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From: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>
To: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>, kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Jiaan Lu <jiaan.lu@intel.com>, Zhang Chen <chen.zhang@intel.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>,
	Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>,
	Sandipan Das <sandipan.das@amd.com>,
	Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>,
	Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 01/11] x86/msr-index: Add bit definitions for BHI_DIS_S and BHI_NO
Date: Fri, 14 Apr 2023 17:52:58 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <6337e250-f121-2a3f-65de-d01aff1be9f9@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230414062545.270178-2-chao.gao@intel.com>


On 4/14/2023 2:25 PM, Chao Gao wrote:
> From: Zhang Chen <chen.zhang@intel.com>
>
> To ensure VM migration from a system where software mitigation works to
> a system where it doesn't won't harm guest's security level, KVM must
> mitigate BHI attacks for guests since migration is transparent to guests
> and guests won't and can't react to VM migration.
>
> For example, simple BHB clear sequence [1] is effective in mitigating BHI
> attacks on processors prior to Alder Lake, but it is not on Alder Lake.
> Guests migrated from prior to Alder Lake host to Alder Lake host become
> vulnerable to BHI attacks even if the simmple BHB clear sequence is

/s/simmple/simple


> deployed. In this case, KVM can enable hardware mitigation for guests by
> setting BHI_DIS_S bit of IA32_SPEC_CTRL MSR.
>
> Define the SPEC_CTRL_BHI_DIS_S of IA32_SPEC_CTRL MSR and BHI_NO bits in
> arch_capabilities, which will be used by KVM later.
>
> [1]: https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/technical-documentation/branch-history-injection.html#inpage-nav-2-4
>
> Signed-off-by: Zhang Chen <chen.zhang@intel.com>
> Co-developed-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
> Tested-by: Jiaan Lu <jiaan.lu@intel.com>
> ---
>   arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h       | 8 +++++++-
>   tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 8 +++++++-
>   2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
> index ad35355ee43e..60b25d87b82c 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
> @@ -48,8 +48,10 @@
>   #define SPEC_CTRL_STIBP			BIT(SPEC_CTRL_STIBP_SHIFT)	/* STIBP mask */
>   #define SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT		2	   /* Speculative Store Bypass Disable bit */
>   #define SPEC_CTRL_SSBD			BIT(SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT)	/* Speculative Store Bypass Disable */
> -#define SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S_SHIFT	6	   /* Disable RRSBA behavior */
> +#define SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S_SHIFT	6	   /* Disable RRSBA behavior in supervisor mode */
>   #define SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S		BIT(SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S_SHIFT)
> +#define SPEC_CTRL_BHI_DIS_S_SHIFT	10	   /* Disable BHI behavior in supervisor mode */
> +#define SPEC_CTRL_BHI_DIS_S		BIT(SPEC_CTRL_BHI_DIS_S_SHIFT)
>   
>   /* A mask for bits which the kernel toggles when controlling mitigations */
>   #define SPEC_CTRL_MITIGATIONS_MASK	(SPEC_CTRL_IBRS | SPEC_CTRL_STIBP | SPEC_CTRL_SSBD \
> @@ -151,6 +153,10 @@
>   						 * are restricted to targets in
>   						 * kernel.
>   						 */
> +#define ARCH_CAP_BHI_NO			BIT(20)	/*
> +						 * Not susceptible to Branch History
> +						 * Injection.
> +						 */
>   #define ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO		BIT(24)	/*
>   						 * Not susceptible to Post-Barrier
>   						 * Return Stack Buffer Predictions.
> diff --git a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
> index ad35355ee43e..6079a5fdb40b 100644
> --- a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
> +++ b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
> @@ -48,8 +48,10 @@
>   #define SPEC_CTRL_STIBP			BIT(SPEC_CTRL_STIBP_SHIFT)	/* STIBP mask */
>   #define SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT		2	   /* Speculative Store Bypass Disable bit */
>   #define SPEC_CTRL_SSBD			BIT(SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT)	/* Speculative Store Bypass Disable */
> -#define SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S_SHIFT	6	   /* Disable RRSBA behavior */
> +#define SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S_SHIFT	6	   /* Disable RRSBA behavior in supervisor mode */
>   #define SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S		BIT(SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S_SHIFT)
> +#define SPEC_CTRL_BHI_DIS_S_SHIFT	10         /* Disable BHI behavior in supervisor mode */
> +#define SPEC_CTRL_BHI_DIS_S		BIT(SPEC_CTRL_BHI_DIS_S_SHIFT)
>   
>   /* A mask for bits which the kernel toggles when controlling mitigations */
>   #define SPEC_CTRL_MITIGATIONS_MASK	(SPEC_CTRL_IBRS | SPEC_CTRL_STIBP | SPEC_CTRL_SSBD \
> @@ -151,6 +153,10 @@
>   						 * are restricted to targets in
>   						 * kernel.
>   						 */
> +#define ARCH_CAP_BHI_NO			BIT(20) /*
> +						 * Not susceptible to Branch History
> +						 * Injection.
> +						 */
>   #define ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO		BIT(24)	/*
>   						 * Not susceptible to Post-Barrier
>   						 * Return Stack Buffer Predictions.

  reply	other threads:[~2023-04-14  9:53 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 42+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-04-14  6:25 [RFC PATCH v2 00/11] Intel IA32_SPEC_CTRL Virtualization Chao Gao
2023-04-14  6:25 ` [RFC PATCH v2 01/11] x86/msr-index: Add bit definitions for BHI_DIS_S and BHI_NO Chao Gao
2023-04-14  9:52   ` Binbin Wu [this message]
2023-04-14  6:25 ` [RFC PATCH v2 02/11] KVM: x86: Advertise CPUID.7.2.EDX and RRSBA_CTRL support Chao Gao
2023-04-16  7:04   ` Binbin Wu
2023-04-16 13:25     ` Chao Gao
2023-05-15  6:53   ` Xiaoyao Li
2023-05-16  2:04     ` Chao Gao
2023-05-16  2:22       ` Xiaoyao Li
2023-05-16  3:01         ` Chao Gao
2023-05-16  7:03           ` Xiaoyao Li
2023-05-16  9:09             ` Chao Gao
2023-05-18  9:50               ` Xiaoyao Li
2023-05-19  9:43                 ` Chao Gao
2023-04-14  6:25 ` [RFC PATCH v2 03/11] KVM: x86: Advertise BHI_CTRL support Chao Gao
2023-05-15  7:14   ` Xiaoyao Li
2023-04-14  6:25 ` [RFC PATCH v2 04/11] KVM: VMX: Add IA32_SPEC_CTRL virtualization support Chao Gao
2023-04-17  3:17   ` Binbin Wu
2023-04-18  2:07     ` Chao Gao
2023-04-17  6:48   ` Chenyi Qiang
2023-04-17  7:31     ` Chao Gao
2023-05-16  7:16   ` Xiaoyao Li
2023-05-16  9:20     ` Chao Gao
2023-04-14  6:25 ` [RFC PATCH v2 05/11] x86/bugs: Use Virtual MSRs to request hardware mitigations Chao Gao
2023-04-17 13:43   ` Binbin Wu
2023-04-18  2:01     ` Chao Gao
2023-04-14  6:25 ` [RFC PATCH v2 06/11] KVM: x86: Advertise ARCH_CAP_VIRTUAL_ENUM support Chao Gao
2023-05-18 10:14   ` Xiaoyao Li
2023-05-19  9:57     ` Chao Gao
2023-05-22  1:02       ` Xiaoyao Li
2023-04-14  6:25 ` [RFC PATCH v2 07/11] KVM: VMX: Advertise MITIGATION_CTRL support Chao Gao
2023-04-14  6:25 ` [RFC PATCH v2 08/11] KVM: VMX: Advertise MITI_ENUM_RETPOLINE_S_SUPPORT Chao Gao
2023-05-18 10:25   ` Xiaoyao Li
2023-05-19 10:26     ` Chao Gao
2023-05-22  9:43   ` Liu, Jingqi
2023-04-14  6:25 ` [RFC PATCH v2 09/11] KVM: VMX: Advertise MITI_CTRL_BHB_CLEAR_SEQ_S_SUPPORT Chao Gao
2023-05-22  9:41   ` Liu, Jingqi
2023-04-14  6:25 ` [RFC PATCH v2 10/11] KVM: selftests: Add tests for virtual enumeration/mitigation MSRs Chao Gao
2023-05-22  9:39   ` Liu, Jingqi
2023-04-14  6:25 ` [RFC PATCH v2 11/11] KVM: selftests: Add tests for IA32_SPEC_CTRL MSR Chao Gao
2023-04-14  9:51 ` [RFC PATCH v2 00/11] Intel IA32_SPEC_CTRL Virtualization Binbin Wu
2023-04-14 22:10   ` Pawan Gupta

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