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From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
To: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: arjan@linux.intel.com, tglx@linutronix.de, karahmed@amazon.de,
	x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com, bp@alien8.de, peterz@infradead.org,
	pbonzini@redhat.com, ak@linux.intel.com,
	torvalds@linux-foundation.org, gregkh@linux-foundation.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 5/8] x86/speculation: Add basic support for IBPB
Date: Sun, 21 Jan 2018 11:26:22 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180121102622.xujqxfliksoe75pm@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1516528149-9370-6-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk>


* David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> wrote:

> From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
> 
> Expose indirect_branch_prediction_barrier() for use in subsequent patches.
> 
> [karahmed: remove the special-casing of skylake for using IBPB (wtf?),
>            switch to using ALTERNATIVES instead of static_cpu_has]
> [dwmw2:    set up ax/cx/dx in the asm too so it gets NOP'd out]
> 
> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
> Signed-off-by: KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@amazon.de>
> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
> ---
>  arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h   |  1 +
>  arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 16 ++++++++++++++++
>  arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c           |  7 +++++++
>  3 files changed, 24 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
> index 8c9e5c0..cf28399 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
> @@ -207,6 +207,7 @@
>  #define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD	( 7*32+13) /* AMD Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */
>  #define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PPIN		( 7*32+14) /* Intel Processor Inventory Number */
>  
> +#define X86_FEATURE_IBPB		( 7*32+16) /* Using Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */
>  #define X86_FEATURE_AMD_PRED_CMD	( 7*32+17) /* Prediction Command MSR (AMD) */
>  #define X86_FEATURE_MBA			( 7*32+18) /* Memory Bandwidth Allocation */
>  #define X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW		( 7*32+19) /* Fill RSB on context switches */
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
> index 4ad4108..c333c95 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
> @@ -218,5 +218,21 @@ static inline void vmexit_fill_RSB(void)
>  #endif
>  }
>  
> +static inline void indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(void)
> +{
> +	unsigned long ax, cx, dx;
> +
> +	asm volatile(ALTERNATIVE("",
> +				 "movl %[msr], %%ecx\n\t"
> +				 "movl %[val], %%eax\n\t"
> +				 "movl $0, %%edx\n\t"
> +				 "wrmsr",
> +				 X86_FEATURE_IBPB)
> +		     : "=a" (ax), "=c" (cx), "=d" (dx)
> +		     : [msr] "i" (MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD),
> +		       [val] "i" (PRED_CMD_IBPB)
> +		     : "memory");
> +}
> +
>  #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
>  #endif /* __NOSPEC_BRANCH_H__ */
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
> index 390b3dc..96548ff 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
> @@ -249,6 +249,13 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
>  		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW);
>  		pr_info("Filling RSB on context switch\n");
>  	}
> +
> +	/* Initialize Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier if supported */
> +	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL) ||
> +	    boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_PRED_CMD)) {
> +		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB);
> +		pr_info("Enabling Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier\n");
> +	}
>  }

I'd suggest writing out the common 'IBPB' acronym in the messages as well:

		pr_info("Enabling Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier (IBPB)\n");

Also, the kernel's barrier*() namespace as it exists today is:

	barrier()
	barrier_data()

I think the better name to introduce would be:

	barrier_indirect_branch_prediction()

to maintain barrier_ as a prefix.

Thanks,

	Ingo

  reply	other threads:[~2018-01-21 10:26 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 35+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-01-21  9:49 [PATCH v2 0/8] Speculation Control feature support, IBPB David Woodhouse
2018-01-21  9:49 ` [PATCH v2 1/8] x86/cpufeatures: Add Intel feature bits for Speculation Control David Woodhouse
2018-01-21 10:17   ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-21  9:49 ` [PATCH v2 2/8] x86/cpufeatures: Add AMD feature bits for Prediction Command David Woodhouse
2018-01-21 17:50   ` Tom Lendacky
2018-01-21 18:01     ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-22 14:31       ` Tom Lendacky
2018-01-22 14:33         ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-21  9:49 ` [PATCH v2 3/8] x86/msr: Add definitions for new speculation control MSRs David Woodhouse
2018-01-21 13:06   ` Jiri Slaby
2018-01-21 13:27     ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-21  9:49 ` [PATCH v2 4/8] x86/pti: Do not enable PTI on fixed Intel processors David Woodhouse
2018-01-21 13:38   ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-21  9:49 ` [PATCH v2 5/8] x86/speculation: Add basic support for IBPB David Woodhouse
2018-01-21 10:26   ` Ingo Molnar [this message]
2018-01-21 18:06   ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-21 18:29     ` KarimAllah Ahmed
2018-01-21 19:01       ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-21 19:31         ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-21 19:37           ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-21 20:04             ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-21 20:19               ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-21 21:25                 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-21 19:53           ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-21 18:54     ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-21 19:04       ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-21 19:31         ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-21 19:54           ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-21 20:07             ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-21 20:17               ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-21  9:49 ` [PATCH v2 6/8] x86/kvm: Add IBPB support David Woodhouse
2018-01-21 18:06   ` Tom Lendacky
2018-01-21  9:49 ` [PATCH v2 7/8] x86/speculation: Use Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier in context switch David Woodhouse
2018-01-21  9:49 ` [PATCH v2 8/8] x86/mm: Only flush indirect branches when switching into non dumpable process David Woodhouse
2018-01-21 10:33   ` Ingo Molnar

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