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From: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
To: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
	Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
	David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>,
	Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>,
	Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>,
	Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>,
	Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>, Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org
Subject: [Patch v4 08/18] sched: Deprecate sched_smt_present and use cpu_smt_enabled static key
Date: Tue, 30 Oct 2018 11:49:15 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <a3035781690278fdea781f4d718917985994e0af.1540923609.git.tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1540923609.git.tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
In-Reply-To: <cover.1540923609.git.tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>

The cpu_smt_enabled static key serves identical purpose as cpu_smt_enabled
to enable SMT specific code.

This patch replaces sched_smt_present in the scheduler with
cpu_smt_enabled and deprecate sched_smt_present.

Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
---
 kernel/sched/core.c  | 12 ------------
 kernel/sched/fair.c  |  6 ++----
 kernel/sched/sched.h |  4 +---
 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/sched/core.c b/kernel/sched/core.c
index 625bc98..a06b157 100644
--- a/kernel/sched/core.c
+++ b/kernel/sched/core.c
@@ -5739,18 +5739,6 @@ int sched_cpu_activate(unsigned int cpu)
 	struct rq *rq = cpu_rq(cpu);
 	struct rq_flags rf;
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_SCHED_SMT
-	/*
-	 * The sched_smt_present static key needs to be evaluated on every
-	 * hotplug event because at boot time SMT might be disabled when
-	 * the number of booted CPUs is limited.
-	 *
-	 * If then later a sibling gets hotplugged, then the key would stay
-	 * off and SMT scheduling would never be functional.
-	 */
-	if (cpumask_weight(cpu_smt_mask(cpu)) > 1)
-		static_branch_enable_cpuslocked(&sched_smt_present);
-#endif
 	set_cpu_active(cpu, true);
 
 	if (sched_smp_initialized) {
diff --git a/kernel/sched/fair.c b/kernel/sched/fair.c
index b39fb59..4899bb1 100644
--- a/kernel/sched/fair.c
+++ b/kernel/sched/fair.c
@@ -5839,8 +5839,6 @@ static inline int find_idlest_cpu(struct sched_domain *sd, struct task_struct *p
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SCHED_SMT
-DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(sched_smt_present);
-
 static inline void set_idle_cores(int cpu, int val)
 {
 	struct sched_domain_shared *sds;
@@ -5900,7 +5898,7 @@ static int select_idle_core(struct task_struct *p, struct sched_domain *sd, int
 	struct cpumask *cpus = this_cpu_cpumask_var_ptr(select_idle_mask);
 	int core, cpu;
 
-	if (!static_branch_likely(&sched_smt_present))
+	if (!static_branch_likely(&cpu_smt_enabled))
 		return -1;
 
 	if (!test_idle_cores(target, false))
@@ -5936,7 +5934,7 @@ static int select_idle_smt(struct task_struct *p, struct sched_domain *sd, int t
 {
 	int cpu;
 
-	if (!static_branch_likely(&sched_smt_present))
+	if (!static_branch_likely(&cpu_smt_enabled))
 		return -1;
 
 	for_each_cpu(cpu, cpu_smt_mask(target)) {
diff --git a/kernel/sched/sched.h b/kernel/sched/sched.h
index 4a2e8ca..5adba57 100644
--- a/kernel/sched/sched.h
+++ b/kernel/sched/sched.h
@@ -928,13 +928,11 @@ static inline int cpu_of(struct rq *rq)
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SCHED_SMT
 
-extern struct static_key_false sched_smt_present;
-
 extern void __update_idle_core(struct rq *rq);
 
 static inline void update_idle_core(struct rq *rq)
 {
-	if (static_branch_unlikely(&sched_smt_present))
+	if (static_branch_likely(&cpu_smt_enabled))
 		__update_idle_core(rq);
 }
 
-- 
2.9.4


  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-10-30 19:22 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 43+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-10-30 18:49 [Patch v4 00/18] Provide process property based options to enable Spectre v2 userspace-userspace protection* Tim Chen
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 01/18] x86/speculation: Clean up spectre_v2_parse_cmdline() Tim Chen
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 02/18] x86/speculation: Remove unnecessary ret variable in cpu_show_common() Tim Chen
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 03/18] x86/speculation: Reorganize cpu_show_common() Tim Chen
2018-11-03 18:07   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-05 19:12     ` Tim Chen
2018-11-05 19:17       ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 04/18] x86/speculation: Add X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_ENHANCED Tim Chen
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 05/18] x86/speculation: Disable STIBP when enhanced IBRS is in use Tim Chen
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 06/18] smt: Create cpu_smt_enabled static key for SMT specific code Tim Chen
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 07/18] x86/smt: Convert cpu_smt_control check to cpu_smt_enabled static key Tim Chen
2018-11-03 18:29   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-08  1:43     ` Tim Chen
2018-11-08 11:18       ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-30 18:49 ` Tim Chen [this message]
2018-11-03 18:20   ` [Patch v4 08/18] sched: Deprecate sched_smt_present and use " Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-09 22:08     ` Tim Chen
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 09/18] x86/speculation: Rename SSBD update functions Tim Chen
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 10/18] x86/speculation: Reorganize speculation control MSRs update Tim Chen
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 11/18] x86/speculation: Update comment on TIF_SSBD Tim Chen
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 12/18] x86: Group thread info flags by functionality Tim Chen
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 13/18] security: Update security level of a process when modifying its dumpability Tim Chen
2018-10-30 20:57   ` Schaufler, Casey
2018-10-30 21:30     ` Tim Chen
2018-10-30 21:53       ` Schaufler, Casey
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 14/18] x86/speculation: Turn on or off STIBP according to a task's TIF_STIBP Tim Chen
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 15/18] x86/speculation: Add Spectre v2 app to app protection modes Tim Chen
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 16/18] x86/speculation: Enable STIBP to protect security sensitive tasks Tim Chen
2018-10-30 21:07   ` Schaufler, Casey
2018-10-30 21:34     ` Tim Chen
2018-10-30 22:02       ` Schaufler, Casey
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 17/18] x86/speculation: Update SPEC_CTRL MSRs of remote CPUs Tim Chen
2018-11-04 19:49   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-05 22:02     ` Tim Chen
2018-11-05 23:04       ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-05 23:59         ` Tim Chen
2018-11-06  7:46           ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-07  0:18             ` Tim Chen
2018-11-07 18:33               ` Waiman Long
2018-11-07 23:15                 ` Tim Chen
2018-11-07 23:03               ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-08  0:22                 ` Tim Chen
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 18/18] x86/speculation: Create PRCTL interface to restrict indirect branch speculation Tim Chen

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