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From: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
To: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>,
	Linux Crypto Mailing List <linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>,
	"Gustavo F. Padovan" <gustavo@padovan.org>,
	Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 12/13] bluetooth/smp: ensure RNG is properly seeded before ECDH use
Date: Thu, 8 Jun 2017 07:04:12 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <7B079482-B436-4FE7-A752-9518606F15AB@holtmann.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170608030631.ywmldxzehtumeqd3@thunk.org>

Hi Ted,

>> This protocol uses lots of complex cryptography that relies on securely
>> generated random numbers. Thus, it's important that the RNG is actually
>> seeded before use. Fortuantely, it appears we're always operating in
>> process context (there are many GFP_KERNEL allocations and other
>> sleeping operations), and so we can simply demand that the RNG is seeded
>> before we use it.
>> 
>> We take two strategies in this commit. The first is for the library code
>> that's called from other modules like hci or mgmt: here we just change
>> the call to get_random_bytes_wait, and return the result of the wait to
>> the caller, along with the other error codes of those functions like
>> usual. Then there's the SMP protocol handler itself, which makes many
>> many many calls to get_random_bytes during different phases. For this,
>> rather than have to change all the calls to get_random_bytes_wait and
>> propagate the error result, it's actually enough to just put a single
>> call to wait_for_random_bytes() at the beginning of the handler, to
>> ensure that all the subsequent invocations are safe, without having to
>> actually change them. Likewise, for the random address changing
>> function, we'd rather know early on in the function whether the RNG
>> initialization has been interrupted, rather than later, so we call
>> wait_for_random_bytes() at the top, so that later on the call to
>> get_random_bytes() is acceptable.
> 
> Do we need to do all of this?  Bluetooth folks, is it fair to assume
> that hci_power_on() has to be called before any bluetooth functions
> can be done?  If so, adding a wait_for_random_bytes() in
> hci_power_on() might be all that is necessary.

yes, there are plenty of commands needed before a controller becomes usable. When plugging in new Bluetooth hardware, we have to power it up and read the initial settings and configuration out of.

Also all the cryptographic features only apply to LE enabled controllers. The classic BR/EDR controllers have this all in hardware. So if you are not LE enabled, then there is not even a point in waiting for any seeding. However that said, also all LE controllers have an extra random number function we could call if we need extra seeding. We never bothered to hook this up since we thought that the kernel has enough sources.

Regards

Marcel

  reply	other threads:[~2017-06-08  5:04 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 63+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-06-06 17:47 [PATCH v4 00/13] Unseeded In-Kernel Randomness Fixes Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:47 ` [PATCH v4 01/13] random: invalidate batched entropy after crng init Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-07 23:58   ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-08  0:52     ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:47 ` [PATCH v4 02/13] random: add synchronous API for the urandom pool Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08  0:00   ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-06 17:47 ` [PATCH v4 03/13] random: add get_random_{bytes,u32,u64,int,long,once}_wait family Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08  0:05   ` [kernel-hardening] " Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-06 17:47 ` [PATCH v4 04/13] security/keys: ensure RNG is seeded before use Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08  0:31   ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-08  0:50     ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08  1:03       ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:47 ` [PATCH v4 05/13] crypto/rng: ensure that the RNG is ready before using Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08  0:41   ` [kernel-hardening] " Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-08  0:47     ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:47 ` [PATCH v4 06/13] iscsi: ensure RNG is seeded before use Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08  2:43   ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-08 12:09     ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-16 21:58       ` Lee Duncan
2017-06-17  0:41         ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-17  3:45           ` Lee Duncan
2017-06-17 14:23             ` Jeffrey Walton
2017-06-17 18:50               ` [kernel-hardening] " Paul Koning
2017-07-05  7:08               ` Antw: Re: [kernel-hardening] " Ulrich Windl
2017-07-05 13:16                 ` Paul Koning
2017-07-05 17:34                   ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-18  8:04             ` Stephan Müller
2017-06-26  1:23               ` Nicholas A. Bellinger
2017-06-26 17:38                 ` Stephan Müller
2017-06-30  6:02                   ` Nicholas A. Bellinger
2017-07-05  7:03                   ` Antw: " Ulrich Windl
2017-07-05 12:35                     ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-06 17:47 ` [PATCH v4 07/13] ceph: ensure RNG is seeded before using Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08  2:45   ` [kernel-hardening] " Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-06 17:47 ` [PATCH v4 08/13] cifs: use get_random_u32 for 32-bit lock random Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08  0:25   ` [kernel-hardening] " Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-08  0:31     ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08  0:34     ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:48 ` [PATCH v4 09/13] rhashtable: use get_random_u32 for hash_rnd Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08  2:47   ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-06 17:48 ` [PATCH v4 10/13] net/neighbor: use get_random_u32 for 32-bit hash random Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08  3:00   ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-06 17:48 ` [PATCH v4 11/13] net/route: use get_random_int for random counter Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08  3:01   ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-06 17:48 ` [PATCH v4 12/13] bluetooth/smp: ensure RNG is properly seeded before ECDH use Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08  3:06   ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-08  5:04     ` Marcel Holtmann [this message]
2017-06-08 12:03       ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 12:05       ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 17:05         ` Marcel Holtmann
2017-06-08 17:34           ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-09  1:16             ` [PATCH] bluetooth: ensure RNG is properly seeded before powerup Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:48 ` [PATCH v4 13/13] random: warn when kernel uses unseeded randomness Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08  8:19   ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-08 12:01     ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-15 11:03     ` [kernel-hardening] " Michael Ellerman
2017-06-15 11:59       ` Stephan Müller
2017-06-18 15:46         ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-18 17:55           ` Stephan Müller
2017-06-18 19:12             ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-18 19:11           ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08  8:43   ` Jeffrey Walton
2017-06-07 12:33 ` [PATCH v4 00/13] Unseeded In-Kernel Randomness Fixes Jason A. Donenfeld

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