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From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
To: x86@kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, peterz@infradead.org,
	David.Kaplan@amd.com, Andrew.Cooper3@citrix.com,
	jpoimboe@kernel.org, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org,
	nik.borisov@suse.com
Subject: [PATCH v2 09/11] x86/cpu/kvm: Provide UNTRAIN_RET_VM
Date: Mon, 14 Aug 2023 13:44:35 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230814121149.109557833@infradead.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230814114426.057251214@infradead.org>

Similar to how it doesn't make sense to have UNTRAIN_RET have two
untrain calls, it also doesn't make sense for VMEXIT to have an extra
IBPB call.

This cures VMEXIT doing potentially unret+IBPB or double IBPB.
Also, the (SEV) VMEXIT case seems to have been overlooked.

Redefine the meaning of the synthetic IBPB flags to:

 - ENTRY_IBPB     -- issue IBPB on entry  (was: entry + VMEXIT)
 - IBPB_ON_VMEXIT -- issue IBPB on VMEXIT

And have 'retbleed=ibpb' set *BOTH* feature flags to ensure it retains
the previous behaviour and issues IBPB on entry+VMEXIT.

The new 'srso=ibpb_vmexit' option only sets IBPB_ON_VMEXIT.

Create UNTRAIN_RET_VM specifically for the VMEXIT case, and have that
check IBPB_ON_VMEXIT.

All this avoids having the VMEXIT case having to check both ENTRY_IBPB
and IBPB_ON_VMEXIT and simplifies the alternatives.

Fixes: fb3bd914b3ec ("x86/srso: Add a Speculative RAS Overflow mitigation")
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h |   11 +++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c           |    1 +
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S           |    7 ++-----
 3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -299,6 +299,17 @@
 #endif
 .endm
 
+.macro UNTRAIN_RET_VM
+#if defined(CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY) || defined(CONFIG_CPU_IBPB_ENTRY) || \
+	defined(CONFIG_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING) || defined(CONFIG_CPU_SRSO)
+	VALIDATE_UNRET_END
+	ALTERNATIVE_3 "",						\
+		      CALL_UNTRAIN_RET, X86_FEATURE_UNRET,		\
+		      "call entry_ibpb", X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT,	\
+		      __stringify(RESET_CALL_DEPTH), X86_FEATURE_CALL_DEPTH
+#endif
+.endm
+
 .macro UNTRAIN_RET_FROM_CALL
 #if defined(CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY) || defined(CONFIG_CPU_IBPB_ENTRY) || \
 	defined(CONFIG_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -1045,6 +1045,7 @@ static void __init retbleed_select_mitig
 
 	case RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB:
 		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB);
+		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT);
 		mitigate_smt = true;
 		break;
 
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S
@@ -222,10 +222,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__svm_vcpu_run)
 	 * because interrupt handlers won't sanitize 'ret' if the return is
 	 * from the kernel.
 	 */
-	UNTRAIN_RET
-
-	/* SRSO */
-	ALTERNATIVE "", "call entry_ibpb", X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT
+	UNTRAIN_RET_VM
 
 	/*
 	 * Clear all general purpose registers except RSP and RAX to prevent
@@ -362,7 +359,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__svm_sev_es_vcpu_run)
 	 * because interrupt handlers won't sanitize RET if the return is
 	 * from the kernel.
 	 */
-	UNTRAIN_RET
+	UNTRAIN_RET_VM
 
 	/* "Pop" @spec_ctrl_intercepted.  */
 	pop %_ASM_BX



  parent reply	other threads:[~2023-08-14 12:20 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 74+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-08-14 11:44 [PATCH v2 00/11] Fix up SRSO stuff Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-14 11:44 ` [PATCH v2 01/11] x86/cpu: Fixup __x86_return_thunk Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-16  7:55   ` [tip: x86/urgent] x86/cpu: Fix __x86_return_thunk symbol type tip-bot2 for Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-14 11:44 ` [PATCH v2 02/11] x86/cpu: Fix up srso_safe_ret() and __x86_return_thunk() Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-16  7:55   ` [tip: x86/urgent] " tip-bot2 for Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-14 11:44 ` [PATCH v2 03/11] objtool/x86: Fix SRSO mess Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-14 12:54   ` Andrew.Cooper3
2023-08-16  7:55   ` [tip: x86/urgent] " tip-bot2 for Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-16 11:59     ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-16 20:31       ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-16 22:08         ` [PATCH] objtool/x86: Fixup frame-pointer vs rethunk Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-16 22:22           ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-17  8:39       ` [tip: x86/urgent] " tip-bot2 for Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-14 11:44 ` [PATCH v2 04/11] x86/alternative: Make custom return thunk unconditional Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-16  7:55   ` [tip: x86/urgent] " tip-bot2 for Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-14 11:44 ` [PATCH v2 05/11] x86/cpu: Clean up SRSO return thunk mess Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-14 13:02   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-14 17:48   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-15 21:29   ` Nathan Chancellor
2023-08-15 22:43     ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-16  7:38       ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-16 14:52         ` Nathan Chancellor
2023-08-16 15:08           ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-16  7:55   ` [tip: x86/urgent] " tip-bot2 for Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-16 18:58     ` Nathan Chancellor
2023-08-16 19:24       ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-16 19:30         ` Nathan Chancellor
2023-08-16 19:42           ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-16 19:57             ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-16 21:20   ` tip-bot2 for Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-14 11:44 ` [PATCH v2 06/11] x86/cpu: Rename original retbleed methods Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-14 19:41   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-16  7:55   ` [tip: x86/urgent] " tip-bot2 for Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-16 21:20   ` tip-bot2 for Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-14 11:44 ` [PATCH v2 07/11] x86/cpu: Rename srso_(.*)_alias to srso_alias_\1 Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-16  7:55   ` [tip: x86/urgent] " tip-bot2 for Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-16 21:20   ` tip-bot2 for Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-14 11:44 ` [PATCH v2 08/11] x86/cpu: Cleanup the untrain mess Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-16  7:55   ` [tip: x86/urgent] " tip-bot2 for Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-16 21:20   ` tip-bot2 for Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-14 11:44 ` Peter Zijlstra [this message]
2023-08-16  7:55   ` [tip: x86/urgent] x86/cpu/kvm: Provide UNTRAIN_RET_VM tip-bot2 for Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-16 21:20   ` tip-bot2 for Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-14 11:44 ` [PATCH v2 10/11] x86/alternatives: Simplify ALTERNATIVE_n() Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-15 20:49   ` Nikolay Borisov
2023-08-15 22:44     ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-09-07  8:31   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-09-07 11:09     ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-09-07 11:11       ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-09-07 11:16         ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-09-07 15:06       ` Borislav Petkov
2023-09-07 15:30         ` Borislav Petkov
2023-09-09  7:50           ` Borislav Petkov
2023-09-09  9:25             ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-09-09  9:42               ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-09-10 14:42               ` Borislav Petkov
2023-09-12  9:27                 ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-09-12  9:44                   ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-09-13  4:37                     ` Borislav Petkov
2023-09-13  8:46                       ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-09-13 14:38                         ` Borislav Petkov
2023-09-13 16:14                           ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-09-15  7:46                           ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-09-15  7:51                             ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-09-15 12:05                               ` Borislav Petkov
2023-09-13  4:24                   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-14 11:44 ` [PATCH v2 11/11] x86/cpu: Use fancy alternatives to get rid of entry_untrain_ret() Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-14 16:44 ` [PATCH v2 00/11] Fix up SRSO stuff Borislav Petkov
2023-08-14 19:51   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-14 19:57     ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-14 20:01     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-14 20:09       ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-15 14:26         ` [PATCH] x86/srso: Explain the untraining sequences a bit more Borislav Petkov
2023-08-15 15:41           ` Nikolay Borisov

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