From: "Nicholas A. Bellinger" <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
To: "Stephan Müller" <smueller@chronox.de>
Cc: Lee Duncan <lduncan@suse.com>,
"Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>,
"Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>,
Linux Crypto Mailing List <linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>,
Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>,
Chris Leech <cleech@redhat.com>,
open-iscsi@googlegroups.com,
target-devel <target-devel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v4 06/13] iscsi: ensure RNG is seeded before use
Date: Thu, 29 Jun 2017 23:02:47 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1498802567.24896.12.camel@haakon3.risingtidesystems.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1678474.GnYBdSlWgs@tauon.chronox.de>
On Mon, 2017-06-26 at 19:38 +0200, Stephan Müller wrote:
> Am Montag, 26. Juni 2017, 03:23:09 CEST schrieb Nicholas A. Bellinger:
>
> Hi Nicholas,
>
> > Hi Stephan, Lee & Jason,
> >
> > (Adding target-devel CC')
> >
> > Apologies for coming late to the discussion. Comments below.
> >
> > On Sun, 2017-06-18 at 10:04 +0200, Stephan Müller wrote:
> > > Am Samstag, 17. Juni 2017, 05:45:57 CEST schrieb Lee Duncan:
> > >
> > > Hi Lee,
> > >
> > > > In your testing, how long might a process have to wait? Are we talking
> > > > seconds? Longer? What about timeouts?
> > >
> > > In current kernels (starting with 4.8) this timeout should clear within a
> > > few seconds after boot.
> > >
> > > In older kernels (pre 4.8), my KVM takes up to 90 seconds to reach that
> > > seeding point. I have heard that on IBM System Z this trigger point
> > > requires minutes to be reached.
> >
> > I share the same concern as Lee wrt to introducing latency into the
> > existing iscsi-target login sequence.
> >
> > Namely in the use-cases where a single node is supporting ~1K unique
> > iscsi-target IQNs, and fail-over + re-balancing of IQNs where 100s of
> > login attempts are expected to occur in parallel.
> >
> > If environments exist that require non trivial amounts of time for RNG
> > seeding to be ready for iscsi-target usage, then enforcing this
> > requirement at iscsi login time can open up problems, especially when
> > iscsi host environments may be sensitive to login timeouts, I/O
> > timeouts, et al.
> >
> > That said, I'd prefer to simply wait for RNG to be seeded at modprobe
> > iscsi_target_mod time, instead of trying to enforce randomness during
> > login.
> >
> > This way, those of use who have distributed storage platforms can know
> > to avoid putting a node into a state to accept iscsi-target IQN export
> > migration, before modprobe iscsi_target_mod has successfully loaded and
> > RNG seeding has been confirmed.
> >
> > WDYT..?
>
> We may have a chicken and egg problem when the wait is at the modprobe time.
> Assume the modprobe happens during initramfs time to get access to the root
> file system. In this case, you entire boot process will lock up for an
> indefinite amount of time. The reason is that in order to obtain events
> detected by the RNG, devices need to be initialized and working. Such devices
> commonly start working after the the root partition is mounted as it contains
> all drivers, all configuration information etc.
>
> Note, during the development of my /dev/random implementation, I added the
> getrandom-like blocking behavior to /dev/urandom (which is the equivalent to
> Jason's patch except that it applies to user space). The boot process locked
> up since systemd wanted data from /dev/urandom while it processed the
> initramfs. As it did not get any, the boot process did not commence that could
> deliver new events to be picked up by the RNG.
>
> As I do not have such an iscsi system, I cannot test Jason's patch. But maybe
> the mentioned chicken-and-egg problem I mentioned above is already visible
> with the current patch as it will lead to a blocking of the mounting of the
> root partition in case the root partition is on an iscsi target.
AFAIK, there are no distro initramfs dependencies for iscsi_target_mod,
and every environment I've ever seen loads iscsi_target_mod after
switching to the real rootfs.
For an iscsi initiator that might not been the case, especially if the
rootfs is running atop a iscsi LUN.
But at least for iscsi-target mode, any blocking during modprobe waiting
for RNG seeding would happen outside of initramfs.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-06-30 6:02 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 63+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-06-06 17:47 [PATCH v4 00/13] Unseeded In-Kernel Randomness Fixes Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:47 ` [PATCH v4 01/13] random: invalidate batched entropy after crng init Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-07 23:58 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-08 0:52 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:47 ` [PATCH v4 02/13] random: add synchronous API for the urandom pool Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 0:00 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-06 17:47 ` [PATCH v4 03/13] random: add get_random_{bytes,u32,u64,int,long,once}_wait family Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 0:05 ` [kernel-hardening] " Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-06 17:47 ` [PATCH v4 04/13] security/keys: ensure RNG is seeded before use Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 0:31 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-08 0:50 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 1:03 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:47 ` [PATCH v4 05/13] crypto/rng: ensure that the RNG is ready before using Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 0:41 ` [kernel-hardening] " Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-08 0:47 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:47 ` [PATCH v4 06/13] iscsi: ensure RNG is seeded before use Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 2:43 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-08 12:09 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-16 21:58 ` Lee Duncan
2017-06-17 0:41 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-17 3:45 ` Lee Duncan
2017-06-17 14:23 ` Jeffrey Walton
2017-06-17 18:50 ` [kernel-hardening] " Paul Koning
2017-07-05 7:08 ` Antw: Re: [kernel-hardening] " Ulrich Windl
2017-07-05 13:16 ` Paul Koning
2017-07-05 17:34 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-18 8:04 ` Stephan Müller
2017-06-26 1:23 ` Nicholas A. Bellinger
2017-06-26 17:38 ` Stephan Müller
2017-06-30 6:02 ` Nicholas A. Bellinger [this message]
2017-07-05 7:03 ` Antw: " Ulrich Windl
2017-07-05 12:35 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-06 17:47 ` [PATCH v4 07/13] ceph: ensure RNG is seeded before using Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 2:45 ` [kernel-hardening] " Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-06 17:47 ` [PATCH v4 08/13] cifs: use get_random_u32 for 32-bit lock random Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 0:25 ` [kernel-hardening] " Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-08 0:31 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 0:34 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:48 ` [PATCH v4 09/13] rhashtable: use get_random_u32 for hash_rnd Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 2:47 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-06 17:48 ` [PATCH v4 10/13] net/neighbor: use get_random_u32 for 32-bit hash random Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 3:00 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-06 17:48 ` [PATCH v4 11/13] net/route: use get_random_int for random counter Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 3:01 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-06 17:48 ` [PATCH v4 12/13] bluetooth/smp: ensure RNG is properly seeded before ECDH use Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 3:06 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-08 5:04 ` Marcel Holtmann
2017-06-08 12:03 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 12:05 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 17:05 ` Marcel Holtmann
2017-06-08 17:34 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-09 1:16 ` [PATCH] bluetooth: ensure RNG is properly seeded before powerup Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:48 ` [PATCH v4 13/13] random: warn when kernel uses unseeded randomness Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 8:19 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-08 12:01 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-15 11:03 ` [kernel-hardening] " Michael Ellerman
2017-06-15 11:59 ` Stephan Müller
2017-06-18 15:46 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-18 17:55 ` Stephan Müller
2017-06-18 19:12 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-18 19:11 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 8:43 ` Jeffrey Walton
2017-06-07 12:33 ` [PATCH v4 00/13] Unseeded In-Kernel Randomness Fixes Jason A. Donenfeld
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