From: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, adurbin@google.com,
Eric Northup <digitaleric@google.com>,
jln@google.com, wad@google.com,
Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>,
Zhang Yanfei <zhangyanfei@cn.fujitsu.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4/7] x86, kaslr: select random base offset
Date: Tue, 01 Oct 2013 13:46:49 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <524B34B9.4020504@zytor.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1380656245-29975-5-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>
On 10/01/2013 12:37 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
> +
> +#include <asm/archrandom.h>
> +static inline int rdrand(unsigned long *v)
> +{
> + int ok;
> + asm volatile("1: " RDRAND_LONG "\n\t"
> + "jc 2f\n\t"
> + "decl %0\n\t"
> + "jnz 1b\n\t"
> + "2:"
> + : "=r" (ok), "=a" (*v)
> + : "0" (RDRAND_RETRY_LOOPS));
> + return ok;
> +}
> +
This looks just like rdrand_long() in arch/x86/kernel/cpu/rdrand.c and
could move into the header file, no?
-hpa
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2013-10-01 20:47 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2013-10-01 19:37 [PATCH v6 0/7] Kernel base address randomization Kees Cook
2013-10-01 19:37 ` [PATCH 1/7] x86, kaslr: move CPU flags out of cpucheck Kees Cook
2013-10-01 20:48 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-10-01 21:09 ` Kees Cook
2013-10-01 19:37 ` [PATCH 2/7] x86, kaslr: return location from decompress_kernel Kees Cook
2013-10-01 19:37 ` [PATCH 3/7] x86, kaslr: find minimum safe relocation position Kees Cook
2013-10-01 19:37 ` [PATCH 4/7] x86, kaslr: select random base offset Kees Cook
2013-10-01 20:46 ` H. Peter Anvin [this message]
2013-10-01 21:18 ` Kees Cook
2013-10-01 19:37 ` [PATCH 5/7] x86, kaslr: select memory region from e820 maps Kees Cook
2013-10-01 19:37 ` [PATCH 6/7] x86, kaslr: report kernel offset on panic Kees Cook
2013-10-02 0:38 ` HATAYAMA Daisuke
2013-10-02 1:06 ` HATAYAMA Daisuke
2013-10-02 7:51 ` Kees Cook
2013-10-02 7:48 ` Kees Cook
2013-10-02 9:13 ` HATAYAMA Daisuke
2013-10-03 0:33 ` HATAYAMA Daisuke
2013-10-03 13:47 ` Dave Anderson
2013-10-07 1:59 ` HATAYAMA Daisuke
2013-10-07 13:21 ` Dave Anderson
2013-10-08 9:52 ` HATAYAMA Daisuke
2013-10-08 13:38 ` Dave Anderson
2013-10-09 10:04 ` HATAYAMA Daisuke
2013-10-09 14:13 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-10-09 18:06 ` Kees Cook
2013-10-01 19:37 ` [PATCH 7/7] x86, kaslr: raise max positions to 1GiB on x86_64 Kees Cook
2013-10-02 5:07 ` [PATCH v6 0/7] Kernel base address randomization Ingo Molnar
2013-10-02 5:11 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-10-02 5:25 ` Ingo Molnar
2013-10-02 5:30 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-10-02 5:36 ` Kees Cook
2013-10-03 20:53 [PATCH v7 0/7] Kernel base address randomization on x86 Kees Cook
2013-10-03 20:53 ` [PATCH 4/7] x86, kaslr: select random base offset Kees Cook
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