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From: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
To: arjan@linux.intel.com, tglx@linutronix.de, karahmed@amazon.de,
	x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com, bp@alien8.de, peterz@infradead.org,
	pbonzini@redhat.com, ak@linux.intel.com,
	torvalds@linux-foundation.org, gregkh@linux-foundation.org
Subject: [PATCH v2 8/8] x86/mm: Only flush indirect branches when switching into non dumpable process
Date: Sun, 21 Jan 2018 09:49:09 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1516528149-9370-9-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1516528149-9370-1-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk>

From: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>

Flush indirect branches when switching into a process that marked
itself non dumpable.  This protects high value processes like gpg
better, without having too high performance overhead.

Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@amazon.de>
---
 arch/x86/mm/tlb.c | 13 ++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c b/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
index 304de7d..f64e80c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
@@ -225,8 +225,19 @@ void switch_mm_irqs_off(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next,
 		 * Avoid user/user BTB poisoning by flushing the branch predictor
 		 * when switching between processes. This stops one process from
 		 * doing Spectre-v2 attacks on another.
+		 *
+		 * As an optimization: Flush indirect branches only when
+		 * switching into processes that disable dumping.
+		 *
+		 * This will not flush when switching into kernel threads.
+		 * But it would flush when switching into idle and back
+		 *
+		 * It might be useful to have a one-off cache here
+		 * to also not flush the idle case, but we would need some
+		 * kind of stable sequence number to remember the previous mm.
 		 */
-		indirect_branch_prediction_barrier();
+		if (tsk && tsk->mm && get_dumpable(tsk->mm) != SUID_DUMP_USER)
+			indirect_branch_prediction_barrier();
 
 		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_VMAP_STACK)) {
 			/*
-- 
2.7.4

  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-01-21  9:49 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 35+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-01-21  9:49 [PATCH v2 0/8] Speculation Control feature support, IBPB David Woodhouse
2018-01-21  9:49 ` [PATCH v2 1/8] x86/cpufeatures: Add Intel feature bits for Speculation Control David Woodhouse
2018-01-21 10:17   ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-21  9:49 ` [PATCH v2 2/8] x86/cpufeatures: Add AMD feature bits for Prediction Command David Woodhouse
2018-01-21 17:50   ` Tom Lendacky
2018-01-21 18:01     ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-22 14:31       ` Tom Lendacky
2018-01-22 14:33         ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-21  9:49 ` [PATCH v2 3/8] x86/msr: Add definitions for new speculation control MSRs David Woodhouse
2018-01-21 13:06   ` Jiri Slaby
2018-01-21 13:27     ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-21  9:49 ` [PATCH v2 4/8] x86/pti: Do not enable PTI on fixed Intel processors David Woodhouse
2018-01-21 13:38   ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-21  9:49 ` [PATCH v2 5/8] x86/speculation: Add basic support for IBPB David Woodhouse
2018-01-21 10:26   ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-21 18:06   ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-21 18:29     ` KarimAllah Ahmed
2018-01-21 19:01       ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-21 19:31         ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-21 19:37           ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-21 20:04             ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-21 20:19               ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-21 21:25                 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-21 19:53           ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-21 18:54     ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-21 19:04       ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-21 19:31         ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-21 19:54           ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-21 20:07             ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-21 20:17               ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-21  9:49 ` [PATCH v2 6/8] x86/kvm: Add IBPB support David Woodhouse
2018-01-21 18:06   ` Tom Lendacky
2018-01-21  9:49 ` [PATCH v2 7/8] x86/speculation: Use Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier in context switch David Woodhouse
2018-01-21  9:49 ` David Woodhouse [this message]
2018-01-21 10:33   ` [PATCH v2 8/8] x86/mm: Only flush indirect branches when switching into non dumpable process Ingo Molnar

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