From: "Stephan Müller" <smueller@chronox.de>
To: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
"Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>,
"Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>,
Linux Crypto Mailing List <linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>,
Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v4 13/13] random: warn when kernel uses unseeded randomness
Date: Thu, 15 Jun 2017 13:59:43 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1606799.lNpamfCTbW@tauon.chronox.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <871sqlpl63.fsf@concordia.ellerman.id.au>
Am Donnerstag, 15. Juni 2017, 13:03:48 CEST schrieb Michael Ellerman:
Hi Michael,
>
> Even with this patch, it's still pretty spammy (today's linux-next):
>
I would think that the issue regarding the logging is relevant for
cryptographic use cases or use cases requiring strong random numbers only.
Only those use cases should be fixed eventually to wait for a fully seeded
DRNG.
The logged messages you present here indicate use cases where no strong
security is required. It looks like that the logs show ASLR related use of
random numbers. Those do not require a fully seeded ChaCha20 DRNG.
IMHO, users using the get_random_u64 or get_random_u32 are use cases that do
not require a fully seeded DRNG thus do not need a cryptographically strong
random number. Hence, I would think that the logging should be removed from
get_random_u32/u64.
Yet, logging should remain for get_random_bytes which should be denominated as
the interface for use cases where cryptographically strong random numbers are
required.
Ciao
Stephan
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-06-15 11:59 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 63+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-06-06 17:47 [PATCH v4 00/13] Unseeded In-Kernel Randomness Fixes Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:47 ` [PATCH v4 01/13] random: invalidate batched entropy after crng init Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-07 23:58 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-08 0:52 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:47 ` [PATCH v4 02/13] random: add synchronous API for the urandom pool Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 0:00 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-06 17:47 ` [PATCH v4 03/13] random: add get_random_{bytes,u32,u64,int,long,once}_wait family Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 0:05 ` [kernel-hardening] " Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-06 17:47 ` [PATCH v4 04/13] security/keys: ensure RNG is seeded before use Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 0:31 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-08 0:50 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 1:03 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:47 ` [PATCH v4 05/13] crypto/rng: ensure that the RNG is ready before using Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 0:41 ` [kernel-hardening] " Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-08 0:47 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:47 ` [PATCH v4 06/13] iscsi: ensure RNG is seeded before use Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 2:43 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-08 12:09 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-16 21:58 ` Lee Duncan
2017-06-17 0:41 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-17 3:45 ` Lee Duncan
2017-06-17 14:23 ` Jeffrey Walton
2017-06-17 18:50 ` [kernel-hardening] " Paul Koning
2017-07-05 7:08 ` Antw: Re: [kernel-hardening] " Ulrich Windl
2017-07-05 13:16 ` Paul Koning
2017-07-05 17:34 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-18 8:04 ` Stephan Müller
2017-06-26 1:23 ` Nicholas A. Bellinger
2017-06-26 17:38 ` Stephan Müller
2017-06-30 6:02 ` Nicholas A. Bellinger
2017-07-05 7:03 ` Antw: " Ulrich Windl
2017-07-05 12:35 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-06 17:47 ` [PATCH v4 07/13] ceph: ensure RNG is seeded before using Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 2:45 ` [kernel-hardening] " Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-06 17:47 ` [PATCH v4 08/13] cifs: use get_random_u32 for 32-bit lock random Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 0:25 ` [kernel-hardening] " Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-08 0:31 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 0:34 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:48 ` [PATCH v4 09/13] rhashtable: use get_random_u32 for hash_rnd Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 2:47 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-06 17:48 ` [PATCH v4 10/13] net/neighbor: use get_random_u32 for 32-bit hash random Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 3:00 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-06 17:48 ` [PATCH v4 11/13] net/route: use get_random_int for random counter Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 3:01 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-06 17:48 ` [PATCH v4 12/13] bluetooth/smp: ensure RNG is properly seeded before ECDH use Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 3:06 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-08 5:04 ` Marcel Holtmann
2017-06-08 12:03 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 12:05 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 17:05 ` Marcel Holtmann
2017-06-08 17:34 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-09 1:16 ` [PATCH] bluetooth: ensure RNG is properly seeded before powerup Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:48 ` [PATCH v4 13/13] random: warn when kernel uses unseeded randomness Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 8:19 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-08 12:01 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-15 11:03 ` [kernel-hardening] " Michael Ellerman
2017-06-15 11:59 ` Stephan Müller [this message]
2017-06-18 15:46 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-18 17:55 ` Stephan Müller
2017-06-18 19:12 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-18 19:11 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 8:43 ` Jeffrey Walton
2017-06-07 12:33 ` [PATCH v4 00/13] Unseeded In-Kernel Randomness Fixes Jason A. Donenfeld
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