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From: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
To: Vishal Annapurve <vannapurve@google.com>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>, <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	<seanjc@google.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>, <x86@kernel.org>,
	H Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>, <linux-edac@vger.kernel.org>,
	<linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
	<rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>, <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
	<kai.huang@intel.com>, <reinette.chatre@intel.com>,
	<xiaoyao.li@intel.com>, <tony.lindgren@linux.intel.com>,
	<binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>, <isaku.yamahata@intel.com>,
	<yan.y.zhao@intel.com>, <chao.gao@intel.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] KVM: TDX: Do not clear poisoned pages
Date: Wed, 25 Jun 2025 19:25:39 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <bc492cb2-1d30-4a30-9eb9-d48b09cd29a9@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAGtprH_cVwWhfXFkM-=rVzQZ0CpY_zcnkF=q5x1n_9Bzm1xKfw@mail.gmail.com>

On 25/06/2025 17:33, Vishal Annapurve wrote:
> On Wed, Jun 18, 2025 at 7:58 AM Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> wrote:
>>
>> On 6/18/25 05:08, Adrian Hunter wrote:
>>> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
>>> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
>>> @@ -282,10 +282,10 @@ static void tdx_clear_page(struct page *page)
>>>       void *dest = page_to_virt(page);
>>>       unsigned long i;
>>>
>>> -     /*
>>> -      * The page could have been poisoned.  MOVDIR64B also clears
>>> -      * the poison bit so the kernel can safely use the page again.
>>> -      */
>>> +     /* Machine check handler may have poisoned the page */
>>> +     if (PageHWPoison(page))
>>> +             return;
> 
> IIUC, even if movdir64b stores contents on hwpoisoned pages, it's not
> going to cause any trouble.

No.  PageHWPoison(page) means the page should not be touched.  It must
be freed back to the allocator where it will never be allocated again.

> 
> This check should be (unlikely(PageHWPoison(page)) and even better

'unlikely' would be fine

> probably should be omitted altogether if there are no side effects of
> direct store to hwpoisoned pages.
> 
>>
>> I think the old comment needs to stay in some form.
>>
>> There are two kinds of poisons here: One from an integrity mismatch and
>> the other because the hardware decided the memory is bad. MOVDIR64B
>> clears the integrity one, but not the hardware one obviously.
> 
> To ensure I understand correctly, Am I correct in saying: movdir64b
> clearing the integrity poison is just hardware clearing the poison
> bit, software will still treat that page as poisoned?

Typically an integrity violation would have caused a machine check
and the machine check handler would have marked the page
SetPageHWPoison(page).

So we really end up with only 2 cases:
1. page is fine and PageHWPoison(page) is false
2. page may have had an integrity violation or a hardware error
(we can't tell which), and PageHWPoison(page) is true


  reply	other threads:[~2025-06-25 16:26 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 35+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-06-18 12:08 [PATCH 0/2] Fixes for recovery for machine check in TDX/SEAM non-root mode Adrian Hunter
2025-06-18 12:08 ` [PATCH 1/2] x86/mce: Fix missing address mask in recovery for errors " Adrian Hunter
2025-06-18 12:36   ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-06-18 14:55   ` Dave Hansen
2025-06-19 11:57     ` Adrian Hunter
2025-06-27 15:23       ` Adrian Hunter
2025-06-27 15:25         ` Dave Hansen
2025-06-27 16:24           ` Luck, Tony
2025-06-27 16:33             ` Dave Hansen
2025-07-30 10:54               ` Adrian Hunter
2025-07-30 11:57                 ` Huang, Kai
2025-07-30 14:20                 ` Vishal Annapurve
2025-06-27 16:28         ` Luck, Tony
2025-06-18 23:20   ` Huang, Kai
2025-06-18 23:39     ` Luck, Tony
2025-06-18 23:46       ` Luck, Tony
2025-06-18 23:57         ` Huang, Kai
2025-06-18 23:53       ` Huang, Kai
2025-06-18 12:08 ` [PATCH 2/2] KVM: TDX: Do not clear poisoned pages Adrian Hunter
2025-06-18 12:39   ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-06-18 14:58   ` Dave Hansen
2025-06-25 14:33     ` Vishal Annapurve
2025-06-25 16:25       ` Adrian Hunter [this message]
2025-06-25 16:31         ` Dave Hansen
2025-06-25 16:42           ` Adrian Hunter
2025-06-25 16:57             ` Dave Hansen
2025-06-25 16:42         ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2025-06-25 22:32         ` Huang, Kai
2025-06-25 22:38           ` Dave Hansen
2025-06-26  1:19             ` Huang, Kai
2025-06-26 15:31               ` Luck, Tony
2025-06-26 22:20                 ` Huang, Kai
2025-06-26 22:33                   ` Dave Hansen
2025-06-27  0:56                     ` Huang, Kai
2025-06-18 23:09   ` Huang, Kai

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