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From: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
To: Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com>,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, kvmarm@lists.linux.dev
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
	James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>,
	Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>,
	Zenghui Yu <yuzenghui@huawei.com>,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Joey Gouly <joey.gouly@arm.com>,
	Alexandru Elisei <alexandru.elisei@arm.com>,
	Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@arm.com>,
	Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>,
	linux-coco@lists.linux.dev,
	Ganapatrao Kulkarni <gankulkarni@os.amperecomputing.com>,
	Gavin Shan <gshan@redhat.com>,
	Shanker Donthineni <sdonthineni@nvidia.com>,
	Alper Gun <alpergun@google.com>,
	"Aneesh Kumar K . V" <aneesh.kumar@kernel.org>,
	Emi Kisanuki <fj0570is@fujitsu.com>,
	Vishal Annapurve <vannapurve@google.com>,
	WeiLin.Chang@arm.com, Lorenzo Pieralisi <lpieralisi@kernel.org>,
	Kohei Enju <enju.kohei@fujitsu.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 11/12] KVM: arm64: CCA: Support runtime faulting of memory
Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2026 18:36:29 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <c5ebf936-fbc6-4910-be59-9e89ff3a625e@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261111145758.217946-12-steven.price@arm.com>

On 11/11/2026 14:57, Steven Price wrote:
> At runtime, if the realm guest accesses an IPA without a stage-2
> mapping, then KVM fixes up the stage-2 mapping for the backing memory.
> 
> For memory in the lower (protected) region of IPA, verify that the
> corresponding guest_memfd page is private before delegating to the RMM.
> The RMM then maps the page into the realm and initializes its contents
> to zero.
> 
> For memory in the upper (shared) IPA region, map the backing page as
> non-secure memory. Check that a guest_memfd page is shared when the
> fault uses guest_memfd; ordinary userspace-backed memslots can only be
> mapped at unprotected IPAs and follow the normal user memory fault path.
> 
> If the fault IPA and guest_memfd attributes disagree then exit to
> userspace with KVM_EXIT_MEMORY_FAULT so the VMM can perform the required
> conversion. If a shared IPA has no memslot, KVM follows the existing
> MMIO or abort-injection path. The latter can result in injecting a SEA
> to the guest.
> 
> Realm faults may need to create RTTs, including when updating a
> mapping after a permission fault. Take the write side of mmu_lock
> and top up the MMU cache for these faults. Do not pre-fault Realm
> memory.
> 
> Co-developed-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
> Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
> Signed-off-by: Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com>
> 
> ---
> Changes since v1:
> - Use the write side of mmu_lock and top up the MMU cache for Realm
>    faults that may create RTTs. Skip unnecessary cache flushing,
>    disable Realm pre-faulting, and tighten memory-fault and mapping
>    retry handling.
> ---
>   arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h |  13 ++
>   arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h     |   4 +-
>   arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_rmi.h     |   6 +
>   arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c                 | 115 +++++++++++--
>   arch/arm64/kvm/rmi.c                 | 235 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>   5 files changed, 353 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h
> index 32021bdf2610..8a71fddfdb85 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h
> +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h
> @@ -847,4 +847,17 @@ static inline bool kvm_realm_is_created(struct kvm *kvm)
>   	return kvm_vm_is_realm(kvm) && kvm_realm_state(kvm) != REALM_STATE_NONE;
>   }
>   
> +static inline gpa_t kvm_gpa_from_fault(struct kvm *kvm, phys_addr_t ipa)
> +{
> +	if (!kvm_vm_is_realm(kvm))
> +		return ipa;
> +
> +	return ipa & ~BIT(kvm->arch.realm.ia_bits - 1);
> +}
> +
> +static inline gfn_t kvm_gfn_from_fault(struct kvm *kvm, phys_addr_t ipa)
> +{
> +	return gpa_to_gfn(kvm_gpa_from_fault(kvm, ipa));
> +}
> +
>   #endif /* __ARM64_KVM_EMULATE_H__ */
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h
> index 32392abf2e21..a70f8bd4b2b9 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h
> +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h
> @@ -371,7 +371,7 @@ static inline bool kvm_is_nested_s2_mmu(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_s2_mmu *mmu)
>   
>   static inline void kvm_fault_lock(struct kvm *kvm)
>   {
> -	if (is_protected_kvm_enabled())
> +	if (kvm_vm_hyp_is_distrusting(kvm))
>   		write_lock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
>   	else
>   		read_lock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
> @@ -379,7 +379,7 @@ static inline void kvm_fault_lock(struct kvm *kvm)
>   
>   static inline void kvm_fault_unlock(struct kvm *kvm)
>   {
> -	if (is_protected_kvm_enabled())
> +	if (kvm_vm_hyp_is_distrusting(kvm))
>   		write_unlock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
>   	else
>   		read_unlock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_rmi.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_rmi.h
> index e64c3bcce160..d1ba0c325bb0 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_rmi.h
> +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_rmi.h
> @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
>   #ifndef __ASM_KVM_RMI_H
>   #define __ASM_KVM_RMI_H
>   
> +#include <asm/kvm_pgtable.h>
>   #include <linux/arm-smccc-rmi.h>
>   #include <linux/kvm.h>
>   
> @@ -89,6 +90,11 @@ void kvm_realm_unmap_range_filter(struct kvm *kvm,
>   				  bool may_block,
>   				  enum kvm_gfn_range_filter attr_filter);
>   
> +int realm_map_ipa(struct kvm *kvm, phys_addr_t ipa,
> +		  kvm_pfn_t pfn, unsigned long map_size,
> +		  enum kvm_pgtable_prot prot,
> +		  struct kvm_mmu_memory_cache *memcache);
> +
>   static inline bool kvm_realm_is_private_address(struct realm *realm,
>   						unsigned long addr)
>   {
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c
> index e550360fc94d..b6c61d7890c8 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c
> @@ -450,6 +450,10 @@ static void stage2_flush_vm(struct kvm *kvm)
>   	struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot;
>   	int idx, bkt;
>   
> +	/* The RMM requires FWB, so Realm stage-2 mappings need no cache flush. */
> +	if (kvm_vm_is_realm(kvm))
> +		return;

While this is true, it would be also worth mentioning KVM can't handle
this for a Realm as the traps are handled within RMM. So this could be
something like:
	
	/*
	 * The RMM mandates FEAT_FWB and additionally KVM can't handle
	 * such traps anyway.
	 */


> +
>   	idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu);
>   	write_lock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
>   
> @@ -1222,6 +1226,10 @@ void stage2_unmap_vm(struct kvm *kvm)
>   	struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot;
>   	int idx, bkt;
>   
> +	/* For realms this is handled by the RMM so nothing to do here */

minor nit: Might be better to add a similar comment as above.
	
	/*
	 * The RMM mandates FEAT_FWB and additionally KVM can't handle
	 * such traps anyway.
	 */

as we skip calling stage2_unmap_vm() if we have FWB anyways.

> +	if (kvm_vm_is_realm(kvm))
> +		return;
> +
>   	idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu);
>   	mmap_read_lock(current->mm);
>   	write_lock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
> @@ -1791,12 +1799,18 @@ static int gmem_abort(const struct kvm_s2_fault_desc *s2fd,
>   	void *memcache = NULL;
>   	gfn_t canonical_gfn;
>   	int ret;
> +	bool is_private = false;
>   
> -	if (!perm_fault) {
> +	if (KVM_BUG_ON(!kvm_slot_has_gmem(s2fd->memslot), kvm))
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +
> +	if (!perm_fault || kvm_arch_has_private_mem(kvm)) {

should this be s/kvm_arch_has_private_mem/kvm_vm_is_realm ? I dont think
this would be required for pKVM yet ?

Also, I wonder why pKVM doesnt need mmu cache pages with permission 
faults with gmem. They do for user_mem_abort().
(may be because they assume Gmem is always single page ? in which case
we could also have the same behavior)


>   		memcache = get_mmu_memcache(s2fd->vcpu);
>   		ret = topup_mmu_memcache(s2fd->mmu, memcache);
>   		if (ret)
>   			return ret;
> +	}
> +	if (!perm_fault) {
>   		if (kvm_is_nested_s2_mmu(kvm, pgt->mmu)) {
>   			mapping = kmalloc_obj(struct kvm_guest_s2_mapping, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
>   			if (!mapping)
> @@ -1805,7 +1819,7 @@ static int gmem_abort(const struct kvm_s2_fault_desc *s2fd,
>   	}
>   
>   	s2vi.vma_pagesize = PAGE_SIZE;
> -	s2vi.gfn = ALIGN_DOWN(s2fd->fault_ipa, s2vi.vma_pagesize) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
> +	s2vi.gfn = gpa_to_gfn(kvm_gpa_from_fault(kvm, s2fd->fault_ipa));
>   	canonical_gfn = get_canonical_gfn(s2fd, &s2vi);
>   
>   	write_fault = kvm_s2_fault_is_write(s2fd);
> @@ -1817,13 +1831,35 @@ static int gmem_abort(const struct kvm_s2_fault_desc *s2fd,
>   	/* Pairs with the smp_wmb() in kvm_mmu_invalidate_end(). */
>   	smp_rmb();
>   
> +	if (kvm_arch_has_private_mem(kvm)) {

--8>--

> +		switch (kvm->arch.vm_flavor) {
> +		case VM_REALM:
> +			is_private = kvm_realm_is_private_address(&kvm->arch.realm,
> +								  s2fd->fault_ipa);

Could we for now use
		is_private = private_ipa_fault(kvm, s2fd->fault_ipa);

In other words use a wrapper for detecting if a given ipa is private or 
not ? May be something like:	kvm_ipa_is_private(kvm, ipa)? (choose ipa 
to make it explicit, it is arm64 thing).

Where, pKVM could hook in its own check.


> +			break;
> +		default:
> +			break;
> +		}
> +
> +		if (is_private != kvm_gmem_is_private_gfn(kvm, canonical_gfn)) {
> +			if (!result)
> +				kvm_prepare_memory_fault_exit(s2fd->vcpu,
> +							      gfn_to_gpa(canonical_gfn),
> +							      PAGE_SIZE,
> +							      write_fault, exec_fault,
> +							      is_private);
> +			kfree(mapping);
> +			return -EFAULT;
> +		}
> +	}
> +
>   	ret = kvm_gmem_get_pfn(kvm, s2fd->memslot, canonical_gfn, &s2vi.pfn, NULL);
>   	if (ret) {
>   		/* If result is non-NULL this is a synthetic fault. */
>   		if (!result)
>   			kvm_prepare_memory_fault_exit(s2fd->vcpu, gfn_to_gpa(canonical_gfn),
>   						      s2vi.vma_pagesize, write_fault, exec_fault,
> -						      false);
> +						      is_private);
>   		kfree(mapping);
>   		return ret;
>   	}
> @@ -1846,6 +1882,16 @@ static int gmem_abort(const struct kvm_s2_fault_desc *s2fd,
>   		goto out_unlock;
>   	}
>   
> +	switch (kvm->arch.vm_flavor) {
> +	case VM_REALM:
> +		prot &= ~KVM_PGTABLE_PROT_X;
> +		ret = realm_map_ipa(kvm, s2fd->fault_ipa, s2vi.pfn,
> +				    PAGE_SIZE, prot, memcache);
> +		goto out_unlock;
> +	default:
> +		break;
> +	}
> +
>   	if (perm_fault) {
>   		/*
>   		 * Drop the SW bits in favour of those stored in the
> @@ -2047,7 +2093,8 @@ static int kvm_s2_fault_get_vma_info(const struct kvm_s2_fault_desc *s2fd,
>   	 * mapping size to ensure we find the right PFN and lay down the
>   	 * mapping in the right place.
>   	 */
> -	s2vi->gfn = ALIGN_DOWN(s2fd->fault_ipa, s2vi->vma_pagesize) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
> +	s2vi->gfn = kvm_gfn_from_fault(kvm, ALIGN_DOWN(s2fd->fault_ipa,
> +						       s2vi->vma_pagesize));
>   
>   	s2vi->mte_allowed = kvm_vma_mte_allowed(vma);
>   
> @@ -2227,7 +2274,7 @@ static int kvm_s2_fault_map(const struct kvm_s2_fault_desc *s2fd,
>   	 * possible.
>   	 */
>   	if (mapping_size == PAGE_SIZE && s2vi->max_map_size != PAGE_SIZE) {
> -		if (perm_fault_granule > PAGE_SIZE) {
> +		if (perm_fault_granule > PAGE_SIZE && !kvm_vm_is_realm(kvm)) {

Please could we add a comment here, why we do this ? It is a subtle case.

>   			mapping_size = perm_fault_granule;
>   		} else {
>   			mapping_size = transparent_hugepage_adjust(s2fd, &pfn, &gfn);
> @@ -2242,12 +2289,15 @@ static int kvm_s2_fault_map(const struct kvm_s2_fault_desc *s2fd,
>   	if (!perm_fault_granule && !s2vi->map_non_cacheable && kvm_has_mte(kvm))
>   		sanitise_mte_tags(kvm, pfn, mapping_size);
>   
> -	/*
> -	 * Under the premise of getting a FSC_PERM fault, we just need to relax
> -	 * permissions only if mapping_size equals perm_fault_granule. Otherwise,
> -	 * kvm_pgtable_stage2_map() should be called to change block size.
> -	 */
> -	if (mapping_size == perm_fault_granule) {
> +	if (kvm_vm_is_realm(kvm)) {
> +		ret = realm_map_ipa(kvm, s2fd->fault_ipa, pfn, mapping_size,
> +				    prot, memcache);
> +	} else if (mapping_size == perm_fault_granule) {
> +		/*
> +		 * Under the premise of getting a FSC_PERM fault, we just need to relax
> +		 * permissions only if mapping_size equals perm_fault_granule. Otherwise,
> +		 * kvm_pgtable_stage2_map() should be called to change block size.
> +		 */
>   		/*
>   		 * Drop the SW bits in favour of those stored in the
>   		 * PTE, which will be preserved.
> @@ -2306,15 +2356,16 @@ static int user_mem_abort(const struct kvm_s2_fault_desc *s2fd,
>   	/*
>   	 * Permission faults just need to update the existing leaf entry,
>   	 * and so normally don't require allocations from the memcache. The
> -	 * only exception to this is when dirty logging is enabled at runtime
> +	 * exceptions are when dirty logging is enabled at runtime
>   	 * and a fault needs to collapse a block entry into a table.
> +	 * Realms can also require new RTT levels when replacing a mapping.
>   	 * Under pKVM a permission fault can also collapse pages into a block,
>   	 * which needs a fresh mapping object, and the hypervisor requires the
>   	 * min-pages memcache even when the install allocates nothing.
>   	 */
>   	memcache = get_mmu_memcache(s2fd->vcpu);
>   	if (!perm_fault || memslot_is_logging(s2fd->memslot) ||
> -	    is_protected_kvm_enabled()) {
> +	    is_protected_kvm_enabled() || kvm_vm_is_realm(s2fd->vcpu->kvm)) {

kvm_vm_hyp_is_distrusting() ? More importantly, as commented in 
gmem_abort, I don't see why pKVM is inconsistent here.

>   		ret = topup_mmu_memcache(s2fd->mmu, memcache);
>   		if (ret)
>   			return ret;
> @@ -2340,13 +2391,40 @@ static int user_mem_abort(const struct kvm_s2_fault_desc *s2fd,
>   	return kvm_s2_fault_map(s2fd, &s2vi, prot, memcache, result);
>   }
>   
> +static bool private_ipa_fault(struct kvm *kvm, phys_addr_t fault_ipa)

See more on the naming above.

> +{
> +	return kvm_vm_is_realm(kvm) &&
> +		kvm_realm_is_private_address(&kvm->arch.realm, fault_ipa);
> +}
> +
> +/* Decide if an abort should be handled by the gmem */
> +static bool kvm_fault_is_gmem_abort(struct kvm *kvm,
> +				    const struct kvm_s2_fault_desc *s2fd)
> +{
> +	if (!kvm_slot_has_gmem(s2fd->memslot))
> +		return false;
> +	if (kvm_memslot_is_gmem_only(s2fd->memslot))
> +		return true;
> +	/*
> +	 * For Realms, all private faults must be backed by GMEM.
> +	 * TODO: Handle Trusted device private memory mappings.
> +	 */
> +	if (private_ipa_fault(kvm, s2fd->fault_ipa))
> +		return true;
> +	return false;
> +}
> +
>   static int kvm_vm_mem_abort(const struct kvm_s2_fault_desc *s2fd)
>   {
>   	VM_WARN_ON_ONCE(kvm_s2_fault_is_perm(s2fd) &&
>   			!esr_abt_is_write_fault(s2fd->esr) &&
>   			!kvm_s2_fault_is_exec(s2fd));
>   
> -	if (kvm_slot_has_gmem(s2fd->memslot))
> +	if (private_ipa_fault(s2fd->vcpu->kvm, s2fd->fault_ipa) &&
> +	    !kvm_slot_has_gmem(s2fd->memslot))
> +		return -EINVAL;

This looks like duplicated with kvm_fault_is_gmem_abort(). We could 
remove it may be ?

> +
> +	if (kvm_fault_is_gmem_abort(s2fd->vcpu->kvm, s2fd))
>   		return gmem_abort(s2fd, NULL);
>   	else
>   		return user_mem_abort(s2fd, NULL);
> @@ -2458,10 +2536,10 @@ int kvm_handle_guest_sea(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>    */
>   int kvm_handle_guest_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>   {
> +	struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm;
>   	struct kvm_s2_trans nested_trans, *nested = NULL;
>   	unsigned long esr = kvm_vcpu_get_esr(vcpu);
>   	struct kvm_s2_mmu *mmu = vcpu->arch.hw_mmu;
> -	struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm;

Spurious change ?

>   	phys_addr_t fault_ipa; /* The address we faulted on */
>   	phys_addr_t ipa; /* Always the IPA in the L1 guest phys space */
>   	struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot;
> @@ -2554,8 +2632,9 @@ int kvm_handle_guest_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>   		nested = &nested_trans;
>   	}
>   
> -	gfn = ipa >> PAGE_SHIFT;
> +	gfn = kvm_gfn_from_fault(kvm, ipa);
>   	memslot = gfn_to_memslot(kvm, gfn);
> +
>   	hva = gfn_to_hva_memslot_prot(memslot, gfn, &writable);
>   	write_fault = esr_abt_is_write_fault(esr);
>   	if (kvm_is_error_hva(hva) || (write_fault && !writable)) {
> @@ -2598,7 +2677,7 @@ int kvm_handle_guest_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>   		 * of the page size.
>   		 */
>   		ipa |= FAR_TO_FIPA_OFFSET(kvm_vcpu_get_hfar(vcpu));
> -		ret = io_mem_abort(vcpu, ipa);
> +		ret = io_mem_abort(vcpu, kvm_gpa_from_fault(kvm, ipa));
>   		goto out_unlock;
>   	}
>   
> @@ -3156,7 +3235,7 @@ pre_fault_bytes_consumed(gpa_t gpa, unsigned long granule_size,
>   
>   int kvm_arch_pre_fault_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>   {
> -	if (is_protected_kvm_enabled())
> +	if (is_protected_kvm_enabled() || kvm_vm_is_realm(vcpu->kvm))
>   		return -EOPNOTSUPP;

kvm_vm_hyp_is_distrusting() ?

>   	if (!kvm_vcpu_initialized(vcpu))
>   		return -ENOEXEC;
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/rmi.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/rmi.c
> index 5aa34d68de59..682ed7005d57 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/rmi.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/rmi.c
> @@ -551,6 +551,241 @@ void kvm_realm_unmap_range_filter(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long start,
>   		realm_unmap_private_range(kvm, start, end, may_block);
>   }
>   
> +static unsigned long addr_range_desc(unsigned long ipa, unsigned long phys,
> +				     unsigned long size, unsigned long state)
> +{
> +	unsigned long count = 1;
> +	unsigned long out;
> +	int rmi_size;
> +
> +	for (rmi_size = KVM_PGTABLE_LAST_LEVEL; rmi_size >= 0; rmi_size--) {
> +		unsigned long entry_size = rmi_addr_block_size_to_bytes(rmi_size);
> +
> +		if (size >= entry_size && IS_ALIGNED(ipa, entry_size) &&
> +		    IS_ALIGNED(phys, entry_size))
> +			break;
> +	}
> +
> +	if (rmi_size == 0) {
> +		/*
> +		 * Stop at the next block boundary so that a later iteration can
> +		 * use a larger mapping when both addresses are aligned.
> +		 */
> +		count = MIN(size >> PAGE_SHIFT, PTRS_PER_PTE - 1);
> +		count = min(count, (PMD_SIZE - (ipa & (PMD_SIZE - 1))) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
> +		count = min(count, (PMD_SIZE - (phys & (PMD_SIZE - 1))) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
> +	}
> +
> +	WARN_ON(phys & ~PAGE_MASK);
> +
> +	out = FIELD_PREP(RMI_ADDR_RANGE_BLOCK_SIZE_MASK, rmi_size) |
> +	      FIELD_PREP(RMI_ADDR_RANGE_COUNT_MASK, count) |
> +	      FIELD_PREP(RMI_ADDR_RANGE_STATE_MASK, state);
> +	out |= phys & PAGE_MASK;
> +
> +	return out;
> +}
> +
> +static int realm_map_protected(struct kvm *kvm,
> +			       unsigned long ipa,
> +			       kvm_pfn_t pfn,
> +			       unsigned long map_size,
> +			       struct kvm_mmu_memory_cache *memcache)
> +{
> +	struct realm *realm = &kvm->arch.realm;
> +	phys_addr_t phys = __pfn_to_phys(pfn);
> +	phys_addr_t base_phys = phys;
> +	phys_addr_t rd = virt_to_phys(realm->rd);
> +	phys_addr_t delegated_phys;
> +	unsigned long base_ipa = ipa;
> +	unsigned long ipa_top;
> +	long ret = 0;
> +
> +	if (WARN_ON(!IS_ALIGNED(map_size, PAGE_SIZE) ||
> +		    !IS_ALIGNED(ipa, map_size)))
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +
> +	if (rmi_delegate_range(phys, map_size, &delegated_phys)) {
> +		if (delegated_phys == phys) {
> +			/*
> +			 * It's likely we raced with another VCPU on the same
> +			 * fault. Assume the other VCPU has handled the fault
> +			 * and return to the guest.
> +			 */
> +			return 0;
> +		}
> +		/* Partial delegation - map as much as we can */
> +		map_size = delegated_phys - phys;
> +	}
> +
> +	ipa_top = ipa + map_size;
> +
> +	while (ipa < ipa_top) {
> +		unsigned long flags = RMI_ADDR_TYPE_SINGLE;



> +		unsigned long range_desc = addr_range_desc(ipa, phys, ipa_top - ipa,
> +							   RMI_OP_MEM_DELEGATED);

May be pass the range covered back here as an out parameter ( &top ) ?

> +		unsigned long out_top;
> +
> +		ret = rmi_rtt_data_map(rd, ipa, ipa_top, flags, range_desc,
> +				       &out_top);

Should we limit this to what the addr_range_desc covers with out back 
from addr_range_desc() ? (or do at least what we do for map_unprotected
below ?)
			
> +		if (ret < 0)
> +			goto err_undelegate;
> +
> +		if (RMI_RESULT_STATUS(ret) == RMI_ERROR_RTT) {
> +			/* Create missing RTTs and retry */
> +			int level = RMI_RESULT_DATA_LEVEL(ret);
> +
> +			if (WARN_ON(level >= KVM_PGTABLE_LAST_LEVEL))
> +				goto err_undelegate;
> +			ret = realm_create_rtt_levels(realm, ipa, level,
> +						      level + 1,
> +						      memcache);
> +			if (ret)
> +				goto err_undelegate;
> +
> +			continue;
> +		}
> +
> +		if (WARN_ON(ret))
> +			goto err_undelegate;
> +
> +		/* An IRQ can stop the RMM before it maps the first entry. */
> +		if (out_top == ipa) {
> +			ret = -EAGAIN;
> +			goto err_undelegate;
> +		}
> +		if (WARN_ON_ONCE(out_top < ipa || out_top > ipa_top)) {
> +			ret = -ENXIO;
> +			goto err_undelegate;
> +		}
> +
> +		phys += out_top - ipa;
> +		ipa = out_top;
> +	}
> +
> +	return 0;
> +
> +err_undelegate:
> +	realm_unmap_private_range(kvm, base_ipa, ipa, false);
> +	/* A range which cannot be undelegated remains owned by the RMM. */
> +	WARN_ON(rmi_undelegate_range(base_phys, map_size));
> +	return ret < 0 ? ret : -ENXIO;
> +}
> +
> +static int realm_map_unprotected(struct kvm *kvm,
> +				 unsigned long ipa,
> +				 kvm_pfn_t pfn,
> +				 unsigned long size,
> +				 enum kvm_pgtable_prot prot,
> +				 struct kvm_mmu_memory_cache *memcache)
> +{
> +	struct realm *realm = &kvm->arch.realm;
> +	unsigned long attr, flags = 0;
> +	phys_addr_t rd = virt_to_phys(realm->rd);
> +	phys_addr_t phys = __pfn_to_phys(pfn);
> +	unsigned long ipa_top = ipa + size;
> +	unsigned int retries = 0;
> +	long ret;
> +
> +	if (WARN_ON(!IS_ALIGNED(size, PAGE_SIZE)))
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +
> +	switch (prot & (KVM_PGTABLE_PROT_DEVICE | KVM_PGTABLE_PROT_NORMAL_NC)) {
> +	case KVM_PGTABLE_PROT_DEVICE | KVM_PGTABLE_PROT_NORMAL_NC:
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +	case KVM_PGTABLE_PROT_DEVICE:
> +		attr = MT_S2_FWB_DEVICE_nGnRE;
> +		break;
> +	case KVM_PGTABLE_PROT_NORMAL_NC:
> +		attr = MT_S2_FWB_NORMAL_NC;
> +		break;
> +	default:
> +		attr = MT_S2_FWB_NORMAL;
> +	}
> +
> +	flags |= FIELD_PREP(RMI_RTT_UNPROT_MAP_FLAGS_MEMATTR_MASK, attr);
> +
> +	if (prot & KVM_PGTABLE_PROT_R)
> +		flags |= FIELD_PREP(RMI_RTT_UNPROT_MAP_FLAGS_S2AP_MASK, RMI_S2AP_DIRECT_READ);
> +	if (prot & KVM_PGTABLE_PROT_W)
> +		flags |= FIELD_PREP(RMI_RTT_UNPROT_MAP_FLAGS_S2AP_MASK, RMI_S2AP_DIRECT_WRITE);
> +
> +	/* TODO: Batch mappings with RMI_ADDR_TYPE_LIST. */
> +	flags |= RMI_ADDR_TYPE_SINGLE;
> +
> +	while (ipa < ipa_top) {
> +		unsigned long range_desc = addr_range_desc(ipa, phys, ipa_top - ipa,
> +							   RMI_OP_MEM_UNDELEGATED);
> +		unsigned long call_top = ipa + RMI_ADDR_RANGE_COUNT(range_desc) *
> +			rmi_addr_block_size_to_bytes(RMI_ADDR_RANGE_BLOCK_SIZE(range_desc));

We could return this from addr_range_desc(), as mentioned above.

Suzuki

  reply	other threads:[~2026-11-16 18:36 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 30+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-11-11 14:57 [PATCH v2 00/12] KVM: arm64: CCA: Prepare Realm memory management Steven Price
2026-11-11 14:57 ` [PATCH v2 01/12] KVM: arm64: CCA: Reserve the RMM mode Steven Price
2026-11-11 14:57 ` [PATCH v2 02/12] KVM: arm64: guest_memfd: Check mmap support when preparing memslot Steven Price
2026-11-11 15:21   ` Suzuki K Poulose
2026-11-12 10:43     ` Steven Price
2026-11-12 16:35       ` Suzuki K Poulose
2026-11-12 16:57         ` Suzuki K Poulose
2026-11-11 14:57 ` [PATCH v2 03/12] KVM: arm64: CCA: Introduce Realms Steven Price
2026-11-11 14:57 ` [PATCH v2 04/12] KVM: arm64: CCA: Check RMI support and features at init Steven Price
2026-11-12 16:39   ` Suzuki K Poulose
2026-11-13 11:49     ` Steven Price
2026-11-11 14:57 ` [PATCH v2 05/12] KVM: arm64: Handle attributes in stage2_unmap_range Steven Price
2026-11-11 14:57 ` [PATCH v2 06/12] KVM: arm64: CCA: Add basic infrastructure for creating a realm Steven Price
2026-11-11 14:57 ` [PATCH v2 07/12] KVM: arm64: CCA: Tear down RTTs Steven Price
2026-11-13  1:04   ` Suzuki K Poulose
2026-11-13 15:05     ` Steven Price
2026-11-13 16:26       ` Suzuki K Poulose
2026-11-13 16:40         ` Steven Price
2026-11-11 14:57 ` [PATCH v2 08/12] KVM: arm64: CCA: Add Realm RTT mapping and invalidation helpers Steven Price
2026-11-13 19:25   ` Suzuki K Poulose
2026-11-16 11:30     ` Steven Price
2026-11-11 14:57 ` [PATCH v2 09/12] KVM: Allow architectures to reject memslot changes before invalidation Steven Price
2026-11-11 14:57 ` [PATCH v2 10/12] KVM: arm64: CCA: Prevent memslot modifications after Realm creation Steven Price
2026-11-11 14:57 ` [PATCH v2 11/12] KVM: arm64: CCA: Support runtime faulting of memory Steven Price
2026-11-16 18:36   ` Suzuki K Poulose [this message]
2026-11-11 14:57 ` [PATCH v2 12/12] KVM: arm64: CCA: Add Realm stage-2 MMU operations Steven Price
2026-11-16 11:46   ` Suzuki K Poulose
2026-11-16 14:55     ` Steven Price
2026-11-12  9:08 ` [PATCH v2 00/12] KVM: arm64: CCA: Prepare Realm memory management Kohei Enju
2026-11-12  9:41   ` Steven Price

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