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From: "Edgecombe, Rick P" <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
To: "Hunter, Adrian" <adrian.hunter@intel.com>,
	"Annapurve, Vishal" <vannapurve@google.com>
Cc: "kvm@vger.kernel.org" <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
	"Li, Xiaoyao" <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>,
	"Huang, Kai" <kai.huang@intel.com>,
	"Luck, Tony" <tony.luck@intel.com>,
	"dave.hansen@linux.intel.com" <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	"Zhao, Yan Y" <yan.y.zhao@intel.com>,
	"Hansen, Dave" <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"seanjc@google.com" <seanjc@google.com>,
	"Chatre, Reinette" <reinette.chatre@intel.com>,
	"pbonzini@redhat.com" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"mingo@redhat.com" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"tglx@linutronix.de" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com"
	<kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
	"binbin.wu@linux.intel.com" <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>,
	"Yamahata, Isaku" <isaku.yamahata@intel.com>,
	"linux-edac@vger.kernel.org" <linux-edac@vger.kernel.org>,
	"hpa@zytor.com" <hpa@zytor.com>, "bp@alien8.de" <bp@alien8.de>,
	"tony.lindgren@linux.intel.com" <tony.lindgren@linux.intel.com>,
	"Gao, Chao" <chao.gao@intel.com>,
	"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] KVM: TDX: Do not clear poisoned pages
Date: Wed, 25 Jun 2025 16:42:33 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <ea78b667170a190106f58b866a513e2161fd6870.camel@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <bc492cb2-1d30-4a30-9eb9-d48b09cd29a9@intel.com>

On Wed, 2025-06-25 at 19:25 +0300, Adrian Hunter wrote:
> > To ensure I understand correctly, Am I correct in saying: movdir64b
> > clearing the integrity poison is just hardware clearing the poison
> > bit, software will still treat that page as poisoned?
> 
> Typically an integrity violation would have caused a machine check
> and the machine check handler would have marked the page
> SetPageHWPoison(page).
> 
> So we really end up with only 2 cases:
> 1. page is fine and PageHWPoison(page) is false
> 2. page may have had an integrity violation or a hardware error
> (we can't tell which), and PageHWPoison(page) is true

Could an access in userspace take an #MC, and have the kernel set the direct map
for the page to NP and kill process? Then another process with access to the
gmem fd tries to map it as private, and take a non-integrity related SEAMMODE
#MC and ends up here? It does seem safer to just avoid touching it. But I bet
there are many cases like this, and we can't check poison everywhere. 

If guestmemfd turns into more of a persistent allocator, instead of a per-VM
thing, it probably needs to do some of the checks that the page allocator does,
like poison checks.

  parent reply	other threads:[~2025-06-25 16:42 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 35+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-06-18 12:08 [PATCH 0/2] Fixes for recovery for machine check in TDX/SEAM non-root mode Adrian Hunter
2025-06-18 12:08 ` [PATCH 1/2] x86/mce: Fix missing address mask in recovery for errors " Adrian Hunter
2025-06-18 12:36   ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-06-18 14:55   ` Dave Hansen
2025-06-19 11:57     ` Adrian Hunter
2025-06-27 15:23       ` Adrian Hunter
2025-06-27 15:25         ` Dave Hansen
2025-06-27 16:24           ` Luck, Tony
2025-06-27 16:33             ` Dave Hansen
2025-07-30 10:54               ` Adrian Hunter
2025-07-30 11:57                 ` Huang, Kai
2025-07-30 14:20                 ` Vishal Annapurve
2025-06-27 16:28         ` Luck, Tony
2025-06-18 23:20   ` Huang, Kai
2025-06-18 23:39     ` Luck, Tony
2025-06-18 23:46       ` Luck, Tony
2025-06-18 23:57         ` Huang, Kai
2025-06-18 23:53       ` Huang, Kai
2025-06-18 12:08 ` [PATCH 2/2] KVM: TDX: Do not clear poisoned pages Adrian Hunter
2025-06-18 12:39   ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-06-18 14:58   ` Dave Hansen
2025-06-25 14:33     ` Vishal Annapurve
2025-06-25 16:25       ` Adrian Hunter
2025-06-25 16:31         ` Dave Hansen
2025-06-25 16:42           ` Adrian Hunter
2025-06-25 16:57             ` Dave Hansen
2025-06-25 16:42         ` Edgecombe, Rick P [this message]
2025-06-25 22:32         ` Huang, Kai
2025-06-25 22:38           ` Dave Hansen
2025-06-26  1:19             ` Huang, Kai
2025-06-26 15:31               ` Luck, Tony
2025-06-26 22:20                 ` Huang, Kai
2025-06-26 22:33                   ` Dave Hansen
2025-06-27  0:56                     ` Huang, Kai
2025-06-18 23:09   ` Huang, Kai

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