From: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>,
Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>, <x86@kernel.org>,
"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v5 15/16] x86/bugs: Restructure L1TF mitigation
Date: Fri, 18 Apr 2025 11:17:20 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250418161721.1855190-16-david.kaplan@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250418161721.1855190-1-david.kaplan@amd.com>
Restructure L1TF to use select/apply functions to create consistent
vulnerability handling.
Define new AUTO mitigation for L1TF.
Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 1 +
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++------
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 2 ++
3 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
index eaa7214d6953..62705783ca3c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
@@ -735,6 +735,7 @@ void store_cpu_caps(struct cpuinfo_x86 *info);
enum l1tf_mitigations {
L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF,
+ L1TF_MITIGATION_AUTO,
L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOWARN,
L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH,
L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOSMT,
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index e526d06171cd..5f718537ba70 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_user_apply_mitigation(void);
static void __init ssb_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init ssb_apply_mitigation(void);
static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void);
+static void __init l1tf_apply_mitigation(void);
static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init mds_update_mitigation(void);
static void __init mds_apply_mitigation(void);
@@ -243,6 +244,7 @@ void __init cpu_select_mitigations(void)
retbleed_apply_mitigation();
spectre_v2_user_apply_mitigation();
ssb_apply_mitigation();
+ l1tf_apply_mitigation();
mds_apply_mitigation();
taa_apply_mitigation();
mmio_apply_mitigation();
@@ -2543,7 +2545,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(itlb_multihit_kvm_mitigation);
/* Default mitigation for L1TF-affected CPUs */
enum l1tf_mitigations l1tf_mitigation __ro_after_init =
- IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_L1TF) ? L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH : L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF;
+ IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_L1TF) ? L1TF_MITIGATION_AUTO : L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF;
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL)
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(l1tf_mitigation);
#endif
@@ -2590,23 +2592,34 @@ static void override_cache_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
}
static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void)
+{
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF) || cpu_mitigations_off()) {
+ l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (l1tf_mitigation == L1TF_MITIGATION_AUTO) {
+ if (cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt())
+ l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOSMT;
+ else
+ l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH;
+ }
+}
+
+static void __init l1tf_apply_mitigation(void)
{
u64 half_pa;
if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF))
return;
- if (cpu_mitigations_off())
- l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF;
- else if (cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt())
- l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOSMT;
-
override_cache_bits(&boot_cpu_data);
switch (l1tf_mitigation) {
case L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF:
case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOWARN:
case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH:
+ case L1TF_MITIGATION_AUTO:
break;
case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOSMT:
case L1TF_MITIGATION_FULL:
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index 1547bfacd40f..1b2a783f9ad9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -273,6 +273,7 @@ static int vmx_setup_l1d_flush(enum vmx_l1d_flush_state l1tf)
case L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF:
l1tf = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER;
break;
+ case L1TF_MITIGATION_AUTO:
case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOWARN:
case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH:
case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOSMT:
@@ -7704,6 +7705,7 @@ int vmx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)
case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOWARN:
/* 'I explicitly don't care' is set */
break;
+ case L1TF_MITIGATION_AUTO:
case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH:
case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOSMT:
case L1TF_MITIGATION_FULL:
--
2.34.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-04-18 16:17 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 65+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-04-18 16:17 [PATCH v5 00/16] Attack vector controls (part 1) David Kaplan
2025-04-18 16:17 ` [PATCH v5 01/16] x86/bugs: Restructure MDS mitigation David Kaplan
2025-04-18 20:42 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-04-20 21:00 ` Kaplan, David
2025-04-22 8:19 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-04-22 14:32 ` Kaplan, David
2025-04-22 17:25 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-05-02 10:33 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-04-18 16:17 ` [PATCH v5 02/16] x86/bugs: Restructure TAA mitigation David Kaplan
2025-04-19 12:36 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-04-20 21:03 ` Kaplan, David
2025-04-22 8:56 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-05-02 10:33 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-04-18 16:17 ` [PATCH v5 03/16] x86/bugs: Restructure MMIO mitigation David Kaplan
2025-04-24 20:19 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-04-24 20:31 ` Kaplan, David
2025-04-25 8:09 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-04-25 13:28 ` Kaplan, David
2025-04-26 11:22 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-05-02 10:33 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-04-18 16:17 ` [PATCH v5 04/16] x86/bugs: Restructure RFDS mitigation David Kaplan
2025-04-27 15:09 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-04-28 13:42 ` Kaplan, David
2025-05-02 10:33 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-04-18 16:17 ` [PATCH v5 05/16] x86/bugs: Remove md_clear_*_mitigation() David Kaplan
2025-05-02 10:33 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-04-18 16:17 ` [PATCH v5 06/16] x86/bugs: Restructure SRBDS mitigation David Kaplan
2025-05-02 10:33 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-04-18 16:17 ` [PATCH v5 07/16] x86/bugs: Restructure GDS mitigation David Kaplan
2025-05-02 10:33 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-04-18 16:17 ` [PATCH v5 08/16] x86/bugs: Restructure spectre_v1 mitigation David Kaplan
2025-05-02 10:33 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-04-18 16:17 ` [PATCH v5 09/16] x86/bugs: Allow retbleed=stuff only on Intel David Kaplan
2025-04-27 15:38 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-05-02 10:33 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-04-18 16:17 ` [PATCH v5 10/16] x86/bugs: Restructure retbleed mitigation David Kaplan
2025-04-28 18:59 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-04-28 20:55 ` Kaplan, David
2025-04-29 8:21 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-05-02 10:33 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-04-18 16:17 ` [PATCH v5 11/16] x86/bugs: Restructure spectre_v2_user mitigation David Kaplan
2025-04-29 8:47 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-04-29 14:11 ` Kaplan, David
2025-05-02 10:33 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-04-18 16:17 ` [PATCH v5 12/16] x86/bugs: Restructure BHI mitigation David Kaplan
2025-05-02 10:33 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-04-18 16:17 ` [PATCH v5 13/16] x86/bugs: Restructure spectre_v2 mitigation David Kaplan
2025-04-29 10:46 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-05-02 10:33 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-04-18 16:17 ` [PATCH v5 14/16] x86/bugs: Restructure SSB mitigation David Kaplan
2025-04-29 12:54 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-04-29 14:09 ` Kaplan, David
2025-05-02 10:33 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-04-18 16:17 ` David Kaplan [this message]
2025-05-02 10:33 ` [tip: x86/bugs] x86/bugs: Restructure L1TF mitigation tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-04-18 16:17 ` [PATCH v5 16/16] x86/bugs: Restructure SRSO mitigation David Kaplan
2025-04-29 16:50 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-04-29 17:18 ` Kaplan, David
2025-04-30 8:25 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-05-02 10:33 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-04-18 20:03 ` [PATCH v5 00/16] Attack vector controls (part 1) Ingo Molnar
2025-04-18 21:33 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-04-22 9:46 ` Ingo Molnar
2025-04-22 13:59 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-04-22 5:22 ` Josh Poimboeuf
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