From: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>,
Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>, <x86@kernel.org>,
"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v5 12/16] x86/bugs: Restructure BHI mitigation
Date: Fri, 18 Apr 2025 11:17:17 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250418161721.1855190-13-david.kaplan@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250418161721.1855190-1-david.kaplan@amd.com>
Restructure BHI mitigation to use select/update/apply functions to create
consistent vulnerability handling. BHI mitigation was previously selected
from within spectre_v2_select_mitigation() and now is selected from
cpu_select_mitigation() like with all others.
Define new AUTO mitigation for BHI.
Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index bb20cfb81015..b7063f58ae88 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -82,6 +82,9 @@ static void __init l1d_flush_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init gds_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init gds_apply_mitigation(void);
+static void __init bhi_select_mitigation(void);
+static void __init bhi_update_mitigation(void);
+static void __init bhi_apply_mitigation(void);
/* The base value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR without task-specific bits set */
u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base;
@@ -208,6 +211,7 @@ void __init cpu_select_mitigations(void)
*/
srso_select_mitigation();
gds_select_mitigation();
+ bhi_select_mitigation();
/*
* After mitigations are selected, some may need to update their
@@ -223,6 +227,7 @@ void __init cpu_select_mitigations(void)
taa_update_mitigation();
mmio_update_mitigation();
rfds_update_mitigation();
+ bhi_update_mitigation();
spectre_v1_apply_mitigation();
retbleed_apply_mitigation();
@@ -233,6 +238,7 @@ void __init cpu_select_mitigations(void)
rfds_apply_mitigation();
srbds_apply_mitigation();
gds_apply_mitigation();
+ bhi_apply_mitigation();
}
/*
@@ -1792,12 +1798,13 @@ static bool __init spec_ctrl_bhi_dis(void)
enum bhi_mitigations {
BHI_MITIGATION_OFF,
+ BHI_MITIGATION_AUTO,
BHI_MITIGATION_ON,
BHI_MITIGATION_VMEXIT_ONLY,
};
static enum bhi_mitigations bhi_mitigation __ro_after_init =
- IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SPECTRE_BHI) ? BHI_MITIGATION_ON : BHI_MITIGATION_OFF;
+ IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SPECTRE_BHI) ? BHI_MITIGATION_AUTO : BHI_MITIGATION_OFF;
static int __init spectre_bhi_parse_cmdline(char *str)
{
@@ -1818,6 +1825,25 @@ static int __init spectre_bhi_parse_cmdline(char *str)
early_param("spectre_bhi", spectre_bhi_parse_cmdline);
static void __init bhi_select_mitigation(void)
+{
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_BUG_BHI) || cpu_mitigations_off())
+ bhi_mitigation = BHI_MITIGATION_OFF;
+
+ if (bhi_mitigation == BHI_MITIGATION_AUTO)
+ bhi_mitigation = BHI_MITIGATION_ON;
+}
+
+static void __init bhi_update_mitigation(void)
+{
+ if (spectre_v2_cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE)
+ bhi_mitigation = BHI_MITIGATION_OFF;
+
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2) &&
+ spectre_v2_cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO)
+ bhi_mitigation = BHI_MITIGATION_OFF;
+}
+
+static void __init bhi_apply_mitigation(void)
{
if (bhi_mitigation == BHI_MITIGATION_OFF)
return;
@@ -1959,9 +1985,6 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
mode == SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE)
spec_ctrl_disable_kernel_rrsba();
- if (boot_cpu_has(X86_BUG_BHI))
- bhi_select_mitigation();
-
spectre_v2_enabled = mode;
pr_info("%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[mode]);
--
2.34.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-04-18 16:17 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 65+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-04-18 16:17 [PATCH v5 00/16] Attack vector controls (part 1) David Kaplan
2025-04-18 16:17 ` [PATCH v5 01/16] x86/bugs: Restructure MDS mitigation David Kaplan
2025-04-18 20:42 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-04-20 21:00 ` Kaplan, David
2025-04-22 8:19 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-04-22 14:32 ` Kaplan, David
2025-04-22 17:25 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-05-02 10:33 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-04-18 16:17 ` [PATCH v5 02/16] x86/bugs: Restructure TAA mitigation David Kaplan
2025-04-19 12:36 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-04-20 21:03 ` Kaplan, David
2025-04-22 8:56 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-05-02 10:33 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-04-18 16:17 ` [PATCH v5 03/16] x86/bugs: Restructure MMIO mitigation David Kaplan
2025-04-24 20:19 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-04-24 20:31 ` Kaplan, David
2025-04-25 8:09 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-04-25 13:28 ` Kaplan, David
2025-04-26 11:22 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-05-02 10:33 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-04-18 16:17 ` [PATCH v5 04/16] x86/bugs: Restructure RFDS mitigation David Kaplan
2025-04-27 15:09 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-04-28 13:42 ` Kaplan, David
2025-05-02 10:33 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-04-18 16:17 ` [PATCH v5 05/16] x86/bugs: Remove md_clear_*_mitigation() David Kaplan
2025-05-02 10:33 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-04-18 16:17 ` [PATCH v5 06/16] x86/bugs: Restructure SRBDS mitigation David Kaplan
2025-05-02 10:33 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-04-18 16:17 ` [PATCH v5 07/16] x86/bugs: Restructure GDS mitigation David Kaplan
2025-05-02 10:33 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-04-18 16:17 ` [PATCH v5 08/16] x86/bugs: Restructure spectre_v1 mitigation David Kaplan
2025-05-02 10:33 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-04-18 16:17 ` [PATCH v5 09/16] x86/bugs: Allow retbleed=stuff only on Intel David Kaplan
2025-04-27 15:38 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-05-02 10:33 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-04-18 16:17 ` [PATCH v5 10/16] x86/bugs: Restructure retbleed mitigation David Kaplan
2025-04-28 18:59 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-04-28 20:55 ` Kaplan, David
2025-04-29 8:21 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-05-02 10:33 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-04-18 16:17 ` [PATCH v5 11/16] x86/bugs: Restructure spectre_v2_user mitigation David Kaplan
2025-04-29 8:47 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-04-29 14:11 ` Kaplan, David
2025-05-02 10:33 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-04-18 16:17 ` David Kaplan [this message]
2025-05-02 10:33 ` [tip: x86/bugs] x86/bugs: Restructure BHI mitigation tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-04-18 16:17 ` [PATCH v5 13/16] x86/bugs: Restructure spectre_v2 mitigation David Kaplan
2025-04-29 10:46 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-05-02 10:33 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-04-18 16:17 ` [PATCH v5 14/16] x86/bugs: Restructure SSB mitigation David Kaplan
2025-04-29 12:54 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-04-29 14:09 ` Kaplan, David
2025-05-02 10:33 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-04-18 16:17 ` [PATCH v5 15/16] x86/bugs: Restructure L1TF mitigation David Kaplan
2025-05-02 10:33 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-04-18 16:17 ` [PATCH v5 16/16] x86/bugs: Restructure SRSO mitigation David Kaplan
2025-04-29 16:50 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-04-29 17:18 ` Kaplan, David
2025-04-30 8:25 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-05-02 10:33 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-04-18 20:03 ` [PATCH v5 00/16] Attack vector controls (part 1) Ingo Molnar
2025-04-18 21:33 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-04-22 9:46 ` Ingo Molnar
2025-04-22 13:59 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-04-22 5:22 ` Josh Poimboeuf
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