From: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>,
Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>,
Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>,
Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>,
Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>, Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
x86@kernel.org, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Subject: Re: [Patch v4 17/18] x86/speculation: Update SPEC_CTRL MSRs of remote CPUs
Date: Mon, 5 Nov 2018 15:59:37 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <81398b26-e1c3-aac3-b44a-2a0982ae74e0@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <alpine.DEB.2.21.1811052326040.1659@nanos.tec.linutronix.de>
Thomas,
>
>
> Aside of the condition being pointless in that case, that issues an IPI
> whether the task is running or not. So this allows a task to issue tons of
> async IPIs disturbing others by toggling the control.
I'm not crazy about sending IPIs too. Hence the original implementation
using TIF_UPDATE_SPEC_CTRL flag.
I've thought a bit about the options you suggested and was unclear
on a few things.
> 1) Restrict the PRCTL control so it is only possible to modify it at the
> point where the application is still single threaded.
>
My understanding is PRCTL applied on the task only. Should it be extended
to other task threads? In that case, it seems like we didn't do that for SSBD?
> 2) Add _TIF_UPDATE_SPEC_CTRL to the SYSCALL_EXIT_WORK_FLAGS and handle it
> in the slow work path.
There can be tasks that don't do any syscalls, and it seems like we can have MSRs getting
out of sync?
>
> I'm less and less convinced that piggybacking this on dumpable is a good
> idea.
There are daemons like sshd that are non-dumpable. So I think protecting
them is desired. Otherwise all those daemons will need to be updated to
use PRCTL. In the original implementation, IBPB is issued for
non-dumpable task. It will be nice to retain that.
Thanks.
Tim
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-11-05 23:59 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 43+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-10-30 18:49 [Patch v4 00/18] Provide process property based options to enable Spectre v2 userspace-userspace protection* Tim Chen
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 01/18] x86/speculation: Clean up spectre_v2_parse_cmdline() Tim Chen
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 02/18] x86/speculation: Remove unnecessary ret variable in cpu_show_common() Tim Chen
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 03/18] x86/speculation: Reorganize cpu_show_common() Tim Chen
2018-11-03 18:07 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-05 19:12 ` Tim Chen
2018-11-05 19:17 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 04/18] x86/speculation: Add X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_ENHANCED Tim Chen
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 05/18] x86/speculation: Disable STIBP when enhanced IBRS is in use Tim Chen
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 06/18] smt: Create cpu_smt_enabled static key for SMT specific code Tim Chen
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 07/18] x86/smt: Convert cpu_smt_control check to cpu_smt_enabled static key Tim Chen
2018-11-03 18:29 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-08 1:43 ` Tim Chen
2018-11-08 11:18 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 08/18] sched: Deprecate sched_smt_present and use " Tim Chen
2018-11-03 18:20 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-09 22:08 ` Tim Chen
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 09/18] x86/speculation: Rename SSBD update functions Tim Chen
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 10/18] x86/speculation: Reorganize speculation control MSRs update Tim Chen
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 11/18] x86/speculation: Update comment on TIF_SSBD Tim Chen
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 12/18] x86: Group thread info flags by functionality Tim Chen
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 13/18] security: Update security level of a process when modifying its dumpability Tim Chen
2018-10-30 20:57 ` Schaufler, Casey
2018-10-30 21:30 ` Tim Chen
2018-10-30 21:53 ` Schaufler, Casey
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 14/18] x86/speculation: Turn on or off STIBP according to a task's TIF_STIBP Tim Chen
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 15/18] x86/speculation: Add Spectre v2 app to app protection modes Tim Chen
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 16/18] x86/speculation: Enable STIBP to protect security sensitive tasks Tim Chen
2018-10-30 21:07 ` Schaufler, Casey
2018-10-30 21:34 ` Tim Chen
2018-10-30 22:02 ` Schaufler, Casey
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 17/18] x86/speculation: Update SPEC_CTRL MSRs of remote CPUs Tim Chen
2018-11-04 19:49 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-05 22:02 ` Tim Chen
2018-11-05 23:04 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-05 23:59 ` Tim Chen [this message]
2018-11-06 7:46 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-07 0:18 ` Tim Chen
2018-11-07 18:33 ` Waiman Long
2018-11-07 23:15 ` Tim Chen
2018-11-07 23:03 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-08 0:22 ` Tim Chen
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 18/18] x86/speculation: Create PRCTL interface to restrict indirect branch speculation Tim Chen
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