From: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
To: Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com>,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, kvmarm@lists.linux.dev
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>,
Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>,
Zenghui Yu <yuzenghui@huawei.com>,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Joey Gouly <joey.gouly@arm.com>,
Alexandru Elisei <alexandru.elisei@arm.com>,
Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@arm.com>,
Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>,
linux-coco@lists.linux.dev,
Ganapatrao Kulkarni <gankulkarni@os.amperecomputing.com>,
Gavin Shan <gshan@redhat.com>,
Shanker Donthineni <sdonthineni@nvidia.com>,
Alper Gun <alpergun@google.com>,
"Aneesh Kumar K . V" <aneesh.kumar@kernel.org>,
Emi Kisanuki <fj0570is@fujitsu.com>,
Vishal Annapurve <vannapurve@google.com>,
WeiLin.Chang@arm.com, Lorenzo Pieralisi <lpieralisi@kernel.org>,
Kohei Enju <enju.kohei@fujitsu.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 11/12] KVM: arm64: CCA: Support runtime faulting of memory
Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2026 18:36:29 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <c5ebf936-fbc6-4910-be59-9e89ff3a625e@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261111145758.217946-12-steven.price@arm.com>
On 11/11/2026 14:57, Steven Price wrote:
> At runtime, if the realm guest accesses an IPA without a stage-2
> mapping, then KVM fixes up the stage-2 mapping for the backing memory.
>
> For memory in the lower (protected) region of IPA, verify that the
> corresponding guest_memfd page is private before delegating to the RMM.
> The RMM then maps the page into the realm and initializes its contents
> to zero.
>
> For memory in the upper (shared) IPA region, map the backing page as
> non-secure memory. Check that a guest_memfd page is shared when the
> fault uses guest_memfd; ordinary userspace-backed memslots can only be
> mapped at unprotected IPAs and follow the normal user memory fault path.
>
> If the fault IPA and guest_memfd attributes disagree then exit to
> userspace with KVM_EXIT_MEMORY_FAULT so the VMM can perform the required
> conversion. If a shared IPA has no memslot, KVM follows the existing
> MMIO or abort-injection path. The latter can result in injecting a SEA
> to the guest.
>
> Realm faults may need to create RTTs, including when updating a
> mapping after a permission fault. Take the write side of mmu_lock
> and top up the MMU cache for these faults. Do not pre-fault Realm
> memory.
>
> Co-developed-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
> Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
> Signed-off-by: Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com>
>
> ---
> Changes since v1:
> - Use the write side of mmu_lock and top up the MMU cache for Realm
> faults that may create RTTs. Skip unnecessary cache flushing,
> disable Realm pre-faulting, and tighten memory-fault and mapping
> retry handling.
> ---
> arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h | 13 ++
> arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h | 4 +-
> arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_rmi.h | 6 +
> arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c | 115 +++++++++++--
> arch/arm64/kvm/rmi.c | 235 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 5 files changed, 353 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h
> index 32021bdf2610..8a71fddfdb85 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h
> +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h
> @@ -847,4 +847,17 @@ static inline bool kvm_realm_is_created(struct kvm *kvm)
> return kvm_vm_is_realm(kvm) && kvm_realm_state(kvm) != REALM_STATE_NONE;
> }
>
> +static inline gpa_t kvm_gpa_from_fault(struct kvm *kvm, phys_addr_t ipa)
> +{
> + if (!kvm_vm_is_realm(kvm))
> + return ipa;
> +
> + return ipa & ~BIT(kvm->arch.realm.ia_bits - 1);
> +}
> +
> +static inline gfn_t kvm_gfn_from_fault(struct kvm *kvm, phys_addr_t ipa)
> +{
> + return gpa_to_gfn(kvm_gpa_from_fault(kvm, ipa));
> +}
> +
> #endif /* __ARM64_KVM_EMULATE_H__ */
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h
> index 32392abf2e21..a70f8bd4b2b9 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h
> +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h
> @@ -371,7 +371,7 @@ static inline bool kvm_is_nested_s2_mmu(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_s2_mmu *mmu)
>
> static inline void kvm_fault_lock(struct kvm *kvm)
> {
> - if (is_protected_kvm_enabled())
> + if (kvm_vm_hyp_is_distrusting(kvm))
> write_lock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
> else
> read_lock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
> @@ -379,7 +379,7 @@ static inline void kvm_fault_lock(struct kvm *kvm)
>
> static inline void kvm_fault_unlock(struct kvm *kvm)
> {
> - if (is_protected_kvm_enabled())
> + if (kvm_vm_hyp_is_distrusting(kvm))
> write_unlock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
> else
> read_unlock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_rmi.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_rmi.h
> index e64c3bcce160..d1ba0c325bb0 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_rmi.h
> +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_rmi.h
> @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
> #ifndef __ASM_KVM_RMI_H
> #define __ASM_KVM_RMI_H
>
> +#include <asm/kvm_pgtable.h>
> #include <linux/arm-smccc-rmi.h>
> #include <linux/kvm.h>
>
> @@ -89,6 +90,11 @@ void kvm_realm_unmap_range_filter(struct kvm *kvm,
> bool may_block,
> enum kvm_gfn_range_filter attr_filter);
>
> +int realm_map_ipa(struct kvm *kvm, phys_addr_t ipa,
> + kvm_pfn_t pfn, unsigned long map_size,
> + enum kvm_pgtable_prot prot,
> + struct kvm_mmu_memory_cache *memcache);
> +
> static inline bool kvm_realm_is_private_address(struct realm *realm,
> unsigned long addr)
> {
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c
> index e550360fc94d..b6c61d7890c8 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c
> @@ -450,6 +450,10 @@ static void stage2_flush_vm(struct kvm *kvm)
> struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot;
> int idx, bkt;
>
> + /* The RMM requires FWB, so Realm stage-2 mappings need no cache flush. */
> + if (kvm_vm_is_realm(kvm))
> + return;
While this is true, it would be also worth mentioning KVM can't handle
this for a Realm as the traps are handled within RMM. So this could be
something like:
/*
* The RMM mandates FEAT_FWB and additionally KVM can't handle
* such traps anyway.
*/
> +
> idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu);
> write_lock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
>
> @@ -1222,6 +1226,10 @@ void stage2_unmap_vm(struct kvm *kvm)
> struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot;
> int idx, bkt;
>
> + /* For realms this is handled by the RMM so nothing to do here */
minor nit: Might be better to add a similar comment as above.
/*
* The RMM mandates FEAT_FWB and additionally KVM can't handle
* such traps anyway.
*/
as we skip calling stage2_unmap_vm() if we have FWB anyways.
> + if (kvm_vm_is_realm(kvm))
> + return;
> +
> idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu);
> mmap_read_lock(current->mm);
> write_lock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
> @@ -1791,12 +1799,18 @@ static int gmem_abort(const struct kvm_s2_fault_desc *s2fd,
> void *memcache = NULL;
> gfn_t canonical_gfn;
> int ret;
> + bool is_private = false;
>
> - if (!perm_fault) {
> + if (KVM_BUG_ON(!kvm_slot_has_gmem(s2fd->memslot), kvm))
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + if (!perm_fault || kvm_arch_has_private_mem(kvm)) {
should this be s/kvm_arch_has_private_mem/kvm_vm_is_realm ? I dont think
this would be required for pKVM yet ?
Also, I wonder why pKVM doesnt need mmu cache pages with permission
faults with gmem. They do for user_mem_abort().
(may be because they assume Gmem is always single page ? in which case
we could also have the same behavior)
> memcache = get_mmu_memcache(s2fd->vcpu);
> ret = topup_mmu_memcache(s2fd->mmu, memcache);
> if (ret)
> return ret;
> + }
> + if (!perm_fault) {
> if (kvm_is_nested_s2_mmu(kvm, pgt->mmu)) {
> mapping = kmalloc_obj(struct kvm_guest_s2_mapping, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
> if (!mapping)
> @@ -1805,7 +1819,7 @@ static int gmem_abort(const struct kvm_s2_fault_desc *s2fd,
> }
>
> s2vi.vma_pagesize = PAGE_SIZE;
> - s2vi.gfn = ALIGN_DOWN(s2fd->fault_ipa, s2vi.vma_pagesize) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
> + s2vi.gfn = gpa_to_gfn(kvm_gpa_from_fault(kvm, s2fd->fault_ipa));
> canonical_gfn = get_canonical_gfn(s2fd, &s2vi);
>
> write_fault = kvm_s2_fault_is_write(s2fd);
> @@ -1817,13 +1831,35 @@ static int gmem_abort(const struct kvm_s2_fault_desc *s2fd,
> /* Pairs with the smp_wmb() in kvm_mmu_invalidate_end(). */
> smp_rmb();
>
> + if (kvm_arch_has_private_mem(kvm)) {
--8>--
> + switch (kvm->arch.vm_flavor) {
> + case VM_REALM:
> + is_private = kvm_realm_is_private_address(&kvm->arch.realm,
> + s2fd->fault_ipa);
Could we for now use
is_private = private_ipa_fault(kvm, s2fd->fault_ipa);
In other words use a wrapper for detecting if a given ipa is private or
not ? May be something like: kvm_ipa_is_private(kvm, ipa)? (choose ipa
to make it explicit, it is arm64 thing).
Where, pKVM could hook in its own check.
> + break;
> + default:
> + break;
> + }
> +
> + if (is_private != kvm_gmem_is_private_gfn(kvm, canonical_gfn)) {
> + if (!result)
> + kvm_prepare_memory_fault_exit(s2fd->vcpu,
> + gfn_to_gpa(canonical_gfn),
> + PAGE_SIZE,
> + write_fault, exec_fault,
> + is_private);
> + kfree(mapping);
> + return -EFAULT;
> + }
> + }
> +
> ret = kvm_gmem_get_pfn(kvm, s2fd->memslot, canonical_gfn, &s2vi.pfn, NULL);
> if (ret) {
> /* If result is non-NULL this is a synthetic fault. */
> if (!result)
> kvm_prepare_memory_fault_exit(s2fd->vcpu, gfn_to_gpa(canonical_gfn),
> s2vi.vma_pagesize, write_fault, exec_fault,
> - false);
> + is_private);
> kfree(mapping);
> return ret;
> }
> @@ -1846,6 +1882,16 @@ static int gmem_abort(const struct kvm_s2_fault_desc *s2fd,
> goto out_unlock;
> }
>
> + switch (kvm->arch.vm_flavor) {
> + case VM_REALM:
> + prot &= ~KVM_PGTABLE_PROT_X;
> + ret = realm_map_ipa(kvm, s2fd->fault_ipa, s2vi.pfn,
> + PAGE_SIZE, prot, memcache);
> + goto out_unlock;
> + default:
> + break;
> + }
> +
> if (perm_fault) {
> /*
> * Drop the SW bits in favour of those stored in the
> @@ -2047,7 +2093,8 @@ static int kvm_s2_fault_get_vma_info(const struct kvm_s2_fault_desc *s2fd,
> * mapping size to ensure we find the right PFN and lay down the
> * mapping in the right place.
> */
> - s2vi->gfn = ALIGN_DOWN(s2fd->fault_ipa, s2vi->vma_pagesize) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
> + s2vi->gfn = kvm_gfn_from_fault(kvm, ALIGN_DOWN(s2fd->fault_ipa,
> + s2vi->vma_pagesize));
>
> s2vi->mte_allowed = kvm_vma_mte_allowed(vma);
>
> @@ -2227,7 +2274,7 @@ static int kvm_s2_fault_map(const struct kvm_s2_fault_desc *s2fd,
> * possible.
> */
> if (mapping_size == PAGE_SIZE && s2vi->max_map_size != PAGE_SIZE) {
> - if (perm_fault_granule > PAGE_SIZE) {
> + if (perm_fault_granule > PAGE_SIZE && !kvm_vm_is_realm(kvm)) {
Please could we add a comment here, why we do this ? It is a subtle case.
> mapping_size = perm_fault_granule;
> } else {
> mapping_size = transparent_hugepage_adjust(s2fd, &pfn, &gfn);
> @@ -2242,12 +2289,15 @@ static int kvm_s2_fault_map(const struct kvm_s2_fault_desc *s2fd,
> if (!perm_fault_granule && !s2vi->map_non_cacheable && kvm_has_mte(kvm))
> sanitise_mte_tags(kvm, pfn, mapping_size);
>
> - /*
> - * Under the premise of getting a FSC_PERM fault, we just need to relax
> - * permissions only if mapping_size equals perm_fault_granule. Otherwise,
> - * kvm_pgtable_stage2_map() should be called to change block size.
> - */
> - if (mapping_size == perm_fault_granule) {
> + if (kvm_vm_is_realm(kvm)) {
> + ret = realm_map_ipa(kvm, s2fd->fault_ipa, pfn, mapping_size,
> + prot, memcache);
> + } else if (mapping_size == perm_fault_granule) {
> + /*
> + * Under the premise of getting a FSC_PERM fault, we just need to relax
> + * permissions only if mapping_size equals perm_fault_granule. Otherwise,
> + * kvm_pgtable_stage2_map() should be called to change block size.
> + */
> /*
> * Drop the SW bits in favour of those stored in the
> * PTE, which will be preserved.
> @@ -2306,15 +2356,16 @@ static int user_mem_abort(const struct kvm_s2_fault_desc *s2fd,
> /*
> * Permission faults just need to update the existing leaf entry,
> * and so normally don't require allocations from the memcache. The
> - * only exception to this is when dirty logging is enabled at runtime
> + * exceptions are when dirty logging is enabled at runtime
> * and a fault needs to collapse a block entry into a table.
> + * Realms can also require new RTT levels when replacing a mapping.
> * Under pKVM a permission fault can also collapse pages into a block,
> * which needs a fresh mapping object, and the hypervisor requires the
> * min-pages memcache even when the install allocates nothing.
> */
> memcache = get_mmu_memcache(s2fd->vcpu);
> if (!perm_fault || memslot_is_logging(s2fd->memslot) ||
> - is_protected_kvm_enabled()) {
> + is_protected_kvm_enabled() || kvm_vm_is_realm(s2fd->vcpu->kvm)) {
kvm_vm_hyp_is_distrusting() ? More importantly, as commented in
gmem_abort, I don't see why pKVM is inconsistent here.
> ret = topup_mmu_memcache(s2fd->mmu, memcache);
> if (ret)
> return ret;
> @@ -2340,13 +2391,40 @@ static int user_mem_abort(const struct kvm_s2_fault_desc *s2fd,
> return kvm_s2_fault_map(s2fd, &s2vi, prot, memcache, result);
> }
>
> +static bool private_ipa_fault(struct kvm *kvm, phys_addr_t fault_ipa)
See more on the naming above.
> +{
> + return kvm_vm_is_realm(kvm) &&
> + kvm_realm_is_private_address(&kvm->arch.realm, fault_ipa);
> +}
> +
> +/* Decide if an abort should be handled by the gmem */
> +static bool kvm_fault_is_gmem_abort(struct kvm *kvm,
> + const struct kvm_s2_fault_desc *s2fd)
> +{
> + if (!kvm_slot_has_gmem(s2fd->memslot))
> + return false;
> + if (kvm_memslot_is_gmem_only(s2fd->memslot))
> + return true;
> + /*
> + * For Realms, all private faults must be backed by GMEM.
> + * TODO: Handle Trusted device private memory mappings.
> + */
> + if (private_ipa_fault(kvm, s2fd->fault_ipa))
> + return true;
> + return false;
> +}
> +
> static int kvm_vm_mem_abort(const struct kvm_s2_fault_desc *s2fd)
> {
> VM_WARN_ON_ONCE(kvm_s2_fault_is_perm(s2fd) &&
> !esr_abt_is_write_fault(s2fd->esr) &&
> !kvm_s2_fault_is_exec(s2fd));
>
> - if (kvm_slot_has_gmem(s2fd->memslot))
> + if (private_ipa_fault(s2fd->vcpu->kvm, s2fd->fault_ipa) &&
> + !kvm_slot_has_gmem(s2fd->memslot))
> + return -EINVAL;
This looks like duplicated with kvm_fault_is_gmem_abort(). We could
remove it may be ?
> +
> + if (kvm_fault_is_gmem_abort(s2fd->vcpu->kvm, s2fd))
> return gmem_abort(s2fd, NULL);
> else
> return user_mem_abort(s2fd, NULL);
> @@ -2458,10 +2536,10 @@ int kvm_handle_guest_sea(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> */
> int kvm_handle_guest_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> {
> + struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm;
> struct kvm_s2_trans nested_trans, *nested = NULL;
> unsigned long esr = kvm_vcpu_get_esr(vcpu);
> struct kvm_s2_mmu *mmu = vcpu->arch.hw_mmu;
> - struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm;
Spurious change ?
> phys_addr_t fault_ipa; /* The address we faulted on */
> phys_addr_t ipa; /* Always the IPA in the L1 guest phys space */
> struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot;
> @@ -2554,8 +2632,9 @@ int kvm_handle_guest_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> nested = &nested_trans;
> }
>
> - gfn = ipa >> PAGE_SHIFT;
> + gfn = kvm_gfn_from_fault(kvm, ipa);
> memslot = gfn_to_memslot(kvm, gfn);
> +
> hva = gfn_to_hva_memslot_prot(memslot, gfn, &writable);
> write_fault = esr_abt_is_write_fault(esr);
> if (kvm_is_error_hva(hva) || (write_fault && !writable)) {
> @@ -2598,7 +2677,7 @@ int kvm_handle_guest_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> * of the page size.
> */
> ipa |= FAR_TO_FIPA_OFFSET(kvm_vcpu_get_hfar(vcpu));
> - ret = io_mem_abort(vcpu, ipa);
> + ret = io_mem_abort(vcpu, kvm_gpa_from_fault(kvm, ipa));
> goto out_unlock;
> }
>
> @@ -3156,7 +3235,7 @@ pre_fault_bytes_consumed(gpa_t gpa, unsigned long granule_size,
>
> int kvm_arch_pre_fault_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> {
> - if (is_protected_kvm_enabled())
> + if (is_protected_kvm_enabled() || kvm_vm_is_realm(vcpu->kvm))
> return -EOPNOTSUPP;
kvm_vm_hyp_is_distrusting() ?
> if (!kvm_vcpu_initialized(vcpu))
> return -ENOEXEC;
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/rmi.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/rmi.c
> index 5aa34d68de59..682ed7005d57 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/rmi.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/rmi.c
> @@ -551,6 +551,241 @@ void kvm_realm_unmap_range_filter(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long start,
> realm_unmap_private_range(kvm, start, end, may_block);
> }
>
> +static unsigned long addr_range_desc(unsigned long ipa, unsigned long phys,
> + unsigned long size, unsigned long state)
> +{
> + unsigned long count = 1;
> + unsigned long out;
> + int rmi_size;
> +
> + for (rmi_size = KVM_PGTABLE_LAST_LEVEL; rmi_size >= 0; rmi_size--) {
> + unsigned long entry_size = rmi_addr_block_size_to_bytes(rmi_size);
> +
> + if (size >= entry_size && IS_ALIGNED(ipa, entry_size) &&
> + IS_ALIGNED(phys, entry_size))
> + break;
> + }
> +
> + if (rmi_size == 0) {
> + /*
> + * Stop at the next block boundary so that a later iteration can
> + * use a larger mapping when both addresses are aligned.
> + */
> + count = MIN(size >> PAGE_SHIFT, PTRS_PER_PTE - 1);
> + count = min(count, (PMD_SIZE - (ipa & (PMD_SIZE - 1))) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
> + count = min(count, (PMD_SIZE - (phys & (PMD_SIZE - 1))) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
> + }
> +
> + WARN_ON(phys & ~PAGE_MASK);
> +
> + out = FIELD_PREP(RMI_ADDR_RANGE_BLOCK_SIZE_MASK, rmi_size) |
> + FIELD_PREP(RMI_ADDR_RANGE_COUNT_MASK, count) |
> + FIELD_PREP(RMI_ADDR_RANGE_STATE_MASK, state);
> + out |= phys & PAGE_MASK;
> +
> + return out;
> +}
> +
> +static int realm_map_protected(struct kvm *kvm,
> + unsigned long ipa,
> + kvm_pfn_t pfn,
> + unsigned long map_size,
> + struct kvm_mmu_memory_cache *memcache)
> +{
> + struct realm *realm = &kvm->arch.realm;
> + phys_addr_t phys = __pfn_to_phys(pfn);
> + phys_addr_t base_phys = phys;
> + phys_addr_t rd = virt_to_phys(realm->rd);
> + phys_addr_t delegated_phys;
> + unsigned long base_ipa = ipa;
> + unsigned long ipa_top;
> + long ret = 0;
> +
> + if (WARN_ON(!IS_ALIGNED(map_size, PAGE_SIZE) ||
> + !IS_ALIGNED(ipa, map_size)))
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + if (rmi_delegate_range(phys, map_size, &delegated_phys)) {
> + if (delegated_phys == phys) {
> + /*
> + * It's likely we raced with another VCPU on the same
> + * fault. Assume the other VCPU has handled the fault
> + * and return to the guest.
> + */
> + return 0;
> + }
> + /* Partial delegation - map as much as we can */
> + map_size = delegated_phys - phys;
> + }
> +
> + ipa_top = ipa + map_size;
> +
> + while (ipa < ipa_top) {
> + unsigned long flags = RMI_ADDR_TYPE_SINGLE;
> + unsigned long range_desc = addr_range_desc(ipa, phys, ipa_top - ipa,
> + RMI_OP_MEM_DELEGATED);
May be pass the range covered back here as an out parameter ( &top ) ?
> + unsigned long out_top;
> +
> + ret = rmi_rtt_data_map(rd, ipa, ipa_top, flags, range_desc,
> + &out_top);
Should we limit this to what the addr_range_desc covers with out back
from addr_range_desc() ? (or do at least what we do for map_unprotected
below ?)
> + if (ret < 0)
> + goto err_undelegate;
> +
> + if (RMI_RESULT_STATUS(ret) == RMI_ERROR_RTT) {
> + /* Create missing RTTs and retry */
> + int level = RMI_RESULT_DATA_LEVEL(ret);
> +
> + if (WARN_ON(level >= KVM_PGTABLE_LAST_LEVEL))
> + goto err_undelegate;
> + ret = realm_create_rtt_levels(realm, ipa, level,
> + level + 1,
> + memcache);
> + if (ret)
> + goto err_undelegate;
> +
> + continue;
> + }
> +
> + if (WARN_ON(ret))
> + goto err_undelegate;
> +
> + /* An IRQ can stop the RMM before it maps the first entry. */
> + if (out_top == ipa) {
> + ret = -EAGAIN;
> + goto err_undelegate;
> + }
> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(out_top < ipa || out_top > ipa_top)) {
> + ret = -ENXIO;
> + goto err_undelegate;
> + }
> +
> + phys += out_top - ipa;
> + ipa = out_top;
> + }
> +
> + return 0;
> +
> +err_undelegate:
> + realm_unmap_private_range(kvm, base_ipa, ipa, false);
> + /* A range which cannot be undelegated remains owned by the RMM. */
> + WARN_ON(rmi_undelegate_range(base_phys, map_size));
> + return ret < 0 ? ret : -ENXIO;
> +}
> +
> +static int realm_map_unprotected(struct kvm *kvm,
> + unsigned long ipa,
> + kvm_pfn_t pfn,
> + unsigned long size,
> + enum kvm_pgtable_prot prot,
> + struct kvm_mmu_memory_cache *memcache)
> +{
> + struct realm *realm = &kvm->arch.realm;
> + unsigned long attr, flags = 0;
> + phys_addr_t rd = virt_to_phys(realm->rd);
> + phys_addr_t phys = __pfn_to_phys(pfn);
> + unsigned long ipa_top = ipa + size;
> + unsigned int retries = 0;
> + long ret;
> +
> + if (WARN_ON(!IS_ALIGNED(size, PAGE_SIZE)))
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + switch (prot & (KVM_PGTABLE_PROT_DEVICE | KVM_PGTABLE_PROT_NORMAL_NC)) {
> + case KVM_PGTABLE_PROT_DEVICE | KVM_PGTABLE_PROT_NORMAL_NC:
> + return -EINVAL;
> + case KVM_PGTABLE_PROT_DEVICE:
> + attr = MT_S2_FWB_DEVICE_nGnRE;
> + break;
> + case KVM_PGTABLE_PROT_NORMAL_NC:
> + attr = MT_S2_FWB_NORMAL_NC;
> + break;
> + default:
> + attr = MT_S2_FWB_NORMAL;
> + }
> +
> + flags |= FIELD_PREP(RMI_RTT_UNPROT_MAP_FLAGS_MEMATTR_MASK, attr);
> +
> + if (prot & KVM_PGTABLE_PROT_R)
> + flags |= FIELD_PREP(RMI_RTT_UNPROT_MAP_FLAGS_S2AP_MASK, RMI_S2AP_DIRECT_READ);
> + if (prot & KVM_PGTABLE_PROT_W)
> + flags |= FIELD_PREP(RMI_RTT_UNPROT_MAP_FLAGS_S2AP_MASK, RMI_S2AP_DIRECT_WRITE);
> +
> + /* TODO: Batch mappings with RMI_ADDR_TYPE_LIST. */
> + flags |= RMI_ADDR_TYPE_SINGLE;
> +
> + while (ipa < ipa_top) {
> + unsigned long range_desc = addr_range_desc(ipa, phys, ipa_top - ipa,
> + RMI_OP_MEM_UNDELEGATED);
> + unsigned long call_top = ipa + RMI_ADDR_RANGE_COUNT(range_desc) *
> + rmi_addr_block_size_to_bytes(RMI_ADDR_RANGE_BLOCK_SIZE(range_desc));
We could return this from addr_range_desc(), as mentioned above.
Suzuki
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-16 18:36 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 30+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-11 14:57 [PATCH v2 00/12] KVM: arm64: CCA: Prepare Realm memory management Steven Price
2026-11-11 14:57 ` [PATCH v2 01/12] KVM: arm64: CCA: Reserve the RMM mode Steven Price
2026-11-11 14:57 ` [PATCH v2 02/12] KVM: arm64: guest_memfd: Check mmap support when preparing memslot Steven Price
2026-11-11 15:21 ` Suzuki K Poulose
2026-11-12 10:43 ` Steven Price
2026-11-12 16:35 ` Suzuki K Poulose
2026-11-12 16:57 ` Suzuki K Poulose
2026-11-11 14:57 ` [PATCH v2 03/12] KVM: arm64: CCA: Introduce Realms Steven Price
2026-11-11 14:57 ` [PATCH v2 04/12] KVM: arm64: CCA: Check RMI support and features at init Steven Price
2026-11-12 16:39 ` Suzuki K Poulose
2026-11-13 11:49 ` Steven Price
2026-11-11 14:57 ` [PATCH v2 05/12] KVM: arm64: Handle attributes in stage2_unmap_range Steven Price
2026-11-11 14:57 ` [PATCH v2 06/12] KVM: arm64: CCA: Add basic infrastructure for creating a realm Steven Price
2026-11-11 14:57 ` [PATCH v2 07/12] KVM: arm64: CCA: Tear down RTTs Steven Price
2026-11-13 1:04 ` Suzuki K Poulose
2026-11-13 15:05 ` Steven Price
2026-11-13 16:26 ` Suzuki K Poulose
2026-11-13 16:40 ` Steven Price
2026-11-11 14:57 ` [PATCH v2 08/12] KVM: arm64: CCA: Add Realm RTT mapping and invalidation helpers Steven Price
2026-11-13 19:25 ` Suzuki K Poulose
2026-11-16 11:30 ` Steven Price
2026-11-11 14:57 ` [PATCH v2 09/12] KVM: Allow architectures to reject memslot changes before invalidation Steven Price
2026-11-11 14:57 ` [PATCH v2 10/12] KVM: arm64: CCA: Prevent memslot modifications after Realm creation Steven Price
2026-11-11 14:57 ` [PATCH v2 11/12] KVM: arm64: CCA: Support runtime faulting of memory Steven Price
2026-11-16 18:36 ` Suzuki K Poulose [this message]
2026-11-11 14:57 ` [PATCH v2 12/12] KVM: arm64: CCA: Add Realm stage-2 MMU operations Steven Price
2026-11-16 11:46 ` Suzuki K Poulose
2026-11-16 14:55 ` Steven Price
2026-11-12 9:08 ` [PATCH v2 00/12] KVM: arm64: CCA: Prepare Realm memory management Kohei Enju
2026-11-12 9:41 ` Steven Price
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=c5ebf936-fbc6-4910-be59-9e89ff3a625e@arm.com \
--to=suzuki.poulose@arm.com \
--cc=WeiLin.Chang@arm.com \
--cc=alexandru.elisei@arm.com \
--cc=alpergun@google.com \
--cc=aneesh.kumar@kernel.org \
--cc=catalin.marinas@arm.com \
--cc=christoffer.dall@arm.com \
--cc=enju.kohei@fujitsu.com \
--cc=fj0570is@fujitsu.com \
--cc=gankulkarni@os.amperecomputing.com \
--cc=gshan@redhat.com \
--cc=james.morse@arm.com \
--cc=joey.gouly@arm.com \
--cc=kvm@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=kvmarm@lists.linux.dev \
--cc=linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org \
--cc=linux-coco@lists.linux.dev \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=lpieralisi@kernel.org \
--cc=maz@kernel.org \
--cc=oliver.upton@linux.dev \
--cc=sdonthineni@nvidia.com \
--cc=steven.price@arm.com \
--cc=tabba@google.com \
--cc=vannapurve@google.com \
--cc=will@kernel.org \
--cc=yuzenghui@huawei.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox
all inboxes | Powered by JetHome®