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From: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>,
	Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>, <x86@kernel.org>,
	"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v5 06/16] x86/bugs: Restructure SRBDS mitigation
Date: Fri, 18 Apr 2025 11:17:11 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250418161721.1855190-7-david.kaplan@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250418161721.1855190-1-david.kaplan@amd.com>

Restructure SRBDS to use select/apply functions to create consistent
vulnerability handling.

Define new AUTO mitigation for SRBDS.

Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index ae6619416ce1..942db170eb4e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -72,6 +72,7 @@ static void __init rfds_select_mitigation(void);
 static void __init rfds_update_mitigation(void);
 static void __init rfds_apply_mitigation(void);
 static void __init srbds_select_mitigation(void);
+static void __init srbds_apply_mitigation(void);
 static void __init l1d_flush_select_mitigation(void);
 static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void);
 static void __init gds_select_mitigation(void);
@@ -225,6 +226,7 @@ void __init cpu_select_mitigations(void)
 	taa_apply_mitigation();
 	mmio_apply_mitigation();
 	rfds_apply_mitigation();
+	srbds_apply_mitigation();
 }
 
 /*
@@ -689,6 +691,7 @@ early_param("reg_file_data_sampling", rfds_parse_cmdline);
 
 enum srbds_mitigations {
 	SRBDS_MITIGATION_OFF,
+	SRBDS_MITIGATION_AUTO,
 	SRBDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED,
 	SRBDS_MITIGATION_FULL,
 	SRBDS_MITIGATION_TSX_OFF,
@@ -696,7 +699,7 @@ enum srbds_mitigations {
 };
 
 static enum srbds_mitigations srbds_mitigation __ro_after_init =
-	IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRBDS) ? SRBDS_MITIGATION_FULL : SRBDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
+	IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRBDS) ? SRBDS_MITIGATION_AUTO : SRBDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
 
 static const char * const srbds_strings[] = {
 	[SRBDS_MITIGATION_OFF]		= "Vulnerable",
@@ -747,8 +750,13 @@ void update_srbds_msr(void)
 
 static void __init srbds_select_mitigation(void)
 {
-	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SRBDS))
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SRBDS) || cpu_mitigations_off()) {
+		srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
 		return;
+	}
+
+	if (srbds_mitigation == SRBDS_MITIGATION_AUTO)
+		srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
 
 	/*
 	 * Check to see if this is one of the MDS_NO systems supporting TSX that
@@ -762,13 +770,17 @@ static void __init srbds_select_mitigation(void)
 		srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR;
 	else if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SRBDS_CTRL))
 		srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED;
-	else if (cpu_mitigations_off() || srbds_off)
+	else if (srbds_off)
 		srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
 
-	update_srbds_msr();
 	pr_info("%s\n", srbds_strings[srbds_mitigation]);
 }
 
+static void __init srbds_apply_mitigation(void)
+{
+	update_srbds_msr();
+}
+
 static int __init srbds_parse_cmdline(char *str)
 {
 	if (!str)
-- 
2.34.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2025-04-18 16:17 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 65+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-04-18 16:17 [PATCH v5 00/16] Attack vector controls (part 1) David Kaplan
2025-04-18 16:17 ` [PATCH v5 01/16] x86/bugs: Restructure MDS mitigation David Kaplan
2025-04-18 20:42   ` Borislav Petkov
2025-04-20 21:00     ` Kaplan, David
2025-04-22  8:19       ` Borislav Petkov
2025-04-22 14:32         ` Kaplan, David
2025-04-22 17:25           ` Borislav Petkov
2025-05-02 10:33   ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-04-18 16:17 ` [PATCH v5 02/16] x86/bugs: Restructure TAA mitigation David Kaplan
2025-04-19 12:36   ` Borislav Petkov
2025-04-20 21:03     ` Kaplan, David
2025-04-22  8:56       ` Borislav Petkov
2025-05-02 10:33   ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-04-18 16:17 ` [PATCH v5 03/16] x86/bugs: Restructure MMIO mitigation David Kaplan
2025-04-24 20:19   ` Borislav Petkov
2025-04-24 20:31     ` Kaplan, David
2025-04-25  8:09       ` Borislav Petkov
2025-04-25 13:28         ` Kaplan, David
2025-04-26 11:22           ` Borislav Petkov
2025-05-02 10:33   ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-04-18 16:17 ` [PATCH v5 04/16] x86/bugs: Restructure RFDS mitigation David Kaplan
2025-04-27 15:09   ` Borislav Petkov
2025-04-28 13:42     ` Kaplan, David
2025-05-02 10:33   ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-04-18 16:17 ` [PATCH v5 05/16] x86/bugs: Remove md_clear_*_mitigation() David Kaplan
2025-05-02 10:33   ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-04-18 16:17 ` David Kaplan [this message]
2025-05-02 10:33   ` [tip: x86/bugs] x86/bugs: Restructure SRBDS mitigation tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-04-18 16:17 ` [PATCH v5 07/16] x86/bugs: Restructure GDS mitigation David Kaplan
2025-05-02 10:33   ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-04-18 16:17 ` [PATCH v5 08/16] x86/bugs: Restructure spectre_v1 mitigation David Kaplan
2025-05-02 10:33   ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-04-18 16:17 ` [PATCH v5 09/16] x86/bugs: Allow retbleed=stuff only on Intel David Kaplan
2025-04-27 15:38   ` Borislav Petkov
2025-05-02 10:33   ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-04-18 16:17 ` [PATCH v5 10/16] x86/bugs: Restructure retbleed mitigation David Kaplan
2025-04-28 18:59   ` Borislav Petkov
2025-04-28 20:55     ` Kaplan, David
2025-04-29  8:21       ` Borislav Petkov
2025-05-02 10:33   ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-04-18 16:17 ` [PATCH v5 11/16] x86/bugs: Restructure spectre_v2_user mitigation David Kaplan
2025-04-29  8:47   ` Borislav Petkov
2025-04-29 14:11     ` Kaplan, David
2025-05-02 10:33   ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-04-18 16:17 ` [PATCH v5 12/16] x86/bugs: Restructure BHI mitigation David Kaplan
2025-05-02 10:33   ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-04-18 16:17 ` [PATCH v5 13/16] x86/bugs: Restructure spectre_v2 mitigation David Kaplan
2025-04-29 10:46   ` Borislav Petkov
2025-05-02 10:33   ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-04-18 16:17 ` [PATCH v5 14/16] x86/bugs: Restructure SSB mitigation David Kaplan
2025-04-29 12:54   ` Borislav Petkov
2025-04-29 14:09     ` Kaplan, David
2025-05-02 10:33   ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-04-18 16:17 ` [PATCH v5 15/16] x86/bugs: Restructure L1TF mitigation David Kaplan
2025-05-02 10:33   ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-04-18 16:17 ` [PATCH v5 16/16] x86/bugs: Restructure SRSO mitigation David Kaplan
2025-04-29 16:50   ` Borislav Petkov
2025-04-29 17:18     ` Kaplan, David
2025-04-30  8:25       ` Borislav Petkov
2025-05-02 10:33   ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-04-18 20:03 ` [PATCH v5 00/16] Attack vector controls (part 1) Ingo Molnar
2025-04-18 21:33   ` Borislav Petkov
2025-04-22  9:46     ` Ingo Molnar
2025-04-22 13:59       ` Borislav Petkov
2025-04-22  5:22 ` Josh Poimboeuf

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