From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
To: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de,
luto@kernel.org, peterz@infradead.org,
sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com, aarcange@redhat.com,
ak@linux.intel.com, dan.j.williams@intel.com, david@redhat.com,
hpa@zytor.com, jgross@suse.com, jmattson@google.com,
joro@8bytes.org, jpoimboe@redhat.com, knsathya@kernel.org,
pbonzini@redhat.com, sdeep@vmware.com, seanjc@google.com,
tony.luck@intel.com, vkuznets@redhat.com, wanpengli@tencent.com,
x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCHv3 02/32] x86/coco: Add API to handle encryption mask
Date: Tue, 22 Feb 2022 01:28:56 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220221222856.c6b74b3n3fwqe6vy@black.fi.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <7ebd6ba1-85a4-6fee-c897-22ed108ac8b7@intel.com>
On Mon, Feb 21, 2022 at 11:28:16AM -0800, Dave Hansen wrote:
> I'm just a bit confused why *this* was chosen as the cc_whatever() hook.
> Just like the mask function, it has one spot where it gets used:
>
> +#define pgprot_encrypted(prot) __pgprot(cc_mkenc(pgprot_val(prot)))
> +#define pgprot_decrypted(prot) __pgprot(cc_mkdec(pgprot_val(prot)))
>
> So, why bother having another level of abstraction?
>
> Why don't we just have:
>
> pgprot_t cc_mkenc(pgprot prot)
> pgprot_t cc_mkenc(pgprot prot)
>
> and *no* pgprot_{en,de}crypted()?
Okay. Let me try this.
> >>> +out:
> >>> physical_mask &= ~sme_me_mask;
> >>> + if (sme_me_mask)
> >>> + cc_init(CC_VENDOR_AMD, sme_me_mask);
> >>> }
> >>
> >> I don't think you need to mop it up here, but where does this leave
> >> sme_me_mask?
> >
> > I think sme_me_mask still can be useful to indicate that the code is only
> > relevant for AMD context.
>
> Shouldn't we be able to tell that because something is in an
> AMD-specific file, function or #ifdef?
Sure. But for some code it is not immidiately obvious that it is
AMD-specific. Like from file name alone, mem_encrypt_identity.c doesn't
look like it is only AMD thing.
Anyway, I think getting rid of sme_me_mask is out of scope for the
patchset.
> Is there ever a time where sme_me_mask is populated by cc_mask is not?
Yes. Decompression code. (I know it doesn't affect bottom line much).
> This seems like it is just making a copy of sme_me_mask.
>
> sme_me_mask does look quite AMD-specialized, like its assembly
> manipulation. Even if it's just a copy of cc_mask, it would be nice to
> call that out so the relationship is crystal clear.
--
Kirill A. Shutemov
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-02-21 22:28 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 71+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-02-18 16:16 [PATCHv3 00/32] TDX Guest: TDX core support Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-18 16:16 ` [PATCHv3 01/32] x86/mm: Fix warning on build with X86_MEM_ENCRYPT=y Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-18 19:39 ` Dave Hansen
2022-02-18 16:16 ` [PATCHv3 02/32] x86/coco: Add API to handle encryption mask Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-18 20:36 ` Dave Hansen
2022-02-18 21:33 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-18 21:58 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-02-19 0:13 ` [PATCHv3.1 2/32] x86/coco: Explicitly declare type of confidential computing platform Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-19 0:13 ` [PATCHv3.1 2.1/2] x86/coco: Add API to handle encryption mask Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-21 18:31 ` Tom Lendacky
2022-02-21 22:14 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-21 21:05 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-02-21 22:10 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-21 22:36 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-02-21 23:25 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-22 13:31 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-02-21 11:07 ` [PATCHv3.1 2/32] x86/coco: Explicitly declare type of confidential computing platform Borislav Petkov
2022-02-21 11:44 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-21 12:05 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-02-21 13:52 ` Wei Liu
2022-02-21 20:20 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-02-21 19:28 ` [PATCHv3 02/32] x86/coco: Add API to handle encryption mask Dave Hansen
2022-02-21 19:49 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-02-21 22:21 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-21 22:56 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-02-21 23:18 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-22 13:28 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-02-21 22:28 ` Kirill A. Shutemov [this message]
2022-02-22 11:03 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-22 13:37 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-02-22 13:52 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-18 16:16 ` [PATCHv3 03/32] x86/tdx: Detect running as a TDX guest in early boot Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-18 21:07 ` Dave Hansen
2022-02-20 15:01 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-18 16:16 ` [PATCHv3 04/32] x86/tdx: Provide common base for SEAMCALL and TDCALL C wrappers Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-18 16:16 ` [PATCHv3 05/32] x86/tdx: Add __tdx_module_call() and __tdx_hypercall() helper functions Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-18 16:16 ` [PATCHv3 06/32] x86/tdx: Extend the confidential computing API to support TDX guests Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-18 16:16 ` [PATCHv3 07/32] x86/tdx: Exclude shared bit from __PHYSICAL_MASK Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-18 16:16 ` [PATCHv3 08/32] x86/traps: Add #VE support for TDX guest Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-22 7:19 ` Dingji Li
2022-02-22 11:11 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-18 16:16 ` [PATCHv3 09/32] x86/tdx: Add HLT support for TDX guests Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-18 16:16 ` [PATCHv3 10/32] x86/tdx: Add MSR " Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-18 16:16 ` [PATCHv3 11/32] x86/tdx: Handle CPUID via #VE Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-18 16:16 ` [PATCHv3 12/32] x86/tdx: Handle in-kernel MMIO Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-18 16:16 ` [PATCHv3 13/32] x86/tdx: Detect TDX at early kernel decompression time Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-21 11:37 ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2022-02-21 13:53 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-18 16:17 ` [PATCHv3 14/32] x86: Adjust types used in port I/O helpers Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-18 16:17 ` [PATCHv3 15/32] x86: Consolidate " Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-18 16:17 ` [PATCHv3 16/32] x86/boot: Allow to hook up alternative " Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-21 20:04 ` Tom Lendacky
2022-02-21 22:02 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-22 1:25 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2022-02-18 16:17 ` [PATCHv3 17/32] x86/boot/compressed: Support TDX guest port I/O at decompression time Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-18 16:17 ` [PATCHv3 18/32] x86/tdx: Add port I/O emulation Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-18 16:17 ` [PATCHv3 19/32] x86/tdx: Handle early boot port I/O Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-18 16:17 ` [PATCHv3 20/32] x86/tdx: Wire up KVM hypercalls Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-18 16:17 ` [PATCHv3 21/32] x86/boot: Add a trampoline for booting APs via firmware handoff Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-18 16:17 ` [PATCHv3 22/32] x86/acpi, x86/boot: Add multiprocessor wake-up support Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-18 16:17 ` [PATCHv3 23/32] x86/boot: Set CR0.NE early and keep it set during the boot Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-18 16:17 ` [PATCHv3 24/32] x86/boot: Avoid #VE during boot for TDX platforms Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-18 16:17 ` [PATCHv3 25/32] x86/topology: Disable CPU online/offline control for TDX guests Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-18 16:17 ` [PATCHv3 26/32] x86/tdx: Make pages shared in ioremap() Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-18 16:17 ` [PATCHv3 27/32] x86/mm/cpa: Generailize __set_memory_enc_pgtable() Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-21 15:46 ` Brijesh Singh
2022-02-18 16:17 ` [PATCHv3 28/32] x86/mm/cpa: Add support for TDX shared memory Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-18 16:17 ` [PATCHv3 29/32] x86/kvm: Use bounce buffers for TD guest Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-18 16:17 ` [PATCHv3 30/32] x86/tdx: ioapic: Add shared bit for IOAPIC base address Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-18 16:17 ` [PATCHv3 31/32] ACPICA: Avoid cache flush on TDX guest Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-02-18 16:17 ` [PATCHv3 32/32] Documentation/x86: Document TDX kernel architecture Kirill A. Shutemov
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