From: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
To: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: arjan@linux.intel.com, tglx@linutronix.de, karahmed@amazon.de,
x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com, peterz@infradead.org,
pbonzini@redhat.com, ak@linux.intel.com,
torvalds@linux-foundation.org, gregkh@linux-foundation.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 5/8] x86/speculation: Add basic support for IBPB
Date: Sun, 21 Jan 2018 21:17:53 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180121201753.hvcrs7dvhk4vmrrv@pd.tnic> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1516565226.9814.63.camel@infradead.org>
On Sun, Jan 21, 2018 at 08:07:06PM +0000, David Woodhouse wrote:
> That bug is the *reason* we're arguing about static_cpu_has vs.
> ALTERNATIVE.
>
> A conditional branch that the CPU sees can be speculated over...
Lemme see if I understand it correctly: you don't want to have any such
constructs:
testb $1,boot_cpu_data+50(%rip) #, MEM[(const char *)&boot_cpu_data + 50B]
jnz .L707 #
which could cause any speculation.
Instead, you want to have unconditional code which is slapped in by
alternatives.
Oh, and you don't want to have that at privilege crossing sites, like
VMEXIT or so.
Am I close?
> Now, Andrew is right that in a number of cases there will be another
> serialising instruction before we ever hit a problematic indirect
> branch. But as I just said elsewhere, I'd really like the *primitives*
> to support unconditional operation.
In this particular case, WRMSR is already serializing too. So it is hard
to exploit stuff here :-)
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
Good mailing practices for 400: avoid top-posting and trim the reply.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-01-21 20:17 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 35+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-01-21 9:49 [PATCH v2 0/8] Speculation Control feature support, IBPB David Woodhouse
2018-01-21 9:49 ` [PATCH v2 1/8] x86/cpufeatures: Add Intel feature bits for Speculation Control David Woodhouse
2018-01-21 10:17 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-21 9:49 ` [PATCH v2 2/8] x86/cpufeatures: Add AMD feature bits for Prediction Command David Woodhouse
2018-01-21 17:50 ` Tom Lendacky
2018-01-21 18:01 ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-22 14:31 ` Tom Lendacky
2018-01-22 14:33 ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-21 9:49 ` [PATCH v2 3/8] x86/msr: Add definitions for new speculation control MSRs David Woodhouse
2018-01-21 13:06 ` Jiri Slaby
2018-01-21 13:27 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-21 9:49 ` [PATCH v2 4/8] x86/pti: Do not enable PTI on fixed Intel processors David Woodhouse
2018-01-21 13:38 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-21 9:49 ` [PATCH v2 5/8] x86/speculation: Add basic support for IBPB David Woodhouse
2018-01-21 10:26 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-21 18:06 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-21 18:29 ` KarimAllah Ahmed
2018-01-21 19:01 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-21 19:31 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-21 19:37 ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-21 20:04 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-21 20:19 ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-21 21:25 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-21 19:53 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-21 18:54 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-21 19:04 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-21 19:31 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-21 19:54 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-21 20:07 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-21 20:17 ` Borislav Petkov [this message]
2018-01-21 9:49 ` [PATCH v2 6/8] x86/kvm: Add IBPB support David Woodhouse
2018-01-21 18:06 ` Tom Lendacky
2018-01-21 9:49 ` [PATCH v2 7/8] x86/speculation: Use Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier in context switch David Woodhouse
2018-01-21 9:49 ` [PATCH v2 8/8] x86/mm: Only flush indirect branches when switching into non dumpable process David Woodhouse
2018-01-21 10:33 ` Ingo Molnar
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