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From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
To: "Huang, Kai" <kai.huang@intel.com>,
	"Luck, Tony" <tony.luck@intel.com>,
	"Hunter, Adrian" <adrian.hunter@intel.com>,
	"Annapurve, Vishal" <vannapurve@google.com>
Cc: "kvm@vger.kernel.org" <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
	"Li, Xiaoyao" <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>,
	"Zhao, Yan Y" <yan.y.zhao@intel.com>,
	"dave.hansen@linux.intel.com" <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	"kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com"
	<kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
	"mingo@redhat.com" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"seanjc@google.com" <seanjc@google.com>,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"tglx@linutronix.de" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Yamahata, Isaku" <isaku.yamahata@intel.com>,
	"tony.lindgren@linux.intel.com" <tony.lindgren@linux.intel.com>,
	"binbin.wu@linux.intel.com" <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>,
	"linux-edac@vger.kernel.org" <linux-edac@vger.kernel.org>,
	"hpa@zytor.com" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"Chatre, Reinette" <reinette.chatre@intel.com>,
	"pbonzini@redhat.com" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"Edgecombe, Rick P" <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
	"bp@alien8.de" <bp@alien8.de>, "Gao, Chao" <chao.gao@intel.com>,
	"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] KVM: TDX: Do not clear poisoned pages
Date: Thu, 26 Jun 2025 15:33:11 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <b439abd6-9fd9-4f51-82e2-c8b1304e7cca@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <f51e62543aa765da3b4f4ed19aa13340881fbc89.camel@intel.com>

On 6/26/25 15:20, Huang, Kai wrote:
> But IMHO we may should just have a simple policy that when a page is marked
> as poisoned, it should never be touched again.  It's only one page anyway
> (for one TD) so losing that doesn't seem bad to me.  If we want to clear the
> poisoned page, then perhaps we should mark that page to be not-poisoned
> again.

The simplest policy is to do nothing.

The kernel only has 29 places that check PageHWPoison(). I'd guess that
roughly half of those are the memory-failure.c infrastructure and
bare-minimum code to handle poison, like not allowing pages to go back
into the allocator.

There are something like 5,000 lines of code in the kernel that deal
with a literal 'struct page'. 29 checks for ~5,000 sites is pretty
minuscule. We obviously don't have a policy that every place that uses
'struct page' needs to check for poison. We also don't even have a
policy where writes to or reads from a page check for poison.

Why is this TDX code so special that PageHWPoison() needs to be checked.
For instance:

$ grep -r PageHWPoison arch/x86/
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/core.c:	SetPageHWPoison(p);
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/core.c:	SetPageHWPoison(p);

In other words, this would be the *ONLY* arch/x86 site. Why?

  reply	other threads:[~2025-06-26 22:33 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 35+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-06-18 12:08 [PATCH 0/2] Fixes for recovery for machine check in TDX/SEAM non-root mode Adrian Hunter
2025-06-18 12:08 ` [PATCH 1/2] x86/mce: Fix missing address mask in recovery for errors " Adrian Hunter
2025-06-18 12:36   ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-06-18 14:55   ` Dave Hansen
2025-06-19 11:57     ` Adrian Hunter
2025-06-27 15:23       ` Adrian Hunter
2025-06-27 15:25         ` Dave Hansen
2025-06-27 16:24           ` Luck, Tony
2025-06-27 16:33             ` Dave Hansen
2025-07-30 10:54               ` Adrian Hunter
2025-07-30 11:57                 ` Huang, Kai
2025-07-30 14:20                 ` Vishal Annapurve
2025-06-27 16:28         ` Luck, Tony
2025-06-18 23:20   ` Huang, Kai
2025-06-18 23:39     ` Luck, Tony
2025-06-18 23:46       ` Luck, Tony
2025-06-18 23:57         ` Huang, Kai
2025-06-18 23:53       ` Huang, Kai
2025-06-18 12:08 ` [PATCH 2/2] KVM: TDX: Do not clear poisoned pages Adrian Hunter
2025-06-18 12:39   ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-06-18 14:58   ` Dave Hansen
2025-06-25 14:33     ` Vishal Annapurve
2025-06-25 16:25       ` Adrian Hunter
2025-06-25 16:31         ` Dave Hansen
2025-06-25 16:42           ` Adrian Hunter
2025-06-25 16:57             ` Dave Hansen
2025-06-25 16:42         ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2025-06-25 22:32         ` Huang, Kai
2025-06-25 22:38           ` Dave Hansen
2025-06-26  1:19             ` Huang, Kai
2025-06-26 15:31               ` Luck, Tony
2025-06-26 22:20                 ` Huang, Kai
2025-06-26 22:33                   ` Dave Hansen [this message]
2025-06-27  0:56                     ` Huang, Kai
2025-06-18 23:09   ` Huang, Kai

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