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From: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
	Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
	David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>,
	Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>,
	Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>,
	Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>,
	Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>, Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [Patch v4 17/18] x86/speculation: Update SPEC_CTRL MSRs of remote CPUs
Date: Mon, 5 Nov 2018 14:02:59 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <ea646842-bd32-3615-bf38-27b568a2d81e@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <alpine.DEB.2.21.1811042042060.10744@nanos.tec.linutronix.de>


Thomas,

>> +	if (tifp & _TIF_UPDATE_SPEC_CTRL)
>> +		clear_tsk_thread_flag(prev_p, TIF_UPDATE_SPEC_CTRL);
>> +
>> +	if (tifn & _TIF_UPDATE_SPEC_CTRL) {
>> +		clear_tsk_thread_flag(next_p, TIF_UPDATE_SPEC_CTRL);
>> +		tifn &= ~_TIF_UPDATE_SPEC_CTRL;
>> +	}
> 
> I'm really unhappy about adding yet more conditionals into this code
> path. We really need to find some better solution for that.
> 
> There are basically two options:
> 
>  1) Restrict the PRCTL control so it is only possible to modify it at the
>     point where the application is still single threaded.
> 
>  2) Add _TIF_UPDATE_SPEC_CTRL to the SYSCALL_EXIT_WORK_FLAGS and handle it
>     in the slow work path.
> 
>     The KVM side can be handled in x86_virt_spec_ctrl().
> 

How about sending an IPI if a remote CPU needs to have its SPEC_CTRL MSR
updated?

Something like the following to replace this patch?

Tim

---

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index b8103991..7505925 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -772,9 +772,15 @@ static int ssb_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static void spec_ctrl_update_func(void *info)
+{
+	speculation_ctrl_update(task_thread_info(current)->flags);
+}
+
 static void set_task_stibp(struct task_struct *tsk, bool stibp_on)
 {
 	bool update = false;
+	int cpu;
 
 	if (!static_branch_unlikely(&spectre_v2_app_lite))
 		return;
@@ -789,6 +795,12 @@ static void set_task_stibp(struct task_struct *tsk, bool stibp_on)
 
 	if (tsk == current)
 		speculation_ctrl_update_current();
+	else {
+		cpu = task_cpu(tsk);
+		if (cpu != smp_processor_id())
+			smp_call_function_single(cpu, spec_ctrl_update_func,
+						 NULL, false); 
+	}
 }
 
 void arch_set_security(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned int value)

  reply	other threads:[~2018-11-05 22:03 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 43+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-10-30 18:49 [Patch v4 00/18] Provide process property based options to enable Spectre v2 userspace-userspace protection* Tim Chen
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 01/18] x86/speculation: Clean up spectre_v2_parse_cmdline() Tim Chen
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 02/18] x86/speculation: Remove unnecessary ret variable in cpu_show_common() Tim Chen
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 03/18] x86/speculation: Reorganize cpu_show_common() Tim Chen
2018-11-03 18:07   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-05 19:12     ` Tim Chen
2018-11-05 19:17       ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 04/18] x86/speculation: Add X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_ENHANCED Tim Chen
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 05/18] x86/speculation: Disable STIBP when enhanced IBRS is in use Tim Chen
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 06/18] smt: Create cpu_smt_enabled static key for SMT specific code Tim Chen
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 07/18] x86/smt: Convert cpu_smt_control check to cpu_smt_enabled static key Tim Chen
2018-11-03 18:29   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-08  1:43     ` Tim Chen
2018-11-08 11:18       ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 08/18] sched: Deprecate sched_smt_present and use " Tim Chen
2018-11-03 18:20   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-09 22:08     ` Tim Chen
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 09/18] x86/speculation: Rename SSBD update functions Tim Chen
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 10/18] x86/speculation: Reorganize speculation control MSRs update Tim Chen
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 11/18] x86/speculation: Update comment on TIF_SSBD Tim Chen
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 12/18] x86: Group thread info flags by functionality Tim Chen
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 13/18] security: Update security level of a process when modifying its dumpability Tim Chen
2018-10-30 20:57   ` Schaufler, Casey
2018-10-30 21:30     ` Tim Chen
2018-10-30 21:53       ` Schaufler, Casey
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 14/18] x86/speculation: Turn on or off STIBP according to a task's TIF_STIBP Tim Chen
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 15/18] x86/speculation: Add Spectre v2 app to app protection modes Tim Chen
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 16/18] x86/speculation: Enable STIBP to protect security sensitive tasks Tim Chen
2018-10-30 21:07   ` Schaufler, Casey
2018-10-30 21:34     ` Tim Chen
2018-10-30 22:02       ` Schaufler, Casey
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 17/18] x86/speculation: Update SPEC_CTRL MSRs of remote CPUs Tim Chen
2018-11-04 19:49   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-05 22:02     ` Tim Chen [this message]
2018-11-05 23:04       ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-05 23:59         ` Tim Chen
2018-11-06  7:46           ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-07  0:18             ` Tim Chen
2018-11-07 18:33               ` Waiman Long
2018-11-07 23:15                 ` Tim Chen
2018-11-07 23:03               ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-08  0:22                 ` Tim Chen
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 18/18] x86/speculation: Create PRCTL interface to restrict indirect branch speculation Tim Chen

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