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From: Jon Kohler <jon@nutanix.com>
To: seanjc@google.com, pbonzini@redhat.com, tglx@linutronix.de,
	mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com,
	x86@kernel.org, hpa@zytor.com, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>,
	"Jon Kohler" <jon@nutanix.com>,
	"Sergey Dyasli" <sergey.dyasli@nutanix.com>
Subject: [RFC PATCH 09/18] KVM: x86/mmu: Extend access bitfield in kvm_mmu_page_role
Date: Thu, 13 Mar 2025 13:36:48 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250313203702.575156-10-jon@nutanix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250313203702.575156-1-jon@nutanix.com>

From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>

Extend access bitfield from 3 to 4 in kvm_mmu_page_role, where the 4th
bit will be used to track user executable pages with Intel MBEC.

Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Co-developed-by: Jon Kohler <jon@nutanix.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Kohler <jon@nutanix.com>
Co-developed-by: Sergey Dyasli <sergey.dyasli@nutanix.com>
Signed-off-by: Sergey Dyasli <sergey.dyasli@nutanix.com>

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 10 +++++-----
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c          |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmutrace.h     |  8 +++++++-
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h         |  4 +++-
 4 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index 192233eb557a..e8193de802a7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -312,10 +312,10 @@ struct kvm_kernel_irq_routing_entry;
  * the number of unique SPs that can theoretically be created is 2^n, where n
  * is the number of bits that are used to compute the role.
  *
- * But, even though there are 19 bits in the mask below, not all combinations
+ * But, even though there are 20 bits in the mask below, not all combinations
  * of modes and flags are possible:
  *
- *   - invalid shadow pages are not accounted, so the bits are effectively 18
+ *   - invalid shadow pages are not accounted, so the bits are effectively 19
  *
  *   - quadrant will only be used if has_4_byte_gpte=1 (non-PAE paging);
  *     execonly and ad_disabled are only used for nested EPT which has
@@ -330,7 +330,7 @@ struct kvm_kernel_irq_routing_entry;
  *     cr0_wp=0, therefore these three bits only give rise to 5 possibilities.
  *
  * Therefore, the maximum number of possible upper-level shadow pages for a
- * single gfn is a bit less than 2^13.
+ * single gfn is a bit less than 2^14.
  */
 union kvm_mmu_page_role {
 	u32 word;
@@ -339,7 +339,7 @@ union kvm_mmu_page_role {
 		unsigned has_4_byte_gpte:1;
 		unsigned quadrant:2;
 		unsigned direct:1;
-		unsigned access:3;
+		unsigned access:4;
 		unsigned invalid:1;
 		unsigned efer_nx:1;
 		unsigned cr0_wp:1;
@@ -348,7 +348,7 @@ union kvm_mmu_page_role {
 		unsigned ad_disabled:1;
 		unsigned guest_mode:1;
 		unsigned passthrough:1;
-		unsigned :5;
+		unsigned:4;
 
 		/*
 		 * This is left at the top of the word so that
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
index 8e853a5fc867..791413b93589 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
@@ -1915,7 +1915,7 @@ static bool kvm_sync_page_check(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
 	 */
 	const union kvm_mmu_page_role sync_role_ign = {
 		.level = 0xf,
-		.access = 0x7,
+		.access = 0xf,
 		.quadrant = 0x3,
 		.passthrough = 0x1,
 	};
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmutrace.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmutrace.h
index f35a830ce469..2511fe64ca01 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmutrace.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmutrace.h
@@ -22,10 +22,16 @@
 	__entry->root_count = sp->root_count;		\
 	__entry->unsync = sp->unsync;
 
+/*
+ * X == ACC_EXEC_MASK: executable without guest_exec_control and only
+ *                     supervisor execute with guest exec control
+ * x == ACC_USER_EXEC_MASK: user execute with guest exec control
+ */
 #define KVM_MMU_PAGE_PRINTK() ({				        \
 	const char *saved_ptr = trace_seq_buffer_ptr(p);		\
 	static const char *access_str[] = {			        \
-		"---", "--x", "w--", "w-x", "-u-", "-ux", "wu-", "wux"  \
+		"----", "---X", "-w--", "-w-X", "--u-", "--uX", "-wu-", "-wuX", \
+		"x---", "x--X", "xw--", "xw-X", "xu--", "x-uX", "xwu-", "xwuX"	\
 	};							        \
 	union kvm_mmu_page_role role;				        \
 								        \
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h
index 71d6fe28fafc..d9e22133b6d0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h
@@ -45,7 +45,9 @@ static_assert(SPTE_TDP_AD_ENABLED == 0);
 #define ACC_EXEC_MASK    1
 #define ACC_WRITE_MASK   PT_WRITABLE_MASK
 #define ACC_USER_MASK    PT_USER_MASK
-#define ACC_ALL          (ACC_EXEC_MASK | ACC_WRITE_MASK | ACC_USER_MASK)
+#define ACC_USER_EXEC_MASK (1ULL << 3)
+#define ACC_ALL          (ACC_EXEC_MASK | ACC_WRITE_MASK | ACC_USER_MASK | \
+			  ACC_USER_EXEC_MASK)
 
 /* The mask for the R/X bits in EPT PTEs */
 #define SPTE_EPT_READABLE_MASK			0x1ull
-- 
2.43.0


  parent reply	other threads:[~2025-03-13 20:10 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 75+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-03-13 20:36 [RFC PATCH 00/18] KVM: VMX: Introduce Intel Mode-Based Execute Control (MBEC) Jon Kohler
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 01/18] KVM: VMX: Remove EPT_VIOLATIONS_ACC_*_BIT defines Jon Kohler
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 02/18] KVM: nVMX: Decouple EPT RWX bits from EPT Violation protection bits Jon Kohler
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 03/18] KVM: x86: Add module parameter for Intel MBEC Jon Kohler
2025-05-12 18:08   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-05-13  2:18     ` Jon Kohler
2025-05-13  7:57       ` Shah, Amit
2025-12-23  4:15       ` Jon Kohler
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 04/18] KVM: VMX: add cpu_has_vmx_mbec helper Jon Kohler
2025-05-12 18:14   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-05-13  2:17     ` Jon Kohler
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 05/18] KVM: x86: Add pt_guest_exec_control to kvm_vcpu_arch Jon Kohler
2025-04-22  6:27   ` Chao Gao
2025-05-12 18:15   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-12-23  4:15     ` Jon Kohler
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 06/18] KVM: VMX: Wire up Intel MBEC enable/disable logic Jon Kohler
2025-04-22  7:06   ` Chao Gao
2025-05-12 18:23   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-05-13  2:16     ` Jon Kohler
2025-05-13 13:28       ` Sean Christopherson
2025-05-14 11:14         ` Shah, Amit
2025-05-14 12:55           ` Sean Christopherson
2025-06-16  9:27             ` Shah, Amit
2025-06-17 14:13               ` Sean Christopherson
2025-07-09 13:40                 ` Shah, Amit
2025-12-23  4:15     ` Jon Kohler
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 07/18] KVM: VMX: Define VMX_EPT_USER_EXECUTABLE_MASK Jon Kohler
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 08/18] KVM: x86/mmu: Remove SPTE_PERM_MASK Jon Kohler
2025-03-13 20:36 ` Jon Kohler [this message]
2025-05-12 18:32   ` [RFC PATCH 09/18] KVM: x86/mmu: Extend access bitfield in kvm_mmu_page_role Sean Christopherson
2025-05-13  2:14     ` Jon Kohler
2025-12-23  4:15       ` Jon Kohler
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 10/18] KVM: VMX: Extend EPT Violation protection bits Jon Kohler
2025-05-12 18:37   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-12-23  4:15     ` Jon Kohler
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 11/18] KVM: VMX: Enhance EPT violation handler for PROT_USER_EXEC Jon Kohler
2025-05-12 18:54   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-12-23  4:15     ` Jon Kohler
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 12/18] KVM: x86/mmu: Introduce shadow_ux_mask Jon Kohler
2025-04-23  3:06   ` Chao Gao
2025-05-12 19:13   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-12-23  4:15     ` Jon Kohler
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 13/18] KVM: x86/mmu: Adjust SPTE_MMIO_ALLOWED_MASK to understand MBEC Jon Kohler
2025-04-23  5:37   ` Chao Gao
2025-05-12 19:37   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-05-13  2:11     ` Jon Kohler
2025-12-23  4:15     ` Jon Kohler
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 14/18] KVM: x86/mmu: Extend is_executable_pte " Jon Kohler
2025-04-23  6:16   ` Chao Gao
2025-05-12 21:16   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-05-13  2:09     ` Jon Kohler
2025-12-23  4:15       ` Jon Kohler
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 15/18] KVM: x86/mmu: Extend make_spte " Jon Kohler
2025-05-12 21:29   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-05-13  2:04     ` Jon Kohler
2025-05-13 17:54       ` Sean Christopherson
2025-12-23  4:15     ` Jon Kohler
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 16/18] KVM: nVMX: Setup Intel MBEC in nested secondary controls Jon Kohler
2025-05-12 21:32   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-12-23  4:15     ` Jon Kohler
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 17/18] KVM: VMX: Allow MBEC with EVMCS Jon Kohler
2025-05-12 21:35   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-05-13  2:01     ` Jon Kohler
2025-12-23  4:16       ` Jon Kohler
2025-03-13 20:36 ` [RFC PATCH 18/18] KVM: x86: Enable module parameter for MBEC Jon Kohler
2025-04-15  9:29 ` [RFC PATCH 00/18] KVM: VMX: Introduce Intel Mode-Based Execute Control (MBEC) Mickaël Salaün
2025-04-15 14:43   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-05-12 15:26     ` Jon Kohler
2025-04-15 14:43   ` Jon Kohler
2025-04-16 15:44     ` Mickaël Salaün
2025-04-23 13:54 ` Adrian-Ken Rueegsegger
2025-05-12 15:26   ` Jon Kohler
2025-05-12 21:46 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-05-13  1:59   ` Jon Kohler
2025-12-23  4:17   ` Jon Kohler

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