From: "tip-bot2 for David Kaplan" <tip-bot2@linutronix.de>
To: linux-tip-commits@vger.kernel.org
Cc: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>,
"Borislav Petkov (AMD)" <bp@alien8.de>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>,
x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [tip: x86/bugs] x86/bugs: Restructure SRBDS mitigation
Date: Fri, 02 May 2025 10:33:30 -0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <174618201022.22196.8778383511604906614.tip-bot2@tip-bot2> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250418161721.1855190-7-david.kaplan@amd.com>
The following commit has been merged into the x86/bugs branch of tip:
Commit-ID: 2178ac58e176d8e1e4529b02647f5e549bb88405
Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/2178ac58e176d8e1e4529b02647f5e549bb88405
Author: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
AuthorDate: Fri, 18 Apr 2025 11:17:11 -05:00
Committer: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
CommitterDate: Mon, 28 Apr 2025 15:05:41 +02:00
x86/bugs: Restructure SRBDS mitigation
Restructure SRBDS to use select/apply functions to create consistent
vulnerability handling.
Define new AUTO mitigation for SRBDS.
Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250418161721.1855190-7-david.kaplan@amd.com
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 98476b8..25b74a7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -72,6 +72,7 @@ static void __init rfds_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init rfds_update_mitigation(void);
static void __init rfds_apply_mitigation(void);
static void __init srbds_select_mitigation(void);
+static void __init srbds_apply_mitigation(void);
static void __init l1d_flush_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init gds_select_mitigation(void);
@@ -225,6 +226,7 @@ void __init cpu_select_mitigations(void)
taa_apply_mitigation();
mmio_apply_mitigation();
rfds_apply_mitigation();
+ srbds_apply_mitigation();
}
/*
@@ -693,6 +695,7 @@ early_param("reg_file_data_sampling", rfds_parse_cmdline);
enum srbds_mitigations {
SRBDS_MITIGATION_OFF,
+ SRBDS_MITIGATION_AUTO,
SRBDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED,
SRBDS_MITIGATION_FULL,
SRBDS_MITIGATION_TSX_OFF,
@@ -700,7 +703,7 @@ enum srbds_mitigations {
};
static enum srbds_mitigations srbds_mitigation __ro_after_init =
- IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRBDS) ? SRBDS_MITIGATION_FULL : SRBDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
+ IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRBDS) ? SRBDS_MITIGATION_AUTO : SRBDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
static const char * const srbds_strings[] = {
[SRBDS_MITIGATION_OFF] = "Vulnerable",
@@ -751,8 +754,13 @@ void update_srbds_msr(void)
static void __init srbds_select_mitigation(void)
{
- if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SRBDS))
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SRBDS) || cpu_mitigations_off()) {
+ srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
return;
+ }
+
+ if (srbds_mitigation == SRBDS_MITIGATION_AUTO)
+ srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
/*
* Check to see if this is one of the MDS_NO systems supporting TSX that
@@ -766,13 +774,17 @@ static void __init srbds_select_mitigation(void)
srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR;
else if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SRBDS_CTRL))
srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED;
- else if (cpu_mitigations_off() || srbds_off)
+ else if (srbds_off)
srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
- update_srbds_msr();
pr_info("%s\n", srbds_strings[srbds_mitigation]);
}
+static void __init srbds_apply_mitigation(void)
+{
+ update_srbds_msr();
+}
+
static int __init srbds_parse_cmdline(char *str)
{
if (!str)
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-05-02 10:33 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 65+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-04-18 16:17 [PATCH v5 00/16] Attack vector controls (part 1) David Kaplan
2025-04-18 16:17 ` [PATCH v5 01/16] x86/bugs: Restructure MDS mitigation David Kaplan
2025-04-18 20:42 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-04-20 21:00 ` Kaplan, David
2025-04-22 8:19 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-04-22 14:32 ` Kaplan, David
2025-04-22 17:25 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-05-02 10:33 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-04-18 16:17 ` [PATCH v5 02/16] x86/bugs: Restructure TAA mitigation David Kaplan
2025-04-19 12:36 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-04-20 21:03 ` Kaplan, David
2025-04-22 8:56 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-05-02 10:33 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-04-18 16:17 ` [PATCH v5 03/16] x86/bugs: Restructure MMIO mitigation David Kaplan
2025-04-24 20:19 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-04-24 20:31 ` Kaplan, David
2025-04-25 8:09 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-04-25 13:28 ` Kaplan, David
2025-04-26 11:22 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-05-02 10:33 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-04-18 16:17 ` [PATCH v5 04/16] x86/bugs: Restructure RFDS mitigation David Kaplan
2025-04-27 15:09 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-04-28 13:42 ` Kaplan, David
2025-05-02 10:33 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-04-18 16:17 ` [PATCH v5 05/16] x86/bugs: Remove md_clear_*_mitigation() David Kaplan
2025-05-02 10:33 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-04-18 16:17 ` [PATCH v5 06/16] x86/bugs: Restructure SRBDS mitigation David Kaplan
2025-05-02 10:33 ` tip-bot2 for David Kaplan [this message]
2025-04-18 16:17 ` [PATCH v5 07/16] x86/bugs: Restructure GDS mitigation David Kaplan
2025-05-02 10:33 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-04-18 16:17 ` [PATCH v5 08/16] x86/bugs: Restructure spectre_v1 mitigation David Kaplan
2025-05-02 10:33 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-04-18 16:17 ` [PATCH v5 09/16] x86/bugs: Allow retbleed=stuff only on Intel David Kaplan
2025-04-27 15:38 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-05-02 10:33 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-04-18 16:17 ` [PATCH v5 10/16] x86/bugs: Restructure retbleed mitigation David Kaplan
2025-04-28 18:59 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-04-28 20:55 ` Kaplan, David
2025-04-29 8:21 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-05-02 10:33 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-04-18 16:17 ` [PATCH v5 11/16] x86/bugs: Restructure spectre_v2_user mitigation David Kaplan
2025-04-29 8:47 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-04-29 14:11 ` Kaplan, David
2025-05-02 10:33 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-04-18 16:17 ` [PATCH v5 12/16] x86/bugs: Restructure BHI mitigation David Kaplan
2025-05-02 10:33 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-04-18 16:17 ` [PATCH v5 13/16] x86/bugs: Restructure spectre_v2 mitigation David Kaplan
2025-04-29 10:46 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-05-02 10:33 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-04-18 16:17 ` [PATCH v5 14/16] x86/bugs: Restructure SSB mitigation David Kaplan
2025-04-29 12:54 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-04-29 14:09 ` Kaplan, David
2025-05-02 10:33 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-04-18 16:17 ` [PATCH v5 15/16] x86/bugs: Restructure L1TF mitigation David Kaplan
2025-05-02 10:33 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-04-18 16:17 ` [PATCH v5 16/16] x86/bugs: Restructure SRSO mitigation David Kaplan
2025-04-29 16:50 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-04-29 17:18 ` Kaplan, David
2025-04-30 8:25 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-05-02 10:33 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-04-18 20:03 ` [PATCH v5 00/16] Attack vector controls (part 1) Ingo Molnar
2025-04-18 21:33 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-04-22 9:46 ` Ingo Molnar
2025-04-22 13:59 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-04-22 5:22 ` Josh Poimboeuf
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=174618201022.22196.8778383511604906614.tip-bot2@tip-bot2 \
--to=tip-bot2@linutronix.de \
--cc=bp@alien8.de \
--cc=david.kaplan@amd.com \
--cc=jpoimboe@kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-tip-commits@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=x86@kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox
all inboxes | Powered by JetHome®