From: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>
To: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>, kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Jiaan Lu <jiaan.lu@intel.com>, Zhang Chen <chen.zhang@intel.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>,
Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>,
Sandipan Das <sandipan.das@amd.com>,
Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>,
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 01/11] x86/msr-index: Add bit definitions for BHI_DIS_S and BHI_NO
Date: Fri, 14 Apr 2023 17:52:58 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <6337e250-f121-2a3f-65de-d01aff1be9f9@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230414062545.270178-2-chao.gao@intel.com>
On 4/14/2023 2:25 PM, Chao Gao wrote:
> From: Zhang Chen <chen.zhang@intel.com>
>
> To ensure VM migration from a system where software mitigation works to
> a system where it doesn't won't harm guest's security level, KVM must
> mitigate BHI attacks for guests since migration is transparent to guests
> and guests won't and can't react to VM migration.
>
> For example, simple BHB clear sequence [1] is effective in mitigating BHI
> attacks on processors prior to Alder Lake, but it is not on Alder Lake.
> Guests migrated from prior to Alder Lake host to Alder Lake host become
> vulnerable to BHI attacks even if the simmple BHB clear sequence is
/s/simmple/simple
> deployed. In this case, KVM can enable hardware mitigation for guests by
> setting BHI_DIS_S bit of IA32_SPEC_CTRL MSR.
>
> Define the SPEC_CTRL_BHI_DIS_S of IA32_SPEC_CTRL MSR and BHI_NO bits in
> arch_capabilities, which will be used by KVM later.
>
> [1]: https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/technical-documentation/branch-history-injection.html#inpage-nav-2-4
>
> Signed-off-by: Zhang Chen <chen.zhang@intel.com>
> Co-developed-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
> Tested-by: Jiaan Lu <jiaan.lu@intel.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 8 +++++++-
> tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 8 +++++++-
> 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
> index ad35355ee43e..60b25d87b82c 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
> @@ -48,8 +48,10 @@
> #define SPEC_CTRL_STIBP BIT(SPEC_CTRL_STIBP_SHIFT) /* STIBP mask */
> #define SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT 2 /* Speculative Store Bypass Disable bit */
> #define SPEC_CTRL_SSBD BIT(SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT) /* Speculative Store Bypass Disable */
> -#define SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S_SHIFT 6 /* Disable RRSBA behavior */
> +#define SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S_SHIFT 6 /* Disable RRSBA behavior in supervisor mode */
> #define SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S BIT(SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S_SHIFT)
> +#define SPEC_CTRL_BHI_DIS_S_SHIFT 10 /* Disable BHI behavior in supervisor mode */
> +#define SPEC_CTRL_BHI_DIS_S BIT(SPEC_CTRL_BHI_DIS_S_SHIFT)
>
> /* A mask for bits which the kernel toggles when controlling mitigations */
> #define SPEC_CTRL_MITIGATIONS_MASK (SPEC_CTRL_IBRS | SPEC_CTRL_STIBP | SPEC_CTRL_SSBD \
> @@ -151,6 +153,10 @@
> * are restricted to targets in
> * kernel.
> */
> +#define ARCH_CAP_BHI_NO BIT(20) /*
> + * Not susceptible to Branch History
> + * Injection.
> + */
> #define ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO BIT(24) /*
> * Not susceptible to Post-Barrier
> * Return Stack Buffer Predictions.
> diff --git a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
> index ad35355ee43e..6079a5fdb40b 100644
> --- a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
> +++ b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
> @@ -48,8 +48,10 @@
> #define SPEC_CTRL_STIBP BIT(SPEC_CTRL_STIBP_SHIFT) /* STIBP mask */
> #define SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT 2 /* Speculative Store Bypass Disable bit */
> #define SPEC_CTRL_SSBD BIT(SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT) /* Speculative Store Bypass Disable */
> -#define SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S_SHIFT 6 /* Disable RRSBA behavior */
> +#define SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S_SHIFT 6 /* Disable RRSBA behavior in supervisor mode */
> #define SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S BIT(SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S_SHIFT)
> +#define SPEC_CTRL_BHI_DIS_S_SHIFT 10 /* Disable BHI behavior in supervisor mode */
> +#define SPEC_CTRL_BHI_DIS_S BIT(SPEC_CTRL_BHI_DIS_S_SHIFT)
>
> /* A mask for bits which the kernel toggles when controlling mitigations */
> #define SPEC_CTRL_MITIGATIONS_MASK (SPEC_CTRL_IBRS | SPEC_CTRL_STIBP | SPEC_CTRL_SSBD \
> @@ -151,6 +153,10 @@
> * are restricted to targets in
> * kernel.
> */
> +#define ARCH_CAP_BHI_NO BIT(20) /*
> + * Not susceptible to Branch History
> + * Injection.
> + */
> #define ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO BIT(24) /*
> * Not susceptible to Post-Barrier
> * Return Stack Buffer Predictions.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-04-14 9:53 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 42+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-04-14 6:25 [RFC PATCH v2 00/11] Intel IA32_SPEC_CTRL Virtualization Chao Gao
2023-04-14 6:25 ` [RFC PATCH v2 01/11] x86/msr-index: Add bit definitions for BHI_DIS_S and BHI_NO Chao Gao
2023-04-14 9:52 ` Binbin Wu [this message]
2023-04-14 6:25 ` [RFC PATCH v2 02/11] KVM: x86: Advertise CPUID.7.2.EDX and RRSBA_CTRL support Chao Gao
2023-04-16 7:04 ` Binbin Wu
2023-04-16 13:25 ` Chao Gao
2023-05-15 6:53 ` Xiaoyao Li
2023-05-16 2:04 ` Chao Gao
2023-05-16 2:22 ` Xiaoyao Li
2023-05-16 3:01 ` Chao Gao
2023-05-16 7:03 ` Xiaoyao Li
2023-05-16 9:09 ` Chao Gao
2023-05-18 9:50 ` Xiaoyao Li
2023-05-19 9:43 ` Chao Gao
2023-04-14 6:25 ` [RFC PATCH v2 03/11] KVM: x86: Advertise BHI_CTRL support Chao Gao
2023-05-15 7:14 ` Xiaoyao Li
2023-04-14 6:25 ` [RFC PATCH v2 04/11] KVM: VMX: Add IA32_SPEC_CTRL virtualization support Chao Gao
2023-04-17 3:17 ` Binbin Wu
2023-04-18 2:07 ` Chao Gao
2023-04-17 6:48 ` Chenyi Qiang
2023-04-17 7:31 ` Chao Gao
2023-05-16 7:16 ` Xiaoyao Li
2023-05-16 9:20 ` Chao Gao
2023-04-14 6:25 ` [RFC PATCH v2 05/11] x86/bugs: Use Virtual MSRs to request hardware mitigations Chao Gao
2023-04-17 13:43 ` Binbin Wu
2023-04-18 2:01 ` Chao Gao
2023-04-14 6:25 ` [RFC PATCH v2 06/11] KVM: x86: Advertise ARCH_CAP_VIRTUAL_ENUM support Chao Gao
2023-05-18 10:14 ` Xiaoyao Li
2023-05-19 9:57 ` Chao Gao
2023-05-22 1:02 ` Xiaoyao Li
2023-04-14 6:25 ` [RFC PATCH v2 07/11] KVM: VMX: Advertise MITIGATION_CTRL support Chao Gao
2023-04-14 6:25 ` [RFC PATCH v2 08/11] KVM: VMX: Advertise MITI_ENUM_RETPOLINE_S_SUPPORT Chao Gao
2023-05-18 10:25 ` Xiaoyao Li
2023-05-19 10:26 ` Chao Gao
2023-05-22 9:43 ` Liu, Jingqi
2023-04-14 6:25 ` [RFC PATCH v2 09/11] KVM: VMX: Advertise MITI_CTRL_BHB_CLEAR_SEQ_S_SUPPORT Chao Gao
2023-05-22 9:41 ` Liu, Jingqi
2023-04-14 6:25 ` [RFC PATCH v2 10/11] KVM: selftests: Add tests for virtual enumeration/mitigation MSRs Chao Gao
2023-05-22 9:39 ` Liu, Jingqi
2023-04-14 6:25 ` [RFC PATCH v2 11/11] KVM: selftests: Add tests for IA32_SPEC_CTRL MSR Chao Gao
2023-04-14 9:51 ` [RFC PATCH v2 00/11] Intel IA32_SPEC_CTRL Virtualization Binbin Wu
2023-04-14 22:10 ` Pawan Gupta
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