] KVM: x86: Save and reload SSP to/from SMRAM Chao Gao
2025-07-04  8:49 ` [PATCH v11 16/23] KVM: VMX: Set up interception for CET MSRs Chao Gao
2025-07-04  8:49 ` [PATCH v11 17/23] KVM: VMX: Set host constant supervisor states to VMCS fields Chao Gao
2025-07-04  8:49 ` [PATCH v11 18/23] KVM: x86: Don't emulate instructions guarded by CET Chao Gao
2025-07-04  8:49 ` [PATCH v11 19/23] KVM: x86: Enable CET virtualization for VMX and advertise to userspace Chao Gao
2025-07-21 15:51   ` Mathias Krause [this message]
2025-07-21 17:45     ` Sean Christopherson
2025-07-22  5:49       ` Mathias Krause
2025-07-22 14:13         ` Sean Christopherson
2025-07-22 21:25         ` [PATCH v2] KVM: VMX: Make CR4.CET a guest owned bit Mathias Krause
2025-07-23  6:24           ` Chao Gao
2025-08-06 20:58   ` [PATCH v11 19/23] KVM: x86: Enable CET virtualization for VMX and advertise to userspace John Allen
2025-08-06 22:47     ` Sean Christopherson
2025-07-04  8:49 ` [PATCH v11 20/23] KVM: nVMX: Virtualize NO_HW_ERROR_CODE_CC for L1 event injection to L2 Chao Gao
2025-07-04  8:49 ` [PATCH v11 21/23] KVM: nVMX: Enable CET support for nested guest Chao Gao
2025-07-28  6:30   ` Xin Li
2025-07-28  8:42     ` Chao Gao
2025-07-04  8:49 ` [PATCH v11 22/23] KVM: nVMX: Add consistency checks for CR0.WP and CR4.CET Chao Gao
2025-07-04  8:49 ` [PATCH v11 23/23] KVM: nVMX: Add consistency checks for CET states Chao Gao
2025-07-06 16:51 ` [PATCH v11 00/23] Enable CET Virtualization Xiaoyao Li
2025-07-07  1:32   ` Chao Gao
2025-07-16 20:36     ` John Allen
2025-07-17  7:00       ` Mathias Krause
2025-07-17  7:57         ` Chao Gao
2025-07-21 18:08           ` John Allen
2025-07-21 15:35 ` Mathias Krause

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