From: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
To: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Cc: Linux Crypto Mailing List <linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>,
Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 13/13] random: warn when kernel uses unseeded randomness
Date: Thu, 8 Jun 2017 04:19:19 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170608081919.zbtwdjl32vbvd7jt@thunk.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170606174804.31124-14-Jason@zx2c4.com>
On Tue, Jun 06, 2017 at 07:48:04PM +0200, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote:
> This enables an important dmesg notification about when drivers have
> used the crng without it being seeded first. Prior, these errors would
> occur silently, and so there hasn't been a great way of diagnosing these
> types of bugs for obscure setups. By adding this as a config option, we
> can leave it on by default, so that we learn where these issues happen,
> in the field, will still allowing some people to turn it off, if they
> really know what they're doing and do not want the log entries.
>
> However, we don't leave it _completely_ by default. An earlier version
> of this patch simply had `default y`. I'd really love that, but it turns
> out, this problem with unseeded randomness being used is really quite
> present and is going to take a long time to fix. Thus, as a compromise
> between log-messages-for-all and nobody-knows, this is `default y`,
> except it is also `depends on DEBUG_KERNEL`. This will ensure that the
> curious see the messages while others don't have to.
>
> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
This patch is pretty spammy. On my KVM test kernel:
random: bucket_table_alloc+0x15f/0x190 get_random_u32 called with crng_init = 0
random: bucket_table_alloc+0x15f/0x190 get_random_u32 called with crng_init = 0
random: bucket_table_alloc+0x15f/0x190 get_random_u32 called with crng_init = 0
random: bucket_table_alloc+0x15f/0x190 get_random_u32 called with crng_init = 0
random: bucket_table_alloc+0x15f/0x190 get_random_u32 called with crng_init = 0
random: bucket_table_alloc+0x15f/0x190 get_random_u32 called with crng_init = 0
random: bucket_table_alloc+0x15f/0x190 get_random_u32 called with crng_init = 0
random: bucket_table_alloc+0x15f/0x190 get_random_u32 called with crng_init = 0
random: bucket_table_alloc+0x15f/0x190 get_random_u32 called with crng_init = 0
random: bucket_table_alloc+0x15f/0x190 get_random_u32 called with crng_init = 0
random: bucket_table_alloc+0x15f/0x190 get_random_u32 called with crng_init = 0
random: bucket_table_alloc+0x15f/0x190 get_random_u32 called with crng_init = 0
random: bucket_table_alloc+0x15f/0x190 get_random_u32 called with crng_init = 0
random: bucket_table_alloc+0x15f/0x190 get_random_u32 called with crng_init = 0
random: bucket_table_alloc+0x15f/0x190 get_random_u32 called with crng_init = 0
random: bucket_table_alloc+0x15f/0x190 get_random_u32 called with crng_init = 0
random: bucket_table_alloc+0x15f/0x190 get_random_u32 called with crng_init = 0
random: bucket_table_alloc+0x15f/0x190 get_random_u32 called with crng_init = 0
random: bucket_table_alloc+0x15f/0x190 get_random_u32 called with crng_init = 0
random: bucket_table_alloc+0x15f/0x190 get_random_u32 called with crng_init = 0
random: bucket_table_alloc+0x15f/0x190 get_random_u32 called with crng_init = 0
random: bucket_table_alloc+0x15f/0x190 get_random_u32 called with crng_init = 0
random: bucket_table_alloc+0x15f/0x190 get_random_u32 called with crng_init = 0
random: bucket_table_alloc+0x15f/0x190 get_random_u32 called with crng_init = 0
random: bucket_table_alloc+0x15f/0x190 get_random_u32 called with crng_init = 0
random: bucket_table_alloc+0x15f/0x190 get_random_u32 called with crng_init = 0
random: bucket_table_alloc+0x15f/0x190 get_random_u32 called with crng_init = 0
random: bucket_table_alloc+0x15f/0x190 get_random_u32 called with crng_init = 0
random: bucket_table_alloc+0x15f/0x190 get_random_u32 called with crng_init = 0
random: bucket_table_alloc+0x15f/0x190 get_random_u32 called with crng_init = 0
random: bucket_table_alloc+0x15f/0x190 get_random_u32 called with crng_init = 0
random: neigh_hash_alloc+0x77/0x8f get_random_u32 called with crng_init = 0
random: neigh_hash_alloc+0x77/0x8f get_random_u32 called with crng_init = 0
random: neigh_hash_alloc+0x77/0x8f get_random_u32 called with crng_init = 0
random: neigh_hash_alloc+0x77/0x8f get_random_u32 called with crng_init = 0
random: rt_genid_init+0x24/0x2f get_random_u32 called with crng_init = 0
random: bucket_table_alloc+0x15f/0x190 get_random_u32 called with crng_init = 0
At the very least we probably should do a logical "uniq" on the output
(e.g., if we have complained about the previous callsite, don't whinge
about it again).
- Ted
commit 9d9035bc6d7871a73d7f9aada4e63cb190874a68
Author: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Date: Thu Jun 8 04:16:59 2017 -0400
random: suppress duplicate crng_init=0 warnings
Suppress duplicate CONFIG_WARN_UNSEEDED_RANDOM warnings to avoid
spamming dmesg.
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index 798f353f0d3c..3bdeef13afda 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -1481,9 +1481,14 @@ void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes)
__u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE];
#ifdef CONFIG_WARN_UNSEEDED_RANDOM
- if (!crng_ready())
+ static void *previous = NULL;
+ void *caller = (void *) _RET_IP_;
+
+ if (!crng_ready() && (READ_ONCE(previous) != caller)) {
printk(KERN_NOTICE "random: %pF get_random_bytes called "
- "with crng_init = %d\n", (void *) _RET_IP_, crng_init);
+ "with crng_init=%d\n", caller, crng_init);
+ WRITE_ONCE(previous, caller);
+ }
#endif
trace_get_random_bytes(nbytes, _RET_IP_);
@@ -2064,6 +2069,10 @@ u64 get_random_u64(void)
bool use_lock = crng_init < 2;
unsigned long flags;
struct batched_entropy *batch;
+#ifdef CONFIG_WARN_UNSEEDED_RANDOM
+ static void *previous = NULL;
+ void *caller = (void *) _RET_IP_;
+#endif
#if BITS_PER_LONG == 64
if (arch_get_random_long((unsigned long *)&ret))
@@ -2075,9 +2084,11 @@ u64 get_random_u64(void)
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_WARN_UNSEEDED_RANDOM
- if (!crng_ready())
+ if (!crng_ready() && (READ_ONCE(previous) != caller)) {
printk(KERN_NOTICE "random: %pF get_random_u64 called "
- "with crng_init = %d\n", (void *) _RET_IP_, crng_init);
+ "with crng_init=%d\n", caller, crng_init);
+ WRITE_ONCE(previous, caller);
+ }
#endif
batch = &get_cpu_var(batched_entropy_u64);
@@ -2102,14 +2113,20 @@ u32 get_random_u32(void)
bool use_lock = crng_init < 2;
unsigned long flags;
struct batched_entropy *batch;
+#ifdef CONFIG_WARN_UNSEEDED_RANDOM
+ static void *previous = NULL;
+ void *caller = (void *) _RET_IP_;
+#endif
if (arch_get_random_int(&ret))
return ret;
#ifdef CONFIG_WARN_UNSEEDED_RANDOM
- if (!crng_ready())
+ if (!crng_ready() && READ_ONCE(previous) != caller) {
printk(KERN_NOTICE "random: %pF get_random_u32 called "
- "with crng_init = %d\n", (void *) _RET_IP_, crng_init);
+ "with crng_init=%d\n", caller, crng_init);
+ WRITE_ONCE(previous, caller);
+ }
#endif
batch = &get_cpu_var(batched_entropy_u32);
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-06-08 8:19 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 63+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-06-06 17:47 [PATCH v4 00/13] Unseeded In-Kernel Randomness Fixes Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:47 ` [PATCH v4 01/13] random: invalidate batched entropy after crng init Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-07 23:58 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-08 0:52 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:47 ` [PATCH v4 02/13] random: add synchronous API for the urandom pool Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 0:00 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-06 17:47 ` [PATCH v4 03/13] random: add get_random_{bytes,u32,u64,int,long,once}_wait family Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 0:05 ` [kernel-hardening] " Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-06 17:47 ` [PATCH v4 04/13] security/keys: ensure RNG is seeded before use Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 0:31 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-08 0:50 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 1:03 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:47 ` [PATCH v4 05/13] crypto/rng: ensure that the RNG is ready before using Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 0:41 ` [kernel-hardening] " Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-08 0:47 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:47 ` [PATCH v4 06/13] iscsi: ensure RNG is seeded before use Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 2:43 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-08 12:09 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-16 21:58 ` Lee Duncan
2017-06-17 0:41 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-17 3:45 ` Lee Duncan
2017-06-17 14:23 ` Jeffrey Walton
2017-06-17 18:50 ` [kernel-hardening] " Paul Koning
2017-07-05 7:08 ` Antw: Re: [kernel-hardening] " Ulrich Windl
2017-07-05 13:16 ` Paul Koning
2017-07-05 17:34 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-18 8:04 ` Stephan Müller
2017-06-26 1:23 ` Nicholas A. Bellinger
2017-06-26 17:38 ` Stephan Müller
2017-06-30 6:02 ` Nicholas A. Bellinger
2017-07-05 7:03 ` Antw: " Ulrich Windl
2017-07-05 12:35 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-06 17:47 ` [PATCH v4 07/13] ceph: ensure RNG is seeded before using Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 2:45 ` [kernel-hardening] " Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-06 17:47 ` [PATCH v4 08/13] cifs: use get_random_u32 for 32-bit lock random Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 0:25 ` [kernel-hardening] " Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-08 0:31 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 0:34 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:48 ` [PATCH v4 09/13] rhashtable: use get_random_u32 for hash_rnd Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 2:47 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-06 17:48 ` [PATCH v4 10/13] net/neighbor: use get_random_u32 for 32-bit hash random Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 3:00 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-06 17:48 ` [PATCH v4 11/13] net/route: use get_random_int for random counter Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 3:01 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-06 17:48 ` [PATCH v4 12/13] bluetooth/smp: ensure RNG is properly seeded before ECDH use Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 3:06 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-08 5:04 ` Marcel Holtmann
2017-06-08 12:03 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 12:05 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 17:05 ` Marcel Holtmann
2017-06-08 17:34 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-09 1:16 ` [PATCH] bluetooth: ensure RNG is properly seeded before powerup Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-06 17:48 ` [PATCH v4 13/13] random: warn when kernel uses unseeded randomness Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 8:19 ` Theodore Ts'o [this message]
2017-06-08 12:01 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-15 11:03 ` [kernel-hardening] " Michael Ellerman
2017-06-15 11:59 ` Stephan Müller
2017-06-18 15:46 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-06-18 17:55 ` Stephan Müller
2017-06-18 19:12 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-18 19:11 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-06-08 8:43 ` Jeffrey Walton
2017-06-07 12:33 ` [PATCH v4 00/13] Unseeded In-Kernel Randomness Fixes Jason A. Donenfeld
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